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The three chapters of this thesis deal with three distinct
problems in the philosophy of linguistics'. Cha,pter 1 examines
the theory of case grammar, Charles Fillmore's proposed revision
of the standard theory of transformational grammar. Grounds are
given for rejecting Fillmore's semantic, syntactic, and methodo-
logical arguments in support of case grammar, and some semantic
'and syntactic arguments _against case grammar are advanced.
Chapter 2 concerns Chomsky's claim that children have innate
knowledge of "the principles of universal grammar, and-make use of
that knowledge in learning langu.ages. The author rejects an
argument to the effect that innate knowledge would require, but
not have, justification, as well as an argument to the effect
- that certain of our purport~d innate beliefs lack truth-value~
and fail to qualify as innate knowledge for that reason. Cer-
tain difficul ties are seen, however, in the -implication tha t '\"ie
innately believe the principles of universal grammar I The Appen-
dix questions" the explanatory value of the tacit-knowledge theory.
Chapter 3 defends rationalist ,claims about the psychology of
language acqui~ition. (Chapter 2, by way of contrast, is abo~t
rationalist claims in epistemology.) It has "been charged that
rationalism in learning theory generates a vicious infinite
regress; that rationalist theories of learnirig are.empirically
illdisti;nguishable from .empiricist learning theories; and that
a new, enriched theory of inductive inference invalidates the
rationalist critique of ~mpiricist learriing theory. All three of
the~e charges are rejec~ed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 1 .
A ~RIEF AGAINS~ CASE GRAMMAR
6In this paper I wish to review some of the arguments which
-Charles Fillmore has put forward in support of the theory of case
grammar. I hope that I have not neglected any argument which
case granrnarians regard as weighty and significant, and that none
of the arguments I discuss will strike them as -insignificant or
readily dispensable. Fillmore's writi~gs are typically not
po~emical; they tend simply to explain how this.or 'that lin-
guistic phenomenon may be described within' the framework of case
"_gramrnar, wi thou t examinil!g in detail the question of whether (or
how economically) the standard theory of transforrna tional g:rammar
could describe" the same phenomenon. Fillmore leaves h·is readers
to draw their own conclusions about what con~titutes evidence for
- case grammar and against th~ standard theory, and ~~out the.
relative importance of. the various arguments'for case- grammar.
If my judgment in these matters has been faulty, I rely on the
advocates of case grammar to set the record straight.,
Fillmore has argued that "subject/object ll grammars suffer
from,ce~tain semantic s~ortcomings. I shall argue, in. section I,
tha_t Fillmore has ignored certain crucia'l aspects of Katzian
sem~~tic theory, and tha~ when th~se ~spects of semant~c theory
ar~ taken into account,' the alleged deficiencies disappear. I
shall also point out two sorts of defects in the semantic theory
associated with case grammar. Section II deals with various
syntactic arguments intended to snow that the theory of case
grammar is preferable to the standard theory. Finally, in"sec-
tion III, I shall discuss ~ sort of methodological argument for
case grammar, to the effect that case gran~ars (unlike those
t 7
..
provided under the ,standard theory) properly distinguish facts
a"bout sernantic structure, fro"m' fa-~t's about surface syntax.
I. CASES IN SEMANTICS
'It is a well-known feature of the standard theory that it
uses tree graphs to present' two kinds of information about deep
structures. In addition to providing information on the .grarn-
,.'
matical ~ategories of the various constituents in a sentence, a
tree diagram indicates what grammatical relations hold between
constituents~ For exampl~, besides
- ,NP Aux
N
Ibeast• Alj .terrible
Pj\S.
bt ~
Tense
IPast
N
.J
rnern-sahib
Det
f
our
Fig'ure 1
telling us that the p11ras,e ~ ~-sahib is 'a noun ,phrase, 'Figure
1 tells us ·that this phrase bears the subject relation to the VP
in the sentenCe there represen'ted. The phrase tha t terrible be~st
can similarly be recognized as the direct object of the sentence
ylhose de'ep structure is represented by t.his tree diagram.
This kind of relational information is derivable from tree
graphs by virtu~ of certain definitions laid down by Chomsky
8(1965,' 69-74). One of these definitions states that the sUbj~ct
,of a sent~nce is that noun phrase which is dominated by , the NP
node which lies directly under the node Si another' definition
tells us that the NP node immediately dominated by the node VP is
the direct obj ect NP -node. Th'us if a sentence is to, have a deep
structure subject, in Chomsky's sense, there must be a node NP
which, is immediately dominated by s; 'sim~larly, if the" deep
structure, tree of a sentence does not contain a node NP which is
'directly dominated by VP, then th~t sentence does'not have a
direct object in Chomsky's sense.,
The principal function of grammatical relat'ions in' deep
structure, under the s-tanda'rd theory, is to direct the .,proce,ss. of
semantic interpretation. without information
(1) That terrible beast was ~i11ed by our mem-sahib •
.concerning granuna tical relations in deep ·structure, we would be
,'\lnable to determine whether it was the lady or the tiger that
perished in ~he encounter described by sentence (1). For purposes
of sernantic interpretation, the fact that the, phrase that terrible
beast is the topic, or surface structure sUbject, of sentence (1),
is of little consequence.
(2) *Him was killed by she.
(3) He was killed by her;.-
Information' about grammatical relations in surface structure is
important in assigning 'the proper case features or morphemes to
constituents in surface structure, as sehtences (.2) and (3)·
illu~trate, but the standard theory claims semantic relevance
9primarily for grammatical relations at the level of deep structure.
Now Fillmore has argued that even at the level. of deep struc-
. ture, the grammatical relation terms subject· and direct object,
as defined by Chomsky, are inadequate to the needs of a semantic
-theory for English. First, Fillmore (1966, 363) observes that
the deep subject of one sentence may
(4) The door will open. l
(5) The janitor will open the door.
-have the same semantic role as the deep object of another sentence.
In sentences (4 ) and (5) , for example, "there is a semantically
relevant relation between the door and open that is the same in
the tlATO sentences, in spite of the fact that the door·is the sub-
-ject of the. so-called intransitive verb and .the object of the 80-
-c~lled transitiv~ verb~. To anticipate, the semantic role of the
door in both these sentences is what Fillmor~ terms the Objective
ca·se e Evid'entl'y the distinction between su.bject and object in
deep structure does not always reflect a semantic difference.
Otherwise put, if we retain this distinction in deep structure,
then the semantic component will have to neutralize this distinc-
tion when it interprets pairs of sentences like (4) and (5).
On tlle other hand, Fillmore argues that both the
(6) a. The boy slapped the girl.
b,. The boy fell down.
c. The boy received a blow.
d. The boy has a toothache.
e. The boy has b'lue eyes.
------- ~ /
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f. The boy c=· 4is appearanceJ shocked ,2me.
.(7 ) a. I smas'hed the pumpki~•
b. I grew the pumpkin.
c. I like the pumpkin.
d. 'r imagined .the pumpkin •
e. I made the pumpkin into a mask.
f. I made a mask out of the pumpkin.
,
'subject relation and the direct object relation may correspo,nd to
any 0'£ a number of distinc,t semantic re-lations, depending on the
verb and on other constituents in the sentence. Commenting on
. -
sentences ,(6) a-~, Fillmor~ .(1~70, 252-253) writes~ II •.•• the
semantic role of deep structure subjects appears not to be univ-
- . ocal .- •• The involvement of ,the entity named by the subject NP ., __
appears to be quite different in each 6a~e ••• there appears to be
no common notional property of I subjectne.ss I which semantic
des~riptions of these sen~ences can' exploit. "- Sim~larly, sen-
. tences (7) a-f are intended to show that lithe direct object rela-
tion is not semantically univocal II (Fillmore 1970, 255),.
To anticipate again, the sUbject NP the boy of (6) is seman-
tically an -Agent in (6)_ a, .an Object 'in (6) b, a Da'tive, or
Experiencer in (6) d, and an Instrument in (6) f. The-direct
object of (7) a-e, the pumpki~, is Objective in (7) a, 'but Facti-
·tive or Goal in (7) b. Each of these two gramrnatic~l relations,
then, hides a multiplicity of distinct semantic roles. To say of
the phrase the boy only that ~t bears the subject rel~tion to
"each of the sentences (6) a-f is to obscure the diversity which
11
~n fact characterizes the relations between this phrase and its
containing sentences on the semantic level.
Subject Object
\1
R~
~
Subject
R R 'R 'R R R
abc d e f
.Figure 2
Object
R. R R R R R
J. j k l'ID,n
Figure 2 provides,~ schematic summary of Fillmore's argument
thus far. He has presented evidence that the semantic component,
in. mapping grammatical r~lations into semantic ones, m~st on some
occasions map the grammatical subject relation and the grariunatical
object. relation into exactly the same semantic role, say R .•
. . ~ .
,Moreover, it appears that the subject relation m~y be mapped into
any of ~ half-dozen or so semantic roles, and the same appLies to
the objec"t r~lation.
Havi~g shown that the mapping from gramma~ical relations to
semantic relations is neither one-to~one nor functional, Fillmore
proposes to change the form of the base rules so as to mark the
semantic roles of constituents directly in deep structu~e. Deep
.~~ructures·will no longer contain SUbjects or objects in Chomsky's
sense, so no formal mechanism will be needed to map th~se gram-
-matical relations into the semantic roles, during the process of
sernantic interpretation. Specifically, Fillmore (1968, 24)
(8 ) a. S ---;>NP + Aux + VP'
b • Vp~V (l{P)
(9 ) .a. . S~ Modal,ity. + Proposition
b.
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Proposition7 V + C1 + • •• + Cn"
. proposes to replace the usual phrase structure rules (8) a-b with
the rule (9) a and the rule schema (9) b. Clearly,'no sentence
generated by Fillmore's rules will contain a subject in deep
structure, in Chomsky's sense, since ~y rule (9) a the node S
will never immediately domi?ate an NP node. Similarly, Fillmore's
base will not generate "ahy deep struqture·objects, since Chomsky
defined the object relation in terms of the node VP, and this
,node will not appear at all in any of Fillmore's deep structures.
The rule schema (9) b calls for a little explanatlonm Each
of the C 's in this rule schema stands for one or another case"
i
symbol, representing one of the semantic roles~ The .schema tells
'us that in ~ deep- (case) structure, the node Prop inunediately
-: dominates' the ,node V, fol'lo~ed by a· string of one or more case
, symbols. No case symbol may occur more than once directly und'er
a given Prop node. 3
The list· of cases now available for use 'in connection wi th
rule schema (9) b is as' follows: Agent, Experiencer, Instrument,
Object, Source, Goal, Loc.ation, Time, and Path (Fillmore 1'971,
42, 50-51). The order of cases on' this list is significant; tithe
left-to-right order of the cases in the deep structure represen-
'tation of individual sentences" must reflect the order imposed by
this list, since in particular sentences it is lithe leftmost noun
'phrase in the list" '-"7hich pecomes the surface subj ect of the
sentence, via II the subj ect se-lection pr.D,cess I~ (F illrnor'e 1971, 37).
--_....../
13
I shall have more to say. about, this "subject choice ·heirarchy"
in section II of this -paper.
Fillmore's proposed ~hanges in the structure of the base,
-and in particular the introduction of semantic case nodes in deep
structure, seem_to be offered as a re~edy for a defect which
Fillmore sees in the treatment of semantics under th~ standard
theory. Any seman tic theory must, acco'rding to F_illmore ,. provide
. ~- '
complete information about the semantic roles played by NP's and
- embedded SiS, for any sentence in the language being described w
The ,grammatical ~elations .defined in deep structure,.under' the
- stand~rd the0J;Y,' do n,ot pr'ovide -us wi th informa tion on .semantic
r'oles '. Therefo're, Fillmore seems to ~mply, we need, to-- al ter the
structure of the base so that deep structures do provide informa-
4
. t'ion about semantic roles.
This argument assumes, quite without justification, that if
the standard theory cannot provide semantic_role information
simply on the b~sis of grammatical relations in deep s~ructure,
-then it cannot provide such informati~n at all. I wish to argue
that the standard theory can provide complete role ,information at
the level of semanticreprssentation? Lexical rea~ings for verbs
and prepositions, as well as grammatical relations, must be taken
into account in determin~ng the semantic roles of constituents.
To argue this thesis in -detail, it ,will be !J-ecessary to.
examine Fillmore I s definitions for the various _cases.' First, if
. I ~ay proceed in violation of the subject selection heirarchy,
14
consider the Experiencer case. This case is associated with verbs
describing U a genuine psychological event or mental state'~
(Fillmore '1971, 42). Formerly, Experiencers were 'considered to
be in the Dative case, n the cas'e of the anirnate being affected by
the state or action identified by the verb" (Fillmore 1968, 24),
but Fillmore (1971, 42) "no longer confuse [5] selection restric-
tions to animates with true case-like notions".
To identify Experiencers in semantic rep~esentations of sen-'
tences, we must be able to recognize mental state and psycholog-
ical event verbs. Now as i~ happens, Katz has proposed a seman-
ti't~ marker for verbs, tha t see-TUS admirably sui ted' to this purpose.
In a· discussion of the·· verb" chase, Katz (1967, 169) observes. tpat
in adqition to being characterized as an activity verb, this verb
must have in its reading the- sema~tic marker (Phy~ical), ~o dis-
.tinguish chas.i!1g from mental activi ties, ·such as thinki~g and
.·~emembering. Thus it seems plausible to suppose that verbs which
Fillmore wou~d describe as taking an Experiencer, will contain
the semantic marker (Mental) in a Katzian lexicon.
There remains the problem of deciding which argument of such
'a.. verb is the Experiencer, giving only a semantic
(10) I saw the rock
(11) *The rock saw me.
representation of the kind envisioned by the standard theory'.
The verb see takes an.Experiencer, but it also takes an Instrument
phrase referring .to the stimulus, as' in sentence (10). We must
find some way to determine which NP d~signates the Experiencer,
15
arid "it seems-to me that Fillmore's definition of the old Dative
case affo~ds a suggesti6n worth pursui~g. From the sefuantic
an~maly of sentence (11), i't is evident, that the verb se"e requires
that one of its arguments be semantically animate. 6 This fact
will be reflected in the lexical reading for ~, in
by [NP~S] J
Q.nimate>
(12) ~,
. [NP ,VP, s]
(Event)· (Mental) (Vi,sual) (p~rception of ;(
'/Physical,,-
'·object/"
"C)
that the variable whose value is the s~mantic reading of the sub-
ject NP will have the selection restriction .~Animate~ under-
neath it, as in (12). Violation of this selection restriction.
results in the semantic anomaly of (11), where the semantic rea6-
-
-ing of the sUbject NP the rock does not include the semantic
marker (Animate).
It is likely that every psychological verb will have in its
lexical reading at least one argument that is marked as obliga-
torily animate. If, as I suspect, such verbs have exactly one
- argument so marked, then·-that argument will usually be· the Expe-
riencer in Fillmore loS sense. Under circumstances shortly t.o be
'described, such. arguments will be Agents. The'verb add is a
psychological verb, for example, but its obligatorily animate
argument is an Agent rather than an Experiencer.
,Next, let us consider how we might pe able to recognize
Location and Time phrases, ·without benefit of cases in deep
16
(13 ) The oli,ve hit the windshield
(14) The operation lasted two hours
(15) *The olive hit two hours.
(16 ) *The operation lasted the windshield.
structure. The Location case is examplified py the windshield in
.. (13), and the Time case by two ho~ in . (14) •. The ·semantic
anomaly of (15) and (16) calls attention to the fact that not all
,nouns are capable of appearing as heads of Location or Time
p~rases. Within the standard theory, the natural way to explain
t-his fact is to' posit (Time) and (Location) as semantic markers,
a'nd to indicate that the verb hi t requires an object that includes
the marker (Location) -in its readi?g, on pain of semantic, anomaly.
A similar· analysis applies to the verb last, and to prepositions
like durin~, before, after, behind, inside, under, etc. Location
phrases, then, will be NP' s thatare req.uired to be $emantically
locative by the lexical reading of tpe verb or preposition
. involved~' and similarly fo~ Time phrases.
Agents and 'Instruments are both associated with causative
verbs. The Instrumental case is "the case of the immediate cause
of an everlt, or, in the ca?e of a pSYGholog ical pr~d,icator, ,the
I stimulus'" the thing reacted to II (F illmore 1971, 42) III In forrner
days, an Agent was defined as an animate cause, and an-Instrument
as an inanimate cause, but as I indicated above, animacy is no
longer allowed to playa role. in defi~ing the cases. Fillmore
(1971, 43-44) suggests that we might d~fine the Agen~ive as the
.case of the'principal cause of an event, but then he gives several
it
- --- -- ~~-_._. _._~ ~.:
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reasons for rejecti~g this proposal, and lets the question drop,
without coming to any conclusions about the proper definition of
this case.,
The amorphous character of Fillmoreis present position in
regard to the Agentive case makes it difficul t to tel'l wha t would
,count as a satisfactory definition of this case .within the vocab-
ulary of the standard theory,. Nonetheles~, I believe that .it is
possible, to make a begin~ing on the task, and the related job of
devising a way to recognize Instruments. The semantic marker
(X causes ••• ) has established' itself in the vocabulary of Katzian
semantics, and whenever this marker appears in the'semantic read~
'ing ~or a verb, it is safe' .to conclude tha't the val'ue of the
variable X will ,be the reading of an NP or S which is in eiiher
the Instr~mental or the Agentive case.- Moreover ,_ whenever tllis
variable is marked to reqriire a value which includes the semantic,
.marker (Animate), we may feel quite confident in 'concluding that
we are dea~ing with the Agent case, and not the- Instrumental. I
would fu~ther conjecture that whenever the vaiue of the variable
includes (Animate) ~ ~ matter of fact, -then the phrase in ques-
tion has an Agentive reading (perhaps in ad.di tion to' an Instru-
mental reading).
There is, of course, another approach which the standard
theory could take to the problem of distinguishing Agents from
Instruments. The approach I have in mind is highly ad'hoc, and
, -- ...............-
represents no insight i.nto the nature of agency beyond ,tho'se
provided by Fillmore's theory. Nonetheless, this IIbrute force"
18
approach serves to illustrate a general formal point which has
some significance, I 'think. To ident~fy Agent~, we might first
.introduce a new semantic marker, (X do), into the standard sernan-
tic theory~ This new marker is to be slightly stronger than the
marker (X cause), in some unspecified way. We then write the
lexicon in such a way that the arguments'of (do) are always
Agents in Fillmore's grammar, and conversely. The formal point
to be made is that any case notion, can be defined over Katzian
s~mantic r~presentations, simp~y by introducing a suitably con-
strained new semantic marker.- 'Whatever the insights of case
grammar may be, these i'nsights can be captured wi,th no change in
the structure of th~ base, and in particular, with no case sym-
boIs in deep structure.
'The Source, Goal, and Path cases seem to me to be adjuncts
of process verbs of motion. For this
(17)
[NP, 5]
(Condition) (.,..:: . X
,Barrie9
closed at
time .!:),
rNP,5]
_•• ~ r"j' (Condition) ( X open at t + n)
(Barrietr>
reason, it may be worth. our while to look briefly at the kind of
-lexical entry used for process verbs, under the standard theory.
7
The intransitive verb ope~ has a lexical entry roughly like (17);
the process of opening is represented as a sequence of conditions
"or states, begipning with a state in which some barrier is closed,
. and ending with a state in which that barr,ier "is open. Each stage
19
of the process is ordered in time with respect to the other stages,
by means' of a time variable.
Fillmore (1971, 41) -states that Source and Goal may be inter-
-preted as "earlier and later_locations, earlier and later states,
or earlier and 'later time points", depending .on the verb in the
sentence. An embedded sentence in the Goal case m~y identify
lithe resulting state or event in a caus'ative construction ll
't'
(Fillmore 1971, 42). Goal is also lithe end-result role of a
-_ thing which comes into existence as a result of the action iden-
tified by .the pr~dicator, .as in I wrote ~ poem" (Fillmore 1971,
42) •
'(18) He walked from th~ dormito~y to the chapel."
~entence (18) provides an example of ~ Ioeational Source
··phrase (from the dormi tor:r:) and a loeational Goal phrase (to the
.
Under the standard theory, the. 'semantic -readings for
these two phras,es would c'ontain time var iables • For example, the
reading for from the dormitory might contain simply the variable
t,- whereas the reading for the phrase to the, chapel might contain
the time variable t+n. Since ~«t+n, the time variables in the
readings for these phrases makes it clear that the .walker referred
to was in-the dormitory before he was in the chapel.
The device of time variables does not suffice, however, to
identify_ from the dormitory -as a Source phrase. In" a sentence
with the verb walk, a Sourc~ phrase identifies the location (or
t~me) at which the,walking begins, and for all the time variables
have told us thus far, the walker of sentence (18) was al~eady in
----~-------~-----_./-
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transit when he passed through the dormitory. To identify
the dormitory as the initial point bf his walk, we must' look
at the semantic representation of the senten~e as'a whole.
Since walk is a process verb, the semantic representation
for the sentence will be a sequence of state descriptions.
And just as (17) shows an initial state in which some
barrier is closed, so the semantic irtterpretation for (18)
will show an initial state in which the walker's location
is the dormitory. What br~nds from the dormitory as a
Source phrase, then, is the fact .that its semantic reading
appears in the first of the state descriptio'ns whi.ch ma~e
up the s~mantic repiesent~tion for the whole of .sentence
(18) •
(19) I persuaded him to fill my tank.
Another. kind of G.oal is exernplifie.d in-,sentence (19),
where the clause underlying him to fill my t'ank is the
complement 6f the causative verb persuade. Now the semantic
reading for persuade, under the standard theory, will surely
contain the semantic marker (X causes Y), and the variable
,y. in, this reading will be replaced by the semantic reading
for' the underlying clause he fill my tank. But once the
reading for this clause has taken its place .as an argument
of the semantic marker (X causes Y), we know that this
clause is a Goal, by Fillmore's definition.
(20) write, + [_NP]
21
[NP, vp ,S]
( X
<Inseription)
did not exist before !)
(NP, 5]
& ( X produces symbols on a surface at !.)
<Huma~
. ( [NP, VP I sJ exists after t) )causes X
, <Inscription>
Finally, consider Fillmore's last kind of Goal, the kind
-.exemplified by a poem in ! wrote. a poem. The semantic inter-
pretation of this s~nterice will be guided by the lexical
~eading for the verb write, given in crude form above as (20).
An inspection of (20) shows that the semantic reading for the
direct obj ect of wr i te (in this case', a poem) appears twice
in the semantic represe,ntation of the sentence. Once, the
semantic, reading for a poem _appears in the context ... did
not. exist· before ~; later, the rea~ing for ~ poem occurs in
the context ... exists after t. Thus tp~ s~mantic represent-
ation for the sentence I wrote a poem tells us that the poem
is " a thing which comes into existence as a r,esult of -'the
action identified by the. predicator" (Fillmore 19_71, 42).
Every kind of-Source ano Goal recognized by Fillrno~e can thus
be identified on the basis of information provided by semantic
representations under the standard theory.
As one might suspect from its name, the Path case is
. (21) He walked down the hil~ across t~e bridge through
the pasture to the chapel.
22
used with verbs of -moti9n; Fil'lmore (1971, 51) gives a~ an
example 'the phrase down the hill, ~cross the bridge through
the pasture in sentence (21). ' This phrase gives us a
-temporal sequence of locations within which the activity
~f walking took place, ,a~d this sequence can.easily be
.represented through the use of the format for representing
the sequence of stages in process verbs. An NP is in the
Path case, then, just in case it gives tne location within
whi'ch motion takes place, ,without, implying that the, motion
began or terminated-thete. (Initial and final locations
ar-e ,Sources and Goals I respectively.),'
This leaves only the Objective case, and by Fillmore's
(l971, 42), own admissi~n, this' is a wastebasket case. This'
"means that if an embedded S or NP is not. in any of the other
cases already defined, then it is an Obj.ect. But since we
already know h~w to reco~nize all the, other cases, ·we can
easily identify Objects as well. If an" NP or'S does not
belong to any of' the other ~ases, we know that it belongs
in the "wastebasket H Objective case .
. Fillmore. argued successfully that the grammatical
relations defined by standard deep structure representations
do not suffice to provide complete information about the
semantic roles of consti tuerits. We have just seen,' however r
that standard semantic representations provide just as much
~nforrnation about semantic roles as is provided' by Fillmore's
deep structure graphs with case nodes. Thus far we· have
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found -no reason to suppose that the use of cases in deep
structure will remedy any deficiencies in the semanti"c I
theory associated with the'standard theory of transform-
ational grammar. I wish to now argue that the theory of
case grammar "meets with certain semantic difficulties that
do not attend the' standa~d theory.
"(22) a. John smeared .paint on the .wall.
b. John smeared the wall with paint.
(23) a. Bees are swarming "in the garden.
b. The garden lS swarming with bees.
Sentences (22) 'a and (22) b receive th~ same case
-.
structure, according to Fillmore (19GB, 48). Ther~ is~
. however, ,a semantic differ~nc.e between these two" sentences.
'(24)' Most of the wall didn't get a~y paint on ,it.,
Sentence (22) a is logically consistent with "(24), but
(22) b is not 60nsistent with (24). Similarly, seritences
(25) Most of the garden has no bees in it.
(23) a-b are derived from ide~tical case structures, but
(23) a is consistent with (25), while (23) b is not. Steve
. Anderson (1971, 389) describes this semantic difference by
saying tha~ the 'Locative phrases in (22) band (23) b
receive a holistic· int~rpretation; in (22) a and (23) a,
the interp~etation of the Locative phrases is partitive.
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On the basis of (22) and (23), one is t~rnpted to think
that a Locative phrase receives a holistic interpretation
if,and only if that phras~ occupies either the subject
position or the direct object position. 8 Anqerson (1971,
(26) a. The press secretary read his prepared- speech.
b. The press secretary read from his prepared
speecp.
(27) a. John painted Billis portrait this morning.
b. John pain~ed on Bill's portrait this morning.
3~1) provides' some examples that show that the relationship
between holistic, interpretation and grarnm.atical relations
is not limited to Npls in the Location case. Presumably
his prepared speech is Objective -in both (26)" a-b" bu·t this
phrase receives a holistic.interpretation only in (26), a,
where it functions as the di~ect object. Th~ Goal phr~se
. Billis portrait in (27) a-b receives a holistic interpret-
ation only in (27) a, where it occupies the object position •.
~low case grammars. treat graItL.-rna tical" relations as
surface phenorn~na, so it"is natural for Fillmore (1968~
48-49n) to suggest ihat'holistic interpretat~ons be assigned
by some process of surface structure interpretation.
(28) The garden is where bees are swarming.
(29) It is bees that. the garden is swarming with. 9
However, the generalization formulated one paragraph back
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is''fals~ in both directi6ns, at the level of'surfac~ struc-
ture. In sentence (28), the garden does' not receive a
holistic interpretation, though it is the surface subject
of the sentence. In (29), the garden is in neither subject
nor obj~ct position in the sentence, but still it requires
a holistic interpretation. Other sentences cited by
Anderson (1971, 388, 390) ,suggest that n~ generalization
about holistic interpretations can be st~ted in terms of,
grammatical relations in surface structure. lO
We have, seen that the semantic difference between (22) a
arid (22) b cannot be system~t~cally accounted f6r 'in deep.
structure, nor in surface structure, under the theory of .
case grammar. Anderson (1971, 395) argues 'tha.t 'there is
only one level in the derivation of sentences at which
Fillmore can state the appropriate gener~lization. This
level can be defined as the output 'of the transfor~ation
which freely se lects' ei ther paint 'or th.e wall as dire'ct
b·· ( ) 11 . 1 '.o Ject, In the sentences of 22 ~ Let us ca 1 thlS trans-
formation the object selection rule, and let us 'ask whether
the grammar of English ought to contain 'th,is. rule. If there
are.good r~asons to reject this rule, then case grammar will
be deprived of the only level at which it is possible to
assign, holistic readings' correctly.
Steve Anderson (1971, 39'3-395) note's that while smear
undergoes the object selection rule freely, there are other
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(30) a. *John covered jelly on the slice of bread.
b. John covere~ the slice of bread with jelly.
(31)· a. John threw paint on the canvas.
b. *John threw the-canvas with paint.
verbs which do not. Like smear, both cover and throw take
Instrumental and Location adjuncts. The Instrumental
argument of cover cannot be.chosen as object, however, and.
t·he Locative argument o:e'throw is similarly barred from
objecthood; witness sentences (30) a and (31) b. As long
as.'a grammar contains Fillmore's 'object selection rule,
cover and throw will have to be marked i,n the. lexlcon as
excepti6ns to that rule. 'By including this rule in the
grammar, Fillmore complicates the lexical entries for
cer'tain' verbs. This complication can be elimina.ted by
h,andling obj ~c.t selection in the base.
We have just seen that there are syntactic grounds for
having direbt objects in de~p struct~re. There is also a
semantic mativation for this r of course; 'we saw, earlier that
holistic and partitive interpretations can be predicted by
.~ very simple rule, if that rule can refer to grammatical
relations as defined in deep structure. Anderson's paper
shows that holistic and partitive interpret~tions cannot
be assigned on the basis of any well-motivated level of
syntactic representation in a case grammar.
Before going on, I should like to'discuss a certain
objection ~hich might be made to Anderson's argu~ept. If'
_____"---...,-I ,
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we drop the rule of object selection, and assume that the
object, of a sentence will always be indicated i~ deep
structure, this means that'the lexicon.will hav~ to con-
tain two lexical entries for the verb smear. One of these
ntwo" verbs will take a locative object, and the other will
not. Presumably, there ,are many verbs like smear. Con-
~~quently, the lexicon' will (under Anderson's analysis)
'contain many "elaborate and un~xplained examples of h'o"monymy". ,12
Otherwise put, this argument charges Anderson with treating
every verb as irregular "in respect to, the obj ect selection
process. Fillmore's analysis at least has the virtue ,of
treating some verbs as regular, even if cover and throw
turn out to be irregular.
This objection, I'ike Ande.rson ~ s argument", appeals to
our,~oncer~ for simplicity in linguistic descriptions~
Aqcording to the objection, a case 'grarrunar of English 'is.
better, because it is shorter (has less lexical entries)
t11an a non-case grammar. But according to Choms~y -(1965,
42-44), the complexity (;ength) of a rule ought to ~eflect
its' naturalness from a psychological point of view. Long
rules ought to be more difficult to learn, and to ti~e in
speech production and perception, than 'short rules. If
Fillmore means for case grammars to have psychological
reality, then it may be appropriate to choose between
Fi·llmore I s analysis and Anderson 1 s by means <?f psycho-
linguistic experimentation, rather than by appeals to
simplici ty'.
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Unfortu~ately, it is difficult to say jfist what sprt
of expe~imentationwould be relevant to a choice- between
these two analyses, because Fillmore has so far as·I know
never made it clear just what sort of psychological reality
he claims for case grammars " and for his version of univer-
sal granunar. I wish to discuss two posswib1e' _posi t'ions on
this issue, which Jerry Fa.dor (1971) ter~s ,the strong
psychological reality position and the w~ak psychological
reality position. I shall. argue that if Fillmore.holds
~ither of thes~ two positions, then psycholinguistic con-
sider~tions can in principle be brdught to bear on the choice
betwe-en Anderson J s analysis and Fillmore IS. Of course·, if
Fi Ilmore _does not claim psychological- rel~vance for" case
grammars, -or only some· very weak sort 9£ psychological
'. re2~2vance " then the psychological considerations I point
out will be altogether beside the I?oint."
According to adherents of the "weak psychological
realityll position, a hearer understands a'sentence by
computing the structural descriptions of that sentence,
but the speaker does not necessarily use th~ rules' of the
grammar in. computing this structural description. On this
view, a speaker must determine the case structure (deep
structure) of a sentence in order to understand ~he sentence"
but perhaps he does this by means of a set of heuristics
that operate on surface structures. On the'other hand,
those who hold a II strong psyc'hological real"i ty II pas i tiori
believe that ~peakers understand sentences by computing
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their .structura.l descriptions, and that ·this computational
process is carried out. by applying the rules of the grammar.
Analysis-by-synthesis models of speech rec9gnition thus
embody the "strong psychological reality" position.
Suppose, now, that Fillmore accep~s a strong view of
the psychological reality of grammars. Andersopls argument
showed that cover and throw.have more co~plex lexical.
entries than does smear, since these verbs (unlike smear)
impose idiosyncratic constraints 'on the application of a
ce~tain transformation rule (viz.', object selection). Since
cover and throw exhibit these transformationa~ iriegula~ities,
sentences containing ~hese_verbs ought to be harder to under-
stand than sentences containing regular verbs like smear, all
other things being equal.
Andersori's analysis, coupled with a strong view of_
psychological reality, ii~lds an opposite prediction. For
smear appears twice in the lexicon, whereas cover and throw
each.appear only once. To determine the meaning of a sentence
containing smear, a hearer must decide which of the two
lexical entries for this verb is appropriate to the inter-
pretation of the sentence in question. On some occasions,
- he might happen to guess right on his first attempt. Such
good luck is not to be expected all the t~me, however.
Indeed, it might be possible to induce wrong first guesses,
by exposing subjects to sentences with verbs like cover,
then to a.sentence in which smear has its throw-like meaning~
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If we adopt the "strong psychological reality" view, then
Fi Ilmore 's granunar predicts that cover and throV{ wi 11 'pose
greater difficulties to the hearer than smear; Anderson's
proposal, on the contrary, predicts that sen~ences with
smear will on the whole be more difficult to p~ocess than
sentences with either of the "univocal ll v~rbs, cover or
throw.
Now let us suppose that Fillmore holds the_weak view
'discussed by Fodor. Thi.s means that only structural des-
criptions, and not grammatical rules, have psychological
reality, and the difficulty in understanding a sentence
depends on the degree of divergence petween surface s~ruc-
ture and de.ep (case ), structure. Now according to Fillmore,
Goal phrases as~ociated wit~ sm~ar, cover, and throw, do not
appear in postverb position in deep structure; rather', it
is the Instrument phrase which occurs i~nediately to the
right of the verb in deep structure. Thus sentences con-
tairling throw have the same order of consti tuents in surface
structure as in deep s.tructure. The same is true of sen-
- ten~es with smear to which the object selection rule has
n~t applied. Surface structure and deep structure show
different constituent order, however, in sentences con-
taining cover, and in sentences with smear to which the
object selection rule has (optionally) applied. On a
','weak psychological reali tylf view ,then, ,Fil.lmore IS
analysis implies that sentences with throw should be
\,
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ea~ier to understand than sentences with cover~ and that
lintransformed smear, sentences shou"ld be easier t'o under-
stand than sentences with smear to which the object selection
.rule has applied.
On the same view of- psychological reality, Anderson's
. analys~s ,implies' that there will be no difference in
perceptual complexity between the two ,uses of smear, and
"
no difference be,tween sentences wi th cover and sentences
wi th . throw. This is becau,se Anderson does not pos'i t any
singl~ order' of consti tuents in de~p st.ructure. Rather I
surface constitue~t order· conforms to deep constituent-
order for cover as well as for th~ow, and for both uses bf
smear. For Anderson's s, analysis, the, clea,vage is still
between smear on the ,one hand, and cover and throw 'on-the
other." This is because cover and throw both occur "in only
one kind of deep structure, thereas'smear may appear in
either of two kinds of deep structure context.
Whether Fillmore adopts a strong or a weak view on the
psychological re levance of grammars, th~n, his ana,lys is
yields psychological predictions whi'ch are incompatible \:vi th
the psychological claims which are implicit in Anderson's
analysis. So far as I know, there is no evidence available
to decide the issue, but since such evidence is in-principle
available,' an appeal to simplicity seems somewhat slothful,
l.'f d · ht' '1 '13not ownrlg lrre evant.. .
A/?
eaT .Or-
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We have seen that the semantics 9£ the standard theory
is able to determine the semantic roles of constituents, in
Fillmore's ~ense, and that the theory of case grammar is not
able to provide an adequate treatment of-the distinction
between holistic and ,partitive Locatives .. I wish now to
argue that certain entailment relations can be handled in
case grammar only at the cost of added complexity.
The entailment relations I have in mind are of two
kinds. Some of them involve Agentive and Instrumental
phrases; the others arise out of Goal phrases of the kind
which Fi,llmore used to call Factitives . ,Causali ty is part
(.32) a. Helen broke the window.
'b. Helen caused the window to break.
(33) a. The ball broke the window.
b. The ball caused the window to break~
of the definition of both· the Agentive and the Instrumental
case. Since Helen is Agentive in sentence (32) at this
sentence entails (32) ~~ and since ,the ball is Instrum~ntal
in (33)a, (33) a entails (33) b. The Goal case is defined
(34) a. I wrote this poem today.
b. This poem did not -exist before today.
to' include NP' s designating ~bje-cts that are said to come
into existence as a result of some process. In sentence
(34) a, this poem is a Goal ,of this kinq, and of course
(-34) a entails (34) b.
(35) break, + [_NIj
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Now under the standard theory, the semantic readirig
for transitive break will play an important par~ in pre-
di~ting the entailments from (32) a to· (32) b , and "from ,(33) a
(NP ,s]
«( X causes
<Physical V Physical". object event/,
. '. - [NP I VP , sJ
( (Condi tion) ( X
<PhY~iCal'ob]ect/
[NP, VP, s]
(Condi"tion) ( X
<PhY~ical>. . ObJect
whole at 'time t) I
broken at t + ~).)
. . . ,
to (33) b. This lexical readi~g will indicate that in
sentences where -breakis.used transitively, t~e subject of
the ~entence is said to cause a certain process to take
p~ace. By inspecting "the sequence 'of conditions or stages
spelled out in (35), we see that the process is one in which
a physical object starts out whole, and ends up broken.
~p,s]
(Condition) (X whole at ~),
< PhY~ical>obJect
• • • 1
(Condition) (
(NP, s]
X broken at t+n)
<Ph~{~iCal'obJect /"
Consider next the lexical entry for intransitive break,
. .
which is' given above as (36). The semantic marker (X causes
Y), which appeared in the lexical entry for transitive break,
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is conspicuous ly absent from ,( 36) e" However, (36) is vir-
tually a carbon copy of the proce~s portion of (35); both
verbs describe a sequence of conditions, the first of which
involves a whole object, and the last of which involves that
same object in a broken state.
Looking back now to (32) and (33), we notice that the
~'
surface verb cause occurs in sentences (32) band (33) b,
a'long wi th the intransi tive verb break". Consequen,tly I the
.( 37) Helen causes «( Condi tiori) (The window whole. at !),
... , (Condition) (The window broken at't+n))
the semantic representation of (32) b Will be rather like
(3:'). But now' consider (32) a. This se'n tence contains
break in its transitive sense, and,according tb (35), the
semantic ,marker (X ~auses Y) is part of the meaning.~f
transitive break. Consequently, even tho~gh (32) a does
not'contain an occurrence' of the surface verb cau~, the
semantic representation of (32) a will be very much like
(37) .14 The standard theory thus predicts the entailment
from (32)' a to (32) b in terms of the close similarity )
between the semantic representations of these two
sentences.
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How might a case grammar account for the fact that
(32) a entails· (32) b? (The entailment from ('33) a to "(33) b
.can presumably ·be handled,. mutatis mutandis, ;in the saIne way.)
I shall assume that the c,ase structures of (32) a-b. are
'. 15
roughly those given in Figures 3 and 4, respectlvely~
Now a natural way to proceed' would be to devise some rule
for' converting Figure 3 into a structure re~embling'Figure
4. Specifically, this new structure should contain an
explicit occurrence of cause (or the associated semantic
marker), just as Figure 4 does. Since Fillmore is inclined
to define t~e Agentive'case partly in terms of causality,
it is· also natural to suggest that this 'rule of sen1antic
interpretation be sensitive to the presence of Agent nodes.
36
The details of this rule need not concern us. The
point is simply that some such rule is needed. Fillmore
has given us some informal remarks ab~ut Agents, Instruments,
"and causality, but in order to predict the entailments in
question here, some additional formal apparatus is needed.
This formal apparatus must· be reckoned in the cost of
adopting the theory of case grammar. In the standard ~
theory, these entailments are predicted without the need_ for
any special interpretation rules, just as subjects 'and
objects are selected without the need for subject and object
selection transformations. The use of cases in deep struc-
ture thus appears to require the addition of extra semantic,
as well as syntactic, paraphenalia. This suggests that the
cases obscure, rather than clarify, linguistic structure.
A case grammar also needs an extra ru~e of semantic
interpretation in order to capture entailments of certain
sentences ,containing Goal phrases. For example, sentence
(34) a above contains a Goal phrase (this poem) of the kind
Fillmo_re used to call Fa,ctitives, and for this reason,
(34) a entails (34) b. Presumably the case structure for
......_-- j"-
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Pa-st write I this poem To¢lay
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Neg exist this poem before today
Figure 6
sentence (34)a can be represented by the tree graph of. Figure
5, and. the case structure of (34) b by the tree in F'igure 6.
Now the -entailment relation between (34) a and (34) b must
be predicted in some way, but as they stand; Figures ·5 and 6
. surely do not make it obvious that such an entailment. relation
holds. To exhibit the entailment r~lation, we must- presumably
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show that the case struct~re of (34) b is 'derivable from the
case structure of (34) a in some way.16 But the rule for
carrying out such a derivation must be quite complex, for
note how different Figure 6 is from Figura 5~ The verb·of
Figure 5 has been replaced in Figure 6 by another verb al-
together; the Modal constituent of Figure 6 contains a
Negation element not to be found in Figure 5;' the Time
phrase of F'igure 6 contains the preposi tion before, which
was absent from the Time, phrase in Figure 5; and the Agent
phrase of Figure 5 disappears from Figure 6.
Figures 5 and 6 differ more radically than do Figures
3 and 4, which we examined a moment ago. It would appear,
then, that the semantic rule we need for predicting the
contraexistential entailments of sentences with factitive
Go~l phrases~must be more complex than the rule needed to
predict the entaiLments of sentences containing Agents and
Instruments. Fillmore does not·seem to have appreciated
the need for either of these semantic rules in a case grammar.
Within the standard theory,- however, no extra machinery is
needed to show thc:t ,'sentence (34) a entail's sentence- (34) b.
(38) write, + [ __NPJ
[NP, VP, s]
-( X did not exis t before t;
<Inscription> -'
& (
£NP ,s]
X' produces symbols on a surface at ~)
<IIuman>-
[NP, Vp, s]
Causes ( X exists after t)
, '. <Inscription>
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For recall the lexical entry for the verb write, given above
as (20) and repeated here for convenience as (38). According
to, (38), sentences having write as their main verb receive
semantic representations which have the form of a conjunc-
tion of two semantic structures. The,first conjunct of
their semantic representat~ons is always a reading for a
contraexistential statement, such as. (34) ·b. I~ explaining
the entailment from (34) a to (34) b, then", the standard
·theory appeals to the semantic representations of these
sentences, and to the rule of simplification: from a
-statement" of the form P&q, to infer a statement of the.
form E. This rule of inference is of course "familiar from
the sentential calculus.
In summary, the semantic case -for case does not succeed
in impeaching the standard theory, since all the semantic
-information provided by case labels is also available in
the semantic representations generated under the standard-
theory. On the other h~nd, the stand~rd theory is con~
spicllDllsly better than.case grammar at predicting whether
a given Locatiye (or Objective, or Goal) phrase is to
receive a holistic interpretation. Case grammars are also
at a disadvantage in accounting for certain entailments of.
sentences containing Agents, Instruments, and Goals. To
exhibit these entailments, a case, grammar must be supple-
mented by (presumably universal) rules of semantic inter-
pretation that are not needed in the standard theory. On
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balance, the semantic evidence seems to weigh against case
g-rammar , rather than in its favor.'
II~ CASES IN SYNTAX
In this section, we shall consider four syntactic
ar,guments for case granunar. First, Fillmore',(1968, 31)
has argued that· in a case ·granuuar, it is -possible 'to
eliminate Lakoff's (1966) feature '[+stativeJI. without
l~s·ing the insights statable in terms of that feature.
Second, Fillmore (1971, 37) maintains that there is a
un-iv:ersal relationship between the cases appearing in a
sentence, and the normal choice of surface subject in that
sentence.- Third, Fillmore (1968, 15)' appears to regard the
assignment of prepositions and other surface case markers
as a task -fo~" which case grammars are particularly .well
suited. Finally, Fillmore (1968, 2~-30) arg~es that case
granunar permi ts cert.ain economies' in -the lexicon .
. With regard to stativity, Fillmore (196~, 31) inquire~
"whether Lakoff' s fea tU.res are primi tives in the lexical
entries for verbs, or whether they permit reductio~ to
case concepts". He suggests that rules sensitive to non-
stativity may'just as well be stated in terms of the
Agentive case. "The transformation which accounts for the
'true imperatives' can apply only to ~e~tences ~ontaining
A'S", and the selection of a Benefactiv~ phrase, or of the
. Progressive aspect, is permissable only in sentences con-
taining Agents, Fillmore suggests.
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I wish to present three arguments relating to this
suggestion. First, I shall argue that if non-stativity
can be defined away in terms of the Agentive ~asei then
the standard theory can also do without the feature
,[+stative] in its lexical entries fot verbs. Second, I
shall present several counterexamples to the claim that
non-stative verbs -are able to take Agentive arguments.
Finally, ,r shall ci te some evidence which suggests' that
the feature [+stativeJ does not play a role in the
grammar of English; if this i~ cqrrect, then it is no
virtue for a theory to be ~ble to define this feature
away.
Let us assume for the,sake of argum~nt that there
are important generalizations to be stated in terms of
the feature[~stative], and that these generalizations
can also be stated in tgrms 'of ·the presence o~ absence of
an Agent phrase in a senterice. This will count in favor
of the theo:r-y of case 'grarrrrnar, and against the standard
theory, only if the standard t~eory is compelled to in-
corporate [~stative] as a primitive term. But in
section I, We noted that the Agentive case was in part.
definable in terms of the semantic marker (Cause) I and
I conjectured that if a verb contains this marker in its
lexical reading, then that verb can have an Agentive
h " · · 17argument. Let us assume that t 15 conJecture 15 correct.
What follows, then, is that a verb is [-stativeJ just in
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case its semantic reading includes the semantic marker (Cause).
The st~ndard theory can use this semantic marker to dispose
of, Lakoff's feature, just as case grarrunar uses the 'Agent:ive
case to define the feature away.
It may be objected that transformations., such as imper-
ative formation, cannot be 'stated in terms of a semantic
marker such as (Cause). Semantic rna~kers are nbt, aft~r
all, part of deep structure, and transformations are gen-
'erally thought to apply to uninterpreted deep structures.
Katz (1~70, 231), in discussing the controversy oetween
generative and interpretative semantics, has- argued that the
standard theory is "independent of any claims about the type
of information transformations utilize". He. poi~ts out that
under the standard theory, ·1I.transformations can be wri tten
that apply either to underlying ph~ase markers or seman-
tically interpreted underlying phrase markers., and the
process of transformational development can be made log-
ically posterior to the' process of interpreting und~rl'ying
phrase markers". If neeq be, the standard theory can define
away the feature [~stativeJ All that is needed is a
de£inition of the Agent case, in terms of se~antic markers.
Such a definition was sketched in section I.
But as it turns out, Fillmore was mistaken in supposing
h ·· . f· fAt 18t at non-statlvlty could be de lned as presence 0 an gen ·
Several of Fillmore's favorite verbs are countere~amples to
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this claim.' One of the principal marks of a non-stative
verb is its ability to occur in true imperative sentences.
(39) Die gloriously for the' fatherland.
(40) Fallon your knees when you approach the emperor.
(41) Rot~te quickly on the ball of your left foot.
(42) Don't break when they question you.
(43) Imagine, the Joily Green Giant'diesse~ as Santa .
.'
(44). Don't believe a word the recruiter told you.
Sentences (39)-(44) appear to be true imperatives, yet
the. verbs .involved do not have Agentive arguments" even in
'. deep ·structure. Die differs from kill" according to Fillmore
(1968,30)., preci~ely in that die c~nnot take an Agent, wh~reas
kill can .. However, die· is [-stative]. by two tests. Sen-
'. ter~e (39). is an imperative, and it also contains a Bene-
factive phrase. Fall, in (4 0), is a verb Qf motion. r and
sin'ce n the Obj ect case is that of the entity .which J.110ves II
(Fillmore 1971, 42), the deleted subject of (40) is Objective
rather than Agentive. Similarly, the intransitive forms of
rotate and break, which occur in (41) and (42) I do not take
Agents, but Objectives. F~nally, imagine ,and believe, which
occur in (43) and (44), are psychological-state verbs, and
as such they take Experiencer subjects, not Agents.
We .have just seen that ·verbs may be non-stative, with-
out taking an Agentive argument, and presumably without
having the semantic marker (C~use) in their·readings._ This
shows that case grammar is not able" to define away Lakoff's
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feature in the way Fillmore suggested, and tha~ the standard
theory cannot use (Cause) to do the work of this featuie ..
I wish now to argue that the feature [+stativ~cannotbe
used to do all the syntactic work Lakoff had in mind for it.
Lakoff posited this feature in order to account for the
o6currence of nine or so different phenomena, which he
believed to be rel~ted. He cited evidence' to show that if
a verb co~ld appear in true imperative constructions, then
. -it could also appear in th~ Progr~ssive aspecit, with Bene-
factive phrases, with the do-~o construction, etc. He
further hypothesized that if a particular verb rejected.
·one of t~ese constructions, it rejected them all.
Closer examination reveals, however, that verbs do not
always accept or reject these constructions as a-block.
(45) .*Ben is belie~in~ what the recruiter told him.
Sentence (43) shows that believe can occur in true impera-
tives, but believe rejects the Progressive aspec~, as
illustrated in (45). Another verb that seems to share
these properties
(46) a. Dontt despise the gypsy's advice.
b. *I am despising her suggestionc
is despise (cf~ (46) a-b), and there may_be others.
Mike Harnish (personal communication) has pointed 'out
a class of verbs that violates Lakoff's hypothesis in a
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different way. Certain success verbs behave.like non-
statives
(47) Judy found a gem, and Horace did 'so too.
(48) Carl discovered the proof, and Susan did so too.
(49) *Judy is finding a gem.
(50) *Carl is di~~overing the proof.
wi·th, respect to the do-so construction, but like statives,
,they reject the Progressive aspect. As we can see from
(47)-(50), find and discover are two such verbs.
The existence of verbs like believe and f'ind shows
that a single feature is not enough to account for the
'behavior of. verbs with respect to,the imperative, Bene-
factive, Progressive, do~so, and other constructions.
These constructions are app~rently not as' c~osely related
as Lakoff at first thought. But the utility of [±stative]
depends heavily on the supposition that all ~hese construc-
tions a:t;e closely rela tied. Even if Fillmore I s case-theoretic
definition of non-stativity had been vaiid, ,it would not have
con~tituted a particulariy impres~ive vindication of case
gr,arnmar.
We turn next to Fillmore's claim that the process of
subject selection'is predictable in terms of a universal
case heirarchy. If the standard theory is unable to cap-
ture'the.generalization underlying-this claim, and if the
claim is true, then case grammar would enjoy an advantage
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over the standard theory. I shall argue that it is' possible
, .
to state Fillmore's- hypothesis about the case heirarchy,
using terms available in the ~tandard theory. I shall also
'point to some rather dubious implications of'the heirarchy
hypothesis.
The case heirarchy is a ranking of the cases,. in which
the Agentive is the highest-ranke~ case. The Experiencer,
"
Instrumental, Objective, Source, Goal, Location, Timer and
Path cases follow, in that' order. Fillmore's heirarchy
hypothesi'~ state~ that ordinarily, ,the constituent w.ith the
highest-ranked c~se becomes th~ subject in surfa6e str~ctrtre.
Thus 'if a sentence contains an Agentive phrase, that phrase
is normal~y chosen as the subject, whatever other cases 'may'
··be present in the sentence. This is because an Agent Qut-
ranks every other cas~. If a .sentence has an Experiencer,
but· no Ag:ent, ~hen the Experiencer is. the most likely choice
for subject, and so on. If we do not dhoose the highest-
ranked NP as subject, then we must indicate this 'deviation.
by using a passive verb form, in English and many other
languages.
At first glance, this hypothesis does not appear to be
statable within the standard theory. The standard theory
recognizes neither cases nor the subject selection rule,
but this hypothesis concerns the relationship between cases
a:nd the subject selection rule.' But ,semantic i'nterpretation,
in the s.tandard theory, includes' a pl.-oce~s which is· rough~y
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the inverse of the sUbject selection process. Fillm6re's srib-
jeci selection rule takes an NP with a p~rticulai semantic
role, and_moves that NP into subject position. Semantic inter-
pretation, on the other hand, ~perates on the semantic reading
of the subject NP in a sentence. The subject NP reading is,
TQoved irlto a particular spot in t~e lexical reading of the
verb, a11d as we ·saw in section I, th~ semantic role of the
subject is determined by the position it "comes tb ~ccupy iri the
lexical reading of the verb. Arguments of the semantic rna,rker
(Cause) are either Agentive or Instrurnental; obligatorily
an~rnate arguments of (Mental) verbs are Experiencers; and so on.
The' place in a verb reading where the subject.NP reading
'b~longs is marked by means of a categorized variable. In
(35), for" exa.mple, we savl t!1.a·t the lexical entry for transi--
. . ... (NP, sJ . .
tive -break starts out: II ( ( X - causes ... 11
. /Phy~ical V Ph~lSic'al> -
, "'" obJect ' event - . '
The subject-relation s~gn, [NP,SJ, above the·variable X
indicates that the reading of the subject NP must be in-
serted as the value of the variable X. Now if Fillmore
is right in claiming that there is a systematic ,relation-
"ship between subject position and semantic role, it ~hould
be possible to eliminate the use of the subject-relation
sign from over many categorized variables. In the lexical
entry for transitive break, for instance, 'the semantic
marker _(Cause) tells us that we are dea~ing with a sentence
in ~hich an Agent or Instrument is present. The second-
ranked case, Experiencer, is not presen~, since the lexical
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entry does not include the semantic marker (Mental)
Evidently, then, the subject NP must be either Agentive
or. Instrumental. In either case, its semantic r~ading
goes to the left of the semantic marker (Cause) .
. Similarly, suppose that we have a verb whose semantic
reading includes (Ment~~). This semantic marker alerts us
to the presence of an Experiencer, and if (Caus~). is not
part of the meaning of the verb, we know that no Agent is
present. Consequently, .the highest-ranking case is Exper-
iencer, and the reading of the subject NP must be put in
place of the variable that is marked as obligatorily animate.
The reader will recall that obligatory animacy is a mark of
- . the Experiencer, where psycholog~cal verbs are concerned.
The general strategy is to examine the semantic reading
for the verb of a sentence, in orde.r to determine which cases
· h . 19 · d · d h"are present In t e sentence. Havlng etermlne t lS, we
pick out the highest-ranked case, in terms of Fill~ore's
heirarchy. This case will be associated with a specific
variable in the reading ~or the verb, and we can proc~ed
to replace that variable with the semantic reading for the
. subject NP. There is no need for explicit marking of the
relationship between this variable and the subject NP, if
Fillmore's hypothesis is correct.
Some verbs, however, are exceptions to the heirarchy
hypothesis. ~hese verbs n~rmally (that is, in the active
voice) take subjects which are not in the highest-ranked
'case present in the sentence. Fri~~hten, for example, takes
(51) Honesty frightens. a con man.
(52) A con man is ~rightened by honesty.
an Experiencer and an Instrument. The heirarchy leads us
to e'xpect that' ,the normal sllbject of frighte·n will be the
Experiencer, but (51), and (52) indicate that the Instrument
is the normal subject of frighten~ When~ver the higher-.
ranked Experiencer is chosen as subject, the verb must be
passive. Nor is frighten" an isolated example. Fillmore
(1971", 42) maintains that, the whole class of "so-cal·led
Psych~Movement v~rbs, ~e~uiie a tr~nsformation which
moves the highest ranked non-Exper'iencer noun-phras"e lnto
the first ,position". ~resumably these verbs must be marked"
.. in the le~icon, with a special subject s~lection feature which
triggers the re-ranking transformation.
Converse pairs of relation terms provide a more 'random
collection of exceptions to the heirarchy-hypothesis .. Like
(53) A likes B.
(54) B pleases A.
and please are converses of each other. This means that any
sentence of the form (53) is logically equivalent to' the
correspqnding sentence of form (54). For example, sentences
(55) Linus likes Beethoven.
(56) Beet~oven pleases Linus.
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(55) and (56) are logically equivalent, and indeed synonymous,
because they are formally related in the prescribed way. '
Fillmore '(1968,30", describes like and please .as Ifsynonymous;
.•. they differ only in their subject selection features".
Now presumably, like need not have any special subject
selection feature in its lexical entry, since its subject
is normally tIle Experiencer-phrase, ,its 'object the Instru-'
mental phrase in the sente~ce. Please, however, is an
exception, and does require a subject selection feature,
since it takes the Instrum~ntal phrase as it,s subj ect. This
pattern will be repeated for every pair of converses: buy
and -se.ll, give and' receive; teach and learn, etc. At most
- 20
one m~mber of each such pair will be regular. -The other
will have to be marked in the lexicon as an exceptional verb.
It is significant, that _a large. number of verbs should
viola te the heirarchy hypo~hesis, even if Fi'11more does not
mean to claim psychological relevance for this hypothesis.
But if the subject selection heirarchy is intended to reflect
some kind of psychological reali ty, then it. may .actt:tally be
,possible to refute the heirarchy hypothesis. Whether we take
a strong or a weak position on the psychological reality of
grammars (see p. 28 above)" the heirarchy predicts that sen-
tences with frighten will be more difficult to process than'
sentences with fear. Suppose, first, that we take a "strong
psychological reali tyll posi tion-, accord.ing to which the
hearer computes the meaning of a sentence by some process
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which uses the rules' of the grammar. Sentences con.taining
fri~hten must undergo an extra transformation, a minor rule
which selects the Instru~ent rather than the Experiencer as
subject; also, the lexi~al entry for frighten must contain
a ~ubject selection feature to trigger this special trans-
formation. Fear, on the other hand, is regular with respect
-. ~. .
·t~ the subject selection process; the heirarchy. ,hypothesis
correctly predicts which argument of fear ·will become the
subject, without the need for extra machinery in the grammar.
If Fillmore takes a strong view of the psychological impli-
cations of grammar, his heirarchy hypothesis predicts that
sentences with fear will be easier to understand than sen-
. tences with frighten.
~1ext, suppose Fillmore takes a "weak psychological
reality~1 position; ·that is, suppo~e he be'lieves that hearers
must recover the case structures of sentences in order to
understand them, but that this recovery proc~ss does not
require. applica tion of .the rules of the grammar. Even on
this relatively weak assumption, fear ought to be easier
for hearers to handle than frighten. For is the heirarchy
hypothesis is correct, then hearers normally use a heuristic.
which tells them: take the highest-ranked case mentioned in
the case-frame feature of the verb, and assign that case to
the surface subject of the sentence. This heuristic yields
correct results for fear, but not for frighten~ Consequently,
the, hearer would have. to use some. other, less familiar routine
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to" determine the case of the surface subject of fright::.en,
perhaps. after applying the norlnal heur istic, and' finding
it to fail.
Unqer the standard theory, on the other hand, there is
no significant. difference between fear and frighten. Both
'verbs impose certain selectional constraints on their sub-
jects and objects, but these constraints are not claimed to
be more regular or natural for one verb than for the other.
H~nce the standard theorY"predicts that sentences with
frighten will be no more difficult to understand than
sentences with f,ear I all other. things' being equal. This
prediction follows whether we take a strong or a weak .pos-
ition on psychological reality. I a~ not aware of any
psycholinguistic evidence that supports either this view-
~r the' contrary claims of case grammar; put if Fillmore
m~~ns to claim psychological signiiicance fo~ his theory,
then clearly we ought to seek psycholinguistic evidence
bearing on the heirarchy hypothesis. We may expect to find
such evidence by examining the relative perceptual com-
plexity of converse pairs of verbs, such as ,~!ight~n and
fear, please and like, etc.
We turn next to Fillmore 1 s treatment of surface case
systems. In liThe Case for easel! (Fillmore 1968, 15-16),
Fillmore contends that the rules for assigning prepositions
in English, postpositions in ~apanese, and case suffixe~ in
Latin, all depend on case informati9n in deep structure.
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The s.emantic roles, Agentive, Exper iencer, and so on, are
supposed to be relevant to the assignment of case feat~res
or morphemes in surface structure. This suggests that
Fillmore regards the process of preposition insertion as
a phenomenon particularly amenable to case-grammatical
description.
In an earlier paper, Fillmore (196'6" 367-368) divides
English prepositions into three classes, acc~rding to the
kind of information required by the rules that in$ert them.
"~ome prepositions may be filled in by optional choic~s from
the lexicon. In Locative phrases .. _, generally' the choice
is optional: over, under,- in, on, besides, etc. Thes.e are
the preposi tions tha t bring wi th them semantic i.nforma tion. II
Even here, though, case seems to pla,y.a role in ~limiting
(.if not in u~iquely determining) choice of preposi tiOll ~ The
Location case permits i~s~rtion only of those. prepositions
with the feature [+locativeJ ' and excludes suchprepos-
itions as during.
Prepositions of the second class depend more directly
on the case of the NP to which they are prefixed, but these
pr,eposi tions are governed by the occurrence of specifi,c
. lexical items, as well as by case information. IIThus blame
requires the Objective prepositi.on to be for f ,the D'ative ~
preposi tioD to- be on II (Pi llrnore 1966 I 368) c This 'accounts
(57) dilligan blamed the tidal waye on the tycoon.
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(58) Gilligan blamed the tycoon for the tidal wave.
fo~ the fact that on occurs in, (57), while for occurs in
(58). The case grammar of English contains ~ general rule
which deletes the preposition of an NP in post~verbal
position, so that no sent~nce containing blame is likely
~o contain both on and" for.
Finally, there are prepositions that can be inserted
'solely on the basis of information about the cases found
in a sentence. "Thu·s, the Objective preposition is of'if
it is the only actant.in the preposition or if the prepos-
ition contains an Instrumental or Ag~ntive;' otherwise. it
is wi th,. T;he Instrumental preposi tion is wi tIl j us't in case
the Agentive co-occurs; otherwise it is £z. The Agentive
preposition is byJl (Fillnlore 1966, 368)
In order to assess the claim that case g.rarnmar handles'
preposition insertion more economically than the standard
theory, 'let us consider the means at our disposal for
handling these three cla~ses of prepositions without benefit
of cases. Fil'lrnore', s first class of preposi tions II pr ing
wi"th them semantic information"; this class lncludes "over r
under, in, ~, beside, etc. lI , prepositions which according
to Fillmore have the feature [+locativeJ Now,in section
'I, we saw that the standard theory needs a, semantic marker
(Location), and surely this semantic marker will appear in
the lexical readings for prepositions like over and under.
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Consider now the verb sit. Fillmore's lexicon presumably
gives + I _Lac] as a frame feature of this verb, and in this
. way he assur.es that his grarrunar will generate sentences like
(59) Jack sat under the awning.
(60) *Jack sat of the awning.
(59) but not sentences like (60): the pr~po~ition of does
not have the feature [+locativeJ ' and hence this prepos-
i tion cannot, be part of a consti tuent in the Locative case.
But the standard theory can also prevent of from being
inserted in this context, without referring to the Locative
case. The trick is to use the semantic marker (Location)
to state a restriction on the meaning of the Pr'epP .involved,
(61) sit,
---
[NP, s]
X
<.. ~
[preP, VP r fJJ
rests on buttocks or haunches at X ) .
<Location>
as in the lexical entry (61). Since the semantic reading
of the phrase of the awni'ng does not contain the semantic
marker (Location), a grammar containing the lexical entry
(61) would label, sentence (60) 'as semantically anomalous.
Perhaps Fillmore prefers to describe, (60) as syntactically
rather than semantically ill-formed, but surely this
preference is a difficult one to argue foi. With respect
to the first class of prepositions, then, it appears that
the standard theory and the theory of case grammar do not
d.iffer significantly in complexi ty ..
( 63)
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(62) 6. -;) on/blame + X + D[ NP[ Pt· -JJ]+ y
~ -7 for/blame + X+0 [NP[ P[ -:-JJ] +Y
Consider next rules (62)-(63), which would insert on
and for in the appropriate complements of blame, according
to Fillmore's analysis. Rule (62) states th'at a durruny
symbol is to_ be replace.d. by 01'1 in any ~ (~t.ive)·· complement
of blame. According to (63~ for replaces .the dummy symbol
in O(bjective) complements of blame. Taken together, these
(64) Blame #for r + [- NP + prepp].
[..animate]
(65) blame #~, + [ _ NP + P +. NP J
[ +a.nimate]
two rules use one less symbol than the partial lexical
entries (64)-(65) which the standard theoiy might use to
21
achieve the same purpose .. '
To be sure, the standard theory needs an additi~nal
rule in order to permute. for and on with the direct Object,
but. the case grammar also needs -an extra rule to get rid
of the preposition on- the direct object NP. Thus a" count
. of the symbols ~sed under the two theories suggests that
the case-grammatical solution is somewhat more economical
than the analysis provided under the standard theory .
. But a symbol. count can be used to compare two analyses
only if these analys'es are ·couched in the s,ame vocabulary.
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The point is often made in phonology trlat symbol count'ing
leads to absurd consequences if, for example, 9ne analysis
uses only features while the other uses phoneme symbols as
.well as features. In our present circumstances, we are
attempting to compare a solution using only grammatical
c~tegories and features, with a solutio~ in which case
symbols are also allowed. ' And since the difference in the
number of symbols required was so 'small, ~it seems safe to
c~nclude that Fillmore's treatment of this second class of
prepositions is not. significantly more economical than that
suggested by Chomsky (1965,191).
There are certain curious features about the class of
case-governed prepositions, Fillrnore~s third class. First,'
in stating the. distribution of of, Fillmore finds it.
nece~sary to refer to propositions which 'contain either
an Instrumental or an Agentive phrase. From section I, we
know that both these cases are characterized partly in terms
of the semantic' marker (Cause). If Fillmore, has a correct
generalization here, the generalization can be stated in
terms of a single semant~c marker, though Fillmore ,has to
refer to two cases. In this instance, the case te~minology
seems more a hindrance than a help.
I have nothing of interest to say about 'Fillmore's
treatment of with. His remarks about the distribution of.
by, however, call for some comment. Fillmo~e regards ~
as a case-governed preposition, whose distribution can be
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stated solely in terms of case environments. Under the
standard theory, £l ·is introduced by the passive rule, in
'a formulation which naturally does not use case terminology.
According ·to Fillmore, there are two positions in which £l
may occur. This preposition may mark either the Agentive
or the Instrumental case, he says. 'But eviden.tly this is
(66) The UFO was seen by the· ground controller.
not the whole story, for sentence (66) shows ~ associated
'with an Experiencer, though the ,sentence contains an
22Instrument.
In the light of sentences like (66), we can amend
Fillmore's account of ~, as .follows. If a sentence con-
tains an Agentive phrase, then by marks the. Agent,ive. If
a.sentence does.not contain an Agent, then ~ marks the
Experienceri and if no Experiencer is present, then ~
marks the Instrument. This ranking of cases - Agentive,
Experiencer, Instrumental - is' exactly the heirarchy' which
is supposed to govern the normal choice of subjects. It
would be odd if the rules of. English had to duplicate the
statement of this heirarchy in universal gr~mmar, in order
I h · I b h · b 1 23to lnsert t e prepos1tlon -l were 2t e ongs.
Evidently, by is not specifically associated with any
one case. ·Rat~er, it marks whatever NP would normally be
chosen as the subject of a given sentenGe~ In the standard
theory, the NP which Fillmore would call the normal subject
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_choice is invariably the subject in deep.structure, and the
passive 'rule _attaches by to the NP which occupies the sub-
j ect posi tion in deep structure '. The occurrence of ex'" is
-
not predictable directly in terms of case, but rather in
terms of syntactic position. Fillmore (1971, 42-43) has
come to recognize this, and he now has a passive transform-
ation which handles the insertion of~. His analysis has
thus come ~o look very much like that provided by the
_standard theory, and he is hardly in a position to argue
that his treatment of £y is more elegant than the usual one.
So far, we have been considering only o~e kind of
surface case system, the' preposi tion~ of English. We ha~le
not thus far seen any reason to believe that case grammars
provide a' more efficient apparatus for dealing with surface
cases than does the standard theory. Before we take up
Fillmore IS argumants about lexicon simplici ty, let us_ cast
a glance at one other kind.,of surface case system.
Fillmore (1968, 17) observes that case affixation
. often depends on the status of an NP as subject or direct
object {n surface' structur~,. The case of pronouns in
English is determined in this way, for example. Now sur-
f~ce subjects' and objects are selected_ partly on the basis
of case information in deep structure, according to Fillmore.
Thus semantic rol~s are indirectly involved in determining
-the cases of English pronouns. But in order to link
semantic roles with surface, cases of" this kind, Fillmore
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needs subject and object selection rules, ,and the standard
theory, does not need such rules at all. Quite apart from
this, however, subject sel~ction rules may be obje6tion~ble
on formal grounds. Emonds (1970) has a~gued .that most
generally accepted transformation rul~s appear. to preserve
structure, and that perhaps all transformations must, pre-
~erve structure, under" a universal constraint. Chomsky
has pointed out to me in conversation, however, that Fill-
more's subject selection process is not a structure-preserving
transformation. If Emondls constraint is correct, then sub-
ject selection rules violate a principle of universal
grammar.
vle may. conclude, I, think, that the study of s-urface
case systems does not support the theory of case grammar.
We turn now to Fillmore's claim that case, granunars have
simpler lexicons than do grammars provided py the standard
theory~ Fillmore (1968, 29-31) defends this claim rather
cle~rly in liThe Case for Case".. There he points· ou't t,hat
in a case grammar, .lik~ and please can have identical lexical
readings. Aside from th~ir phonological differences, 'these
verbs differ only syntactically, in their subject selection
properties. There is no need for any semanti6,distinction
between these two verbs. Consequently, lIit is possible to
reduce the number of semantic entry types" (in contrast with
s~mantic entry tokens) in the lexicon of English (Fillmore'
1968, 30).
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Accordi"ng to this ~rgument, like and please are synonyms,
and it is implied that this ~as some bearing on the com-
plexity of the lexicon. Fillmore'seems to be invoking some
-general "principle, to the effect that given two lexicons
with the same number of ~n~riesl the one with the greater
-number of synonyms is the simpler of the' two.· I see. no
initial plausibility in this principle, and Fillmore
provides no argument to support it. It £~ not possible
to "have just one lexical ~ntry fo~ like and please" simply
because these words· are phonologically distinct~ Whether
6r not cases are incorporated into deep structur~s, th~n,
the ~exicon will have to include two lexical entries I and
Fillmore "has given us no reason to believe "that ,these
entries will be any simpler under the theory of case gra~ar
tha~ under ~he standard theory.
Similar considerqtions can be brought against" Fillwore's
arguments concerning die and kill, see 'and show, etc. He
argues that a case graIT~ar can treat these pairs of verbs
as synonyms I differing only .in their case structure. But
since these pairs of verbs.are phonologically distinct~ each
member of" a pair must have its own lexical e~try, in a case
grammar as in the standard theory.
FiLlmore has other proposals, however, which are not
vulnerable to this objection. He suggests, ·in parti~ularr
that a case granunar needs only one lexicalentiy for the
transitive and intransitive senses ~f open. The standard
62
theory appears to need two entries; one must contai~'the
semantic marker (Cause) I while the other cannot. Besid~s,
these two verbs have different contextual feature~. The
causative open takes an obj~ct, but the other does not.
Fillmore seems to have brought to light a genuine differ-
ence in complexity between his lexicori and its counterpart
in the standard -theory.
Katz' (1972, 357-361) has pointed out, however', that
it is possible to devise a notation for collapsing the two
le~ical entries for open. This notational innovation uses
op.ly· information already available in a ~tandar~ g'ramrrra.r. . In
. particular, there is no need to use case terminology. An
.( 67)
. [NP I Sl..1:!?, VP, s] . .
open, + [ __ (NP) ] . ( ( . X . causes .
. . ~.~
[NP , VP ,S'l!!P , s]
((Condition) ( Y closed at t) ... 1
<.. ;)[NP,VP~P,sJ
(Condition) . Y open at t + n)))
~.=>
abbreviated form of this collapsed lexical entry is given
here-as (67).
This notation is to be understood in the .following
way_ The variable X has the reading of the ~ubject NP a~
. its value, just in case the sentence in question contains
an NP bearing the relation [NP,VP,S] to the verb. The
variable Y has the reading -of the direct object NP as its
. ,
~alue~ provided the sentence cqntains an NP which bears the'
subject relation, [NP,SJ ; to the verb.' In the event that
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the sentence does not contain .a direct object, the ~e~antic
marker containing t,he vaFiable x (namely, ! caus'es) is deleted,
and the value of the variable'Y is the reading of the subject
.NP. Our new notation thus provides that when open is used
intransitively, it will be interpret~d as a simple process
verb , with no caus al element in its meaning.-_
This notation .is rather elaborate, and one is naturally
interested to know what ~an be said for its inclusion in
linguistic theory. This is clearly related to the question
of what would be said by the inclusion of such a notation
in t~e defini tion of possible -granunar. The not"a tion perm.i ts
us to collapse two lexica~ entrie~ only when the verbs ih-
valved are phonologically identical" and only when their
senses are re~ated in a certain way. Chomsky (1965, 42-46)
.poi1\ts out tha t abbrevia tory conventions. of this sort are
vehicles for claims abou·t the way children learn language.s.
In this case, the claim seems to be that it is easier for
a child to learn the two uses of open than it is for him to
learn to use see and show, or ~ck and blacken. Otherwise
put, the claim shared by this new notation .and the theory
of'case grammar is that it is more natural for a language
to contain verbs like open than it is for a language to
contain pairs of verbs like kill and die.
Is this claim about naturalness' correct, or is it
.wasted effort to try to duplicate the ~implification
effected in the lexicon of a case gramrn~r? Fillmore
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(1968; ,30n) believes that II it is a language-particular
coincidence that English uses the same forrn" for both
transitive and intransitive senses of open. I cannot
think of any reason to dispute'this view. By Fillmore's
own lights, then, we must conclude that this bit of.lexicon
simplification embodies a false claim about what is natural
in lexical structure.
'In summary, none of Fillmore's syntacti~ arguments
appear to favor case grammar over the standard theory. The
attempt to define non-stativity in case terms failed, but
s,uccess would not have supported the theory of case gra'mmar,
since a parallel definition is possible within the standard,
theory. Furthermore, the feature [~stativeJ is somewhat
problematical in itself. Fillmore's heirarchy hypothesis.
abo~t'subject selection can also be incorp6rated into ~he
,standard theory, in the .form of universal constraints 'on
the process ,of semantic interpretation. One is not inclined
to carry. out the importation, however, for the ~eirarchy
hypothesis entails some unsupported and implausible p~ycho­
logical ~lai~s. In describing surface case systems; the
theory of case grammar 'enjoys no clear advantage over the
standard theory. Many of the lexical economies claimed
for case grammar are illusory, and the rest carry with them
a rather dubious claim' about naturalness, which Fillmore
himself rejects in another context.
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III. ,A METHODOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Fillmore (1966, 374) has argued that the theory of case
grammar enjoys certain "general advantages", in addition to
-its alleged semantic and syntactic virtues. These more
general advantages "relate to the interpretatio'n of histor--
idal changes and cross-language differences in lexical.
structure ll • In the history of English, for example, lik~
was once nan exception t,o the rule that fronted actants
are neutralized to the so-called nornin,ative forro u (Filirnol.-e
1966, 374).
(68)
(69)
The verb'like could appear in sentences like
-'-
Him like oysters~
He likes oysters.
(68), at that period of its history, but a ~hange took
place, and (69l superseded (68). This change, ,FilllTIOre
claims, is "purely syntactic ... like did not change
in its !!leaning" (Fill~ore 1966 r 374) ~ Case grammar has
the advantage, according'to Fillmore, of recognizing the
purely syntactic nature of this change.
A synchronic comparison of English kill and Japanese
korosu reveals that these verbs are exact synonyms, with
only syntactic differences. The Japanese verb requires an
animate subj~ct, while kill may have an inanimate Instrument"
phrase as its subject. Again, Fillmore '(1966, 374) suggests
that it is a virtue of case grammar to recognize the
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superficial character o~ the differences between these'
~ verbs, and their underlying ~eman~ic identity.
More recently, Fillmore (1970, 258-259) has used data
taken ~ritirely from present-day English to support this kind
of argument. T,he adoption of a case ,theory, he cl,aims r
"makes it possible tq provide a sharp separation between
purely syntactic phenomena ... and facts about semantic
.'
interpretation II • For example, the differences (bebveen buy 7
. ~-~---~~~_._--'~~~'.-'\','
and sell, kill and die, and the two uses of open,)~
/
~yn,on'ymous •
~-------- -,.~
.Advocates of generative semantics have argued that it
is mi~leading to draw any such sharp distin~tion between
syntax and semantics as Fillmor~ proposes. These linguists
are ,not likely, then, to v~ew Fillmore.'s observations as an
argument in favor of case grammar.' . Defenders of the standard
theory, however, will not be at all in~lined to dis~gree with
Fillmore's claim that syntax and semantics are distinguishable
~nterprises. Katz (1970) has in fact '~ecently presented
empirical arguments on behalf of this position.
It may be, of course, that while Fillmore agrees that
a line betwe~n syntax and semantics must be drawn somewhere,
he is ·finding fault with the place at which the standard
theory draws it. A closer look reveals, however, that there
is considerable agreement between Fillmore's l~xicon and
Katz's. ,On Katz's analysis of ~onverse pairs of verbs, like
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lend and borrow, these verbs get identical lexical entries
except for the markers above categorized variables. These
markers refer to grammatic~l relations, and i~dicate the
pos~tions at which to insert the readings for subject,
direct object, etc. into the lexical reading for the verb.
The vocabulary of these markers is exclusively syntactic.
It seems fair, then, to say that a Katzian lexicon describes
lend and ~orrow as synonyms, with only syntactic differences,.
Similarly, Fillmore's analysis of the historical change in
like; and of the, difference b~tween Japanese korosu and
English ki 11, is not in disagreement wi th the trea.tnlent",
these matters would receive under the standard theory.
There is disagreement, however, about kill and die,
and about the two uses of open. The l.exica'l entries for
kill and for .transitive ,open both contain the 'semantic
. marker (Cause) in a sta~dard grammar" of Engli~h, whereas
the entries for die and for intransitive open do not~ To
this ext~nt, these words are represented as semantically
distinct., Fillmore maintains that these verbs are really
s¥nonymous ( and he claims this fact. as evidence 'in favor
of case grammar, which recognizes their synonymy.
But is it really a fact that kill·and,d.ie are synonyms?
How does one find out about such things? The intuitions of
any speaker of English can tell him that there is a close
relationship between these two, words, but on that the
$tandard theory agrees with Fillmore. We want to know
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more specifically whether the close sernantic"relatipnship
between these two verb~ is one of synonymy, and' on this
question, native speakers cannot be expected to have' mean-
ingful intuitions, simply in their capacity as native
speakers. The question is a technical one, having t9 do
with the form of lexical e.ntries, and to 'und~rstand the
q~estion, one must have a certain amount 6£ training in
linguistic theory.
Fillmore is claiming to have carved Nature at the
joints, specifically at the joints between syntax and
semantics. The joints of Nature are not dir~ctly visible,
'however, to the inner eye of linguistic intuition. To
decide which of two theories has·a better grasp on Nature's
joints, we first confront these theories with "the facts.
Are·there facts wbich refute one theory, 'while supporting
the other? Does one theory explain a wider' range of facts
than the other? If both theories remain unrefuted, and
explain, the sa~e phenomena, we turn to considerations 'of
theoretic~mPlicity·t~decide the is~ue. To say that
kill and die are synonymous is to,say that they get ident-
i6al lexical readings in the best supported~ or simplest,
theory of English.
The methodological argument for case grammar is not
a marshalling of facts to 'settle the ·disagreement between
Fillmore's lexicon and Katz's. No~ is "it an" appeal to
~heoretical simplicity~ -Rather, it is a promissory note
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for an argument, a parochial description of the disagr~ement
between. case grammar an,d the standard theory over the prope,r
lexical treatment of kill,and .die. This argument attempts
to make virtue of necessity, by taking a claim which follows
from the theory of case grammar, and suggesting that this
claim is somehow obvious to all Engli,sh .spea~ers. On
examination, then, the me~hodological ar~u~ent for case
grammar is not an independent argument at all. The case·
for ~ase must rest on the semantic and syntactic arguments
discussed in s~ctions I. and II.
Fillmore I S _sem~ntic Q.rgument did not actually establi-sh
tne need for semantic roles in deep structure, because the
semantic representations (though not the d~ep' structures)
provided by the standard theory contain complete information
on the- semantic roles of consti tuents." On the debi t side I
a case grammar has diffi~ulty capturing the semant~c dis-.
tinction between holistic and partitive Loc'atives, -arid the
t~eory of case grammar needs additional apparatus to
exhibit the entailments of sentences containing Agents,
Instruments, and Goals. Synta6tically, the.effect~ of
adopting the theory of case grammar do not include any
significant s.impli fica tion in the lexicon, nor in the
rules .for surface case marking. The hypothesis about a
universal subject selection heirarchy has s~me implausible
psycholinguistic consequences. Fillmorels attempt to
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define the feature [+stativeJ in terms of the Agentiv~
case fails. It appears th~t the case for case can be
dismiss~d.
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Footnotes
* I am grateful to Dr. Donald Frantz, of the summer Institute
of Linguistics, and to Greg Thomson, one ,of our students at the
Institute, for a sympathetic introduction to the theory of case
grammar. Prof. Jerrold Katz encouraged me to examine Fillmore's
work in a more critical light~ and his guidance in the revision
of earlier drafts of this paper has been most valuable. Prof.
Noam Chomsky and Prof. Steve Anderson read the penultimate draft,
and several changes have resulted from their comments. This
work was supported in part by NIH grant 5 TOl HDOOlll.
1. I have changed' the numbering on Fillmore's examples, here
and throughout this paper.
2. The bracketed remark is Fillmore's.
3. Steve Anderson has pointed out to me that Fillmore's one--
occurrence-per-proposition constraint on case nodes amounts to a
reformulation of Chomsky's uniqueness requirementsg
Recently, Fillmore (1971, 54-55) has expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the practice of representing semantic roles by means of
case nodes in tree-diagrams, but so far as I can see, the argu-
ments to be presented here do not depend on the continuation of
this practice. Indeed, it is not clear to me, from Fillmore's
brief sketch of his reform proposal, whet~er the formulation he
now prefers is different in any substantive ~espect from his
'l968 formulation.
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4. Fillmore's argument may also be construed in the follow-
ing way: "Grammatical relat~ons, tn deep structure were int'ended
solely to carry information about' semantic roles. The relations
,defined ~y Chomsky do not, however, serve this purpose at all
adeq~ately. T~erefore, no motivation'remains for having deep
.structures to which Chomsky's def ini tion"s can be applied." For a
rebuttal to this argument,' cf. Katz 1972; 1"11-li3 •
.'
5. My argument (pp~ 13-22) derives in part from, some insights
~y Chomsky (1972, 98-99).
6. Nouns in Algonkia~ ~an9~ages are syntacti6al1y,ei~herani-
mate ,or inanimate in gender I but as in Indo-E~ropean l.anguages',
syntactic and semantic gender do not always ~gree. r1any nouns
are syntactically anirnate but semantically inanimate, -e.g.
Cheyenne mhaa 'melon l •
7. 'rhis l~xical entry is a simplified version of the entry
proposed by Katz (1972, 358). For a discussion of process verbs
arid temporal var iables, cf II, Ka tz 1972 , C11apter 7.
8. This generalization is meant to combine the virtues of
two. statements by Anderson (1971, 390).
9. Anderson {1971, 388)-numbered this example (5)" d.
10 •. Some but not all of Anderson's examples are discussed,
and similar conclusions are· reached, in Chomsky (1972, 101-102).
11.- The subject selection rule will already have applied at
this'point (Fillmore 1968, 35-36).
Fillmore's recent work requires a slight change in the for-
mulation of this object-selecting transformation. Since the
cases now appear in deep structures in a uniform linear order,
dictated by the subject choice heirarchy (Fillmore 1971, 37),
'the object selection rule will be an optional transformation that
moves the Goal phrase ~ the wall tO l the object position from its
normal deep-st~ucture position to the right of paint.
'Anderson's argument against the object selection rule assumes
that sentences like (22), (30), ~nd (31) arise out 'of simple, one-
clause deep struct~res in which Instrument and Goal are co-
constituents. Fillmore (1971, 45-46) has r~cently.posited com-
plex, multi-clause deep structures for, sentences like (22), (30),
a'nd (31), and this deprives Ande.rson of the particular verbs he
used in his argument. However, there are other verbs which
behave in the requisi te ways vis-a-vis "the obj ect selection rule.
In place of smear,. we can use the verb hi t', which takes both
instrument and Goal arguments; either of these arguments may
app~ar as .the direct object in surface structure (cf'. John hit
the fence with his cane '. to which the obj ect selection rule has
~pplied, versus John -hit his~ against the fence, to which the
rule .has . not ap.plied). The verb ~pen resem1?les Anderson I s cover,
in that the object selection rule must apply to sentences con-
taining open (cf. *John opened his credit card of the door, in
which the order of post-verb constituents follows the deep-
.~tructure orde~ imposed by the subject selection heirarc~y,
versus John opened the ~oor with his credit card, in which the
,constituents have been rearranged by the object selection rule).
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Finall~, throw i.n Anderson's argument may be 'rep1acl?d by frighten,
to which object selection cannot apply (cf. *Lucy frightened a
snake to Schroeder I to wnich the rule has ap,plied, versu.s LU~
fri9htened Schroeder with a ~nake, in which the constituents
oc~ur in their II natural li order).
12._ Fillmore (1968,. 48-49n) cites sp~ay, bla~~, open, and
break as lIexarnples of hornonymy".
13. A conversation with Ned Block helped to clarify my
understanding of the' psychological issues between Fillmore and
Anderson. For so~e f~rther remarks on the psychological implica-
tions of case granunar, pertaining to sUbj-ect selection rather
. than object selection, see pp. 50-52 of this paper.
14. It would be a mistake to give (32) a~b identical seman-
tic representations, however. CfQ Katz 1970-, 253n for discussion
of' a sirnilar example. Neither Katz 1 F illrnore, nor I have any
suggestions about how to represent the semantic difference
between, (32) a and (32). b.
15. For simplici ty,. 'r have eliluinated the Mod and Prop nodes
from these structures.
16. To be sure, Fillmore does not absolutely have to predict
entailments in terms of case structures. He could, for example,
'predict entailments in terms of semantic representations, i.e.
serna~tically interpreted case structures. But a great deal of
- .
semantic information is already available in case structures, in
the form of case. labels on NP's; the process of, se~antic
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interpretation can only add semantic information that depends on
the meanings of particular lexical items in the sentence.' Back in
the days of the Factitive case, Fillmore quite clearly 'regarded
the entailment from (34) a to (34) b as an entailment which held,
not by virtue of the'lexical meaning of write, but by virtue of
the case properties of this verb. I am assuming that he still
holds ,this view, and that Figures 5 and 6 provide ~ll the semantic
information we need to predict' the entailment under discussion.
17. If Fillmore's dontinuing analysis of agency uncovers
other aspects of the meaning of the Agentive case, then presumably
-it will be possible to devise some new, ad hoc semantic marker to
distinguish ~gents within the standard theory. To call such a
marker ad hoc is ,simply to give credit to case grammarians for the
insights they may develop ,into the nature of agency. To call the
ad hoc device a semantic marker, rather than a case label, is to
p01nt out that su~h insights can be stated within the format of a
Katzian lexicon. These insight~ would not 'provide evidence of the
, formal inadequacy of the standard theory.
18. Susumu Kuno,makes a somewhat similar point in "Some Pro-
perties of Non-re£e~ential Nou~ Phrases ll , Studies in Oriental and
General Linguistics, R. ~akobson and S. Kawamoto, eds., Tokyo,
The-TEe Company, 1970.
19. Until we discover a clear definition for the Agentive
case ,- it will be difficult to tell Agents from r'nstrurnents. other-
wise, however, the cases should be recognizable in lexical entries
for verbs,. on the basis ,of the criteria sketched in section I.
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20. Fillmore (1970, 257) describes rob and steal as converses.
These verbs differ in their obj ect selection ·properties·, though
both take Agentive subjects, and are thus reg~lar with respect to
the subject selection process. Whenever a pair of converses
differ in their subject selection processes, however" one member
of" the pair must obviously be irregular, and both may be. In
this connection, see also the discussion of the object~selection
propertie~ of smear, cover, and throw, pp. 23-31 of this paper.
21. Given Fillmore's present views, he might want to regard
. .
blame as a complex predicate, with 'an Experiencer subject plus an
embedded S containing an Agent (or Instrument) and a Goal. Lex-
ical. entries (57)-(58)., and· rules (55)-(56), could be change¢! to
reflect this analysis, but so far as I can see, these changes
would not alter the conclusion of this.discussion, but only its
complexity.
22. I am indebted to Janet Fodor for calling my attention to
this fact and its implications.
23. Ray Dougherty makes .th~ same· point irl "Recent ~tudies on
Language Uni.versals," f?undations of Language. 6, ·520'-525. There
- are of course uses of £z which are not accounted for either by
the standard- passive rule or by Fillmore's amended rule. Consider,
for example, !!;:.~ th.e UF'?. £x. the ~ight of" the ~, or The U~O
landed by the autholise .'
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Leibniz, in his New Essays on Human Understanding, maintains
tl1at there are certain II truths II or "principles ll , which lIeverybody
knows II innately, rather .than on the basis of II th~ ex,ternal doc-
trine" of sensory exper~ence (Leibniz, 1704, ,77). Noam Chomsky
has argued that the findings of transformational linguistics
II are fully in accord ~lvi th the doctr ine of inna te ideas n, as, tha t
- -
dqctrine was defended by Leibniz and, other classical rationalists.
Indeed, Chomsky suggests that the theory of generative grammar
" "u can be regarded as providing a k'ind of substantiation and further
developme'nt of this ,doctrine" (Chomsky 1967, 10). It _~s apparently
Chomsky's view that a child learning a language has innate np~opo-
sitional knowledge" of .. the linguistic univ"ersals" (Stich 1971,
480); that is, the language, learner knows (innately) the propo-
sitions which make up ,general linguistic theory, ,or. the theory
of universal grarnmar. 1
Not surprisingly, Ch~msky's claims about innate lingu~stic
knowledge have generated widespread controversy. Another, quite
distinct (and equally controversial) claim made by rationalistic
linguists is that "speakers [tacitly] know the grammatical rules
of their language", as those rule~ are represented in a trans-
formatiollal granunar of their language (Graves" Katz, et al. ,in
press). That is, a native speaker of English has tacit propo-
sitional knowledge of princ~ples belonging 'to particular grammar,
as well as those belonging to universal grammar. These contro-
versial knowledge claims are based on a much- less controversial
one: that every English speaker knows (or can easily determine,
in an indefin'i tely large number of cases ) that 11 pa"rti'cular,
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expressions have certain grammatical,properties", eg. that
'uliThe. Qat is, on the ,,-rna.t" is graI1Ul\atical n (Graves , Katz, et al .
. in press). This relatively ~ncontroversial knowledge claim
might be described as the claim that "speakers have proposi-
tional knowledge of the consequences of the rules of thelr
grammar II (Stich 1971, 481).
This ,paper examines arguments by three critics of lin-
guistic rationalism., . For convenience I' have, structured the
discussion in terms of the traditional analysis of knowledge
as justified true belief. First we shall consider' a paper by
R. Edgley, in which he argues that our innate linguistic beliefs
(if any) cannot be justified beliefs, and hence cannot be
instances (at least, not paradigmatic instances) of knowledge.
Edgley also objects, -like many others, to the concepts of
implicit belief anq inference. .Next ~e shal~ exarni~e Quine's
thesis of the indetermin~~y of translation. If that thesis is
correct, then certain of our linguistic ,beliefs are not true
(nor false), and for this reas~n fail to qualify as knowledge.
Finally, we shall look at _Stephen Stich's contention, that we
have no beliefs,'let alone any knowledge, about universal or
particular grammar.
One might suppose that such objections pose no threat to
the rationalist's knowledge claims, because of Edmund Gettier's
(1963) well-known attack on the traditional analysis of know-
-,ledge. This supposition would be mistaken, however. To see
that Gettier has not provided rationalists with a defense
82
against Edgley, Quine, and Stich, let us look briefly_at one of
Gettier
'
s counterexamples.
·Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain
job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the
following conjunctive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and
Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Proposition (d) entails:
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins
in his -po<;:ket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d)
'to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which
he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly
justified in believing that (e), is true'.
But imagine, furth~r, that unknown to'Srnit~, he himself,
not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith,
he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Pr6~osition (e)
~s then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith
infe-rred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of ,the
following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith Belteves
that. (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is 'justified in believing
that (e). is true. But it is equally clea'r that Smi th does
not know that (e) is true ... (Get.tier 1963, 122i. emphasis
Gettier's)
This example shows, as Gettier points out, that justifica-
tioni truth, and belief do not together constitute I'a sufficient
condition for someone's knowing a given proposi~ion" (Gettier
.1963, 123; emphasis Gettier's). But the objections of Edgley,
Quine, and Stich do not depend on the .assumption that justifi-
cation, truth, and belief are jointly sufficient to guarantee
knowledge. These objectors require only the assumption that
these conditions are severally necessary for knowledge. 2 The
view Gettier has refuted, then,- is not a view that Edgley,
Quine, and stich have to take in order to support their
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objections against tacit and innate linguistic knowledge. Thus
Gettier has not provided rationalists with a ready-made defense
against these critics.
I. EDGLEY: JUSTIFICATION AND BELIEF
Let us turn, then to ,Edgley)s paper. First, we shall exam-
ine his critique of the ra~ionalist argument' for innate knowledge
of linguistic universals. On the basis of th"is 'examination, I
shall sketch what I take to be Edgley's views (never explicitly
'stated) on how one goes ,about justifying a knowledge claim. In
order to provide further substantiation for that sketch, we shall
then look at the way Edgley tries to show that we know (the
grammar of) English. Finally, I shall reply to Edgley's cri-
tique of the rationalist argument, and to the views which appear
to underlie that critique.
Edgley maintains that there can be only one argument to
support "the strong claim' that what is innate [in the language
learning process] is not merely mental structure, and not merely
Humean riatural belief, but knowledge I' (Edgley 1970, 30). That
argument, which Edgley attributes to Chomsky, rests on the
following principle, which he attributes to Hurne. ,(I shall
ac60rdingly refer to it as Hume l s principle.)
, •• if someon~ knows that something is the case on the
basis of, or in consequence of, certain evidence or data,
it follows that he must already know, explicitly or im-
plicitly, whatever else (if anything) is necessary for
what he consequentially knows to be logically derivable
. from what he already knows' in· conjunction wi·th the data.
(Edgley 1970, 30)
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By Chomsky I s aceo.unt, a child .acquires knowledge of, the grammar
of his language on .the b,asis of ',certain primar.y linguistic· data
(Chomsky 1965, 30-37). But "sinc,e [this data] is 'inadequate,
.he must [according to Hume's principle] know some suppressed
major prernis~ from which, in conjunction wit~ the evidence, his
consequential knowledge logically follows" (Edgley 1970, 30).
We must describe the child's innate language-learning endowment
as knowledge, because "anything less wouid not account for the
fact· that the output of the'language-learning situation is it-
self knowledge~' (Edgley 1970, 30). The premisses of the argu-
men't, then,
'(1) A native speake~ of any ,language knows t~e grammar
. of that language on the bas'is of, primary linguistic
data drawn from, that language.
(2) . The grammar of a language is 'not logically derivable
from the primary linguistic data available to language
learners.
(3) The grammar of a', language is' logically derivable
from the principles of universal gralnmar, in con-
junction with the sort of primary ,linguistic data
available to language learners.
apart from Hume's pr'inciple, are (I)., (2-) I and (3). abo"ve.
As I remarked in the preceding paragraph, Chomsky's account
of language learning seems clearly to commit him to (1). He
also argues (Chomsky 1965, 47-59) for claims very much like
. .
(2) and (3). To this exte~t, Edgley has portrayed Chomsky's
~osition faithfully. But notice that Hume's principle requires
something slightly stronger than (3). Burne's principle only
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allows us to infer that a language learner knows the theory'of
universal granunar if knowledge of that theory i·s IInecessary for
what he consequentially knows to be. logically derivable from
[that theory plus] the data". That is, we are only allowed to
supplement the data with the weakest theory sufficient to permit
inference from the data to the acquired grarnm~r.
It ,might appear that Chomsky.holds this stronger version
of (3). In one passage, for example, he writes" "A considera-
tion of the character Of the grammar that is acquired, [and of]
. the degenerate quality and narrowly limited extent of the avail-
able data ... leave[~J littl,e hope that ... , the 'language can be
learned by an organis~ initially uninformed as to i~s general
character" (Chomsky 1965, 58). Universal grammar is of course
intended to specify the child's initial information about the
general character of human language. But a child might be able
to learn English with less (or less general) information than the
'entire theory of universal grammar. Chomsky postulates knowledge
of univer,sal granunar in order to explain not merely' the child's
learning of English, but his ability to learn any human language
(cf .. Chomsky 1969a, '61-64). O,therwise put, Chomsky wishes to
explain language-learning competence, not ~erelr language~learning
performance. Hume's principle seems concerned only with the
learning performance of a single individual, and in this respect
the argument sketched" by Edgley is hardly a Chomskian one.
But the ar,gument based on Hume I s p~i.nciple departs from
the rationalist position in another respect, and the departure
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I have in" mind is, I believe, important to an understanding of
Edgley's views on the verification" of knowledge claims. The
most succinct pre~entation of the rationaiist argument "that I
know of was wri tten "about three years after Edgley's. paper, but
tha~ presentation differ~ from those available to Edgley,. it
seems to me, only in its succinctness. For convenience, the~
I propose to refer to the recent, brief version of the argument.
Here is the heart of it:
If the best account of how speakers learn grammatical
rules says that they learn them on the basis of certain
innate linguistic principles PI' ... , Pn that determine
a grammar G with respect to some class D of ,primary lin-
guistic data, then there is a deduction of G from D and
Pl, ... , Pn - (Gra~es, Katz, et ale in press)
The argument assumes that a native speaker knows the rules
of G, the" grammar of his language. This much follows from pre-
mise (1) of Edgley'~ argument. Also, the argument intludes~
among its premises something amounting to (3): there is a
deduction of G from D and ?1' •.. , P n - But there is another
premise in the Graves-Katz argument 3 which has no counterpart
. .
in Edgley's version." That is the claim that the best.explana-
tion of the way the speaker came to know G is that he deduced
it from other things he knew, viz. D and Pi r ••• , P n .
It seems clear that Ed~ley intends his argument t6 be a
deductive one; he means for the conclusion (4) to follow
(4) The native speaker of any language knows the
prl.n(::~ples of universal granunar.
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deductively from .Burne's principle, together with (1), :(2), and
(3). The argument ,given, by G'rave"s, Katz, et a,l., hOvJever,' does
not appear to be a deductive One,' and it does not appear to
.require Hume's principle. The rationalist argument is rather
a sort of in4uctive argumenf, specifically an argumeht to the
. best explanation. They argue that if the best expl~nation for
an established fact (namely, our knowledge ,of particular grammar)
says that we know the theory of universal grammar, then we pro-
pably do know that theory., What renders the' ascription of in-
nate knowledge plausible, according to the rationalists, is the,
explanatory value of that ascription~ But of course false
the~iies may enjoy a'degree of explan~tory power, so, even in-
elusion in the best available explanatory theory provides no
deductive guarantee of truth for the ascription of innate know-
leage.
The Graves-Katz argument, I have suggested, can get on
nicely without Hume's principlee But in order to establish_the
explanatory value of the rationalist account of language learning,
one might wish to appeal to something like the converse of Hume's
(5) If someone knows'p, and validly deduces q from p,
-then that person-also knows q.
principle, namely (5).4 On a deductivist theory 'of explanation,
at any rate, one could make'a prima facie case for 'the ration-
alist explanation by pointipg out that the explariandurn, (6) ~
'(6) SUbje~t A knows gramrnar G.
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(7) Subject A knows data D and principles PIt ••• , Pn .
(8) Subject A deduced G from D and PI, ... , Pn .
is entailed by the conjunction of (5) with the rationalist
claims (7) and (8). I s'hall have more to say about ~ulne IS
p~inciple, and the deductive character of Edgley's argument,
'later on.
Now" however, it is time to look at Edgley's 'criticisms
of the rationalist argument. He has two critici~ms. First,
Hume's condition, he argues, imposes a condition on knowledge
that is "too stringent even in normal cases "'; and 'seco~d, the
,process of learning a lang,uage is 11 far f~om ~eing ~ normal case
of the acquisition of knowledge" (Edgley 1970, 30~31).
On t'he first point, he wri tes: .
... it is odd, on the face of it, th~f Chomsky should
insist on· such stringent conditions fo~ conseque~tial know-
ledge and 'allow such' ,lax condi tions for innate knowledge:
to know a language a child needs not on'ly. the data but
also .k~owledge of the general form of any human grammar;
but he can apparently know the general form of any human
grammar without so much as a scrap of evidence .... If
·we try to account for knowledge by tightening up the
standards to an almost impossible pitch in one place, we
shall have to relax them beyond reason in another; as in
other. contexts, the price of a Puritanical ~xt~rior is an
. interior where anything goes. (Edgley 1970, 31)
In this passage, Edgley points out that the rationalist argu-
ment does nothing to show that our innate beliefs about human
language are justified'beliefs. But his point is not merely
that th'is argwnent fails to show justifi'cation for', o'ui inna·te
beli~fs~ If that were his only objection, we might hope to
89
find some other argument that would satisfy the demand for
justification. In another passage, however, Edgley has argued
. that the search for such 'an auxiliary argument is bound to fail.
He points out that in classi'cal rationalism, the principles
alleged to be known 'innately were "so ba~ic or rudim~ntary that
it was from a logical point of view unnecessary for {them] to
be justified". These principles were either "involved in the
ve,ry notion of justifica~ion", or else they "could not be under-
'stood without Itheir] truth being accepted". But lithe very
contingency" of Chomsky's universal grammar makes empirical
justification necessary. On the other hand, its very innate-
ness ~~kes empirical justification impossible, for surely no
prenatal experience the child may have could provide him with
any information relevant to the, truth or falsity of universal
grammar. (Edgley 1970, 29)
Edgley·s first objection, then, is that the rationalists
have not shown, and cannot show,. that our innate linguistic
beliefs are justified; to call such unjustified beliefs know-
ledge is to relax the standards "beyond reason". Edgley
'expla~nsChis second criticism in the.following way:
••. until the process of language acquisition has
gone far enough to give the child a fair mastery of the
language, he occupies, with the birds, bees and fishes,
that area where the application pf the concepts of belief
and knowledge are essentially disputable. Even more dis-
putable are the concepts of reasoning and inferring in-
volved in my paradigm example. 5 Positively inapplicable
are the concepts in terms of which Chomsky models the
.child's acquisition of language-- the concepts of forming
hypotheses about- linguistic structure and testing them _
against the evidence. Chomsky is, of course, fully aware
that this picture of the child as a scientific genius is
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only a 'formal reconstruction of the language-learning
si tuation. But it' is only in the context of this picture
that .... the i.nput ,{can be plausibly] represented as data
or evidence, ... and'the consequential knowle~ge of the
language represented as inferred from, or logically based
on, the data, which then become the childls reasons just-
ifying his claim to know the language. (Edgley 1970, 31)
In the pa~sage just quoted, we may (although Edgley did not)
distinguish two separate objections to the rationallst argument.
The first of these objections consists in the remark that the
11'
application of the concept of belief to non~verbal or pre-verbal
organisms is lIessentially' ·disputable". Three pages back, Edgley
has. suggested th.at "when ,some,one is able to, ,use and .understand
word~ and so ,make st~tement·s,· the concepts of belief and know-
I'edge become clearly applicable, 'beca,use what a person believes
or knbws can be identified as what he says"~ Dogs, birds, and
fish, however ,_ "whose behaviour ... ' does not include their use
,of .- ... words", fall wi thin nan essentially disputable area of
applica tion 11 of the concepts of belief and knowled·ge. (Edgle)l
1970, 28)
According to this objection, it is necessary condition on
someonels knowing the principles PI' ... , Pn that he believe
those principles. Now "correct application rof psychological
concepts such as belief] is determined by a range of cri teria II ,
and the standard criter~on for belief directs us to.a personls
verbal behavior: a person believes proposition p if he utter~
some sentence expressing p.. (Edgley 1970, 28) Know~edge of
~inguistic theory is supposed to be.a precondition for language
learning, but wOe can hardly hope' to catch children, asserting
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princip'les of linguistic theory, ei ther a t the, beginning of the
, language acqui~ition process or (in most cases) at any o~her
time in their lives., 'Indeed, as Stich points out, most ~eqple
"are incapable of recognizing [principles of" universal grammar]
when presented"; many are even "incapable of' understanding them"
(Stich 1971, 486). On our principal criterion of b~lief, Edgley
argues, linguist~c theory fails dismally.
It is'well worth noting that this same objection applies
against the claim that ~ative speakers know the rules of the
grammar of their language., Again, most native speakers do not
assert any of those rules at any time in their lives; even when
presented wi th rules of ·the'ir grammar I they do not recogni ze
them as such. If the claim that we believe principles of
universal, granunar is "essentially disputable ll , then the claim
that we know principle,s of particular, grammar is disputable on
th~ very same grounds.
But Edgley has a further objection to 'the rationalist
arg~ment. That objection is that premise (1) is not literally
true, so our kncwledge of English grammar does not satisfy the
'antecedent of Iiume's' 'principle. The granunar of English is not
something we know to be the case ,lion the basis of .•. certain
evidenc~ or data". A child -learning English benefits from var-
ious inputs (parental corrections" for example), but these in-
puts are not literally evidence on the basis of which the child
,makes inferences about English grammar. Only in the context of
a formal reconstruction of language learning does it make sense
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to describe these inputs as evidence, or data. This may be
enough to give (1) a kind of metaphorical truth, but ~ume's
pr~nciple requires .the literal truth of (1)
I wish to defer my- comments on. these objections until later.
".For ~he present, we shall only use these objections as a basis
for reconstructing Edgley's conception of the way knowledge ·claims
are to be established. First, I think these objections arise out
of a belief that arguments in support of knowledge claims must
be deductive arguments; inductive arguments, or anyway arguments
to the best explanation, are clearly not sufficient, in Edgley's
view, to ground knowledge claims. This claim about Edgley's
v£ews is further borne out, I thirtk, by the way he mi~read the
rationalis~ argument: he took it to be a deductive argument,
something it was surely never irttended to be.
Second, it would appear that the major·premise in such an
argument must state a set, of criteria fo~ applying the concept
of knowledge. Edgley actually ~tates such a' list of criteria
in his paper. In order for someone to know that it will snow
tomorrow, it is necesiary (and sufficient), Edgley maintains,
that three conditions b~ satisfied:
First, it must be true that it will· snow tomorrow.
Second, he must' not only believe that it will snow tomorrow
but believe with that degree of conviction that amounts to
being sure or certain. Third, his certainty must be just-
ified not simply by its being true that it will snow, nor
even by there being good reasons for thinking that it will
snow, but by his having good reasons for being certai,n --
reasons good enough, that is,. to excluqe reasonable doubt
93
that it will snow tomorrow. Fulfillment of these condi-
tions would make this a paradigm case of. knowledge.
(Edgley 1970, .28-29,),
By a "paradigm case of knowledge", E~gley means a case in
which our application of th~ concept of knowledge is minimally
IIfaltering and' uncertain'lI (Edgley 1970, 28)., Any case which
satisfies these three criteria, then, will be a c~s~, Edgley
predicts, to which we will apply the cbncept of knowledg~ with-
. "
out hesitation or uncertainty. I take Edgley to hold, further,
that where it cannot be shown that these three conditions are
sa~isfied, we find it difficult to, decide whether or not to
apply the concept of knowledge~ Here the attribution of know-
ledge may be altogether false, or it ,may be that we know some~
thing I bu~ in a non-paradigmatic sen·se of know. Even such 'non-
. pa,radigma~ic knowledge claims must ·apparently be justified by
·appe.ai to criteria, however, and it se-ems that the criteria
appealed to must always be derived from those which define the
paradigmatic concept of knowledge. Edgley, at any rate, follows
this practice. In two arguments we shall look at presently, he
claims th~t we know (the grammar of) English in a non-paradig-
matic sense, because our. kno\'11edge of Eng.lish gr'ammar fulf'ills
"laxer conditions, which are, so to speak, natural. analogues
of the stricter logical conditions" on knowledge (Edgley 1970,
33) .6.
Third, and finally, Ed,g1ey seems to re.qui·re more or less
~irect ver~fication, ~y standard methods, of the minor premisses
in arguments for knowledge claims--the premisses which state
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that each of the relevant criteria has been satisfied. Thus,
for example, unless we can show that someone has uttered 'a
sentence that expresses PI' which would be the usual or direct
way to establish that the person believes PI' the claim that he
b~lieves PI has ~ot been established peyond reasonable. doubt.
Until that kind of verification can be found, the belief claim
is "essentially disputablen~ I suspect· that this attitude. under-
lies' Edgiey's third obj~ction as well. In order to determine
what evidence a person has for a 'given belief, we generally ask
hi~. But obviously we cannot'expect very satisfactory results
if we ask a naive speaker of English to .state, his reasons for
believing some principle of English grammar. Perhaps .this is
Edgley l s reason' for maintaining that the grammar. underlying' one1s
competehce as a native spe~ker'is nat'.literally inferred from the'
primary ling~istic data one encounters a~ a child.
We have seen that Edgley rejects Chomsky"~ claim of innate
linguistic knowledge, and the rationalist argument 'in support
of that claim. I have suggested that.Edgley'pl~ces three require-
ments on arguments in support of knowledge claims, and 'that he
.. +.ejects the rationalist 'argument because it fails to satisfy
these requirements. I wish now to examine two arguments which
Edgley offers in support of the' claim that we have intuitive
(tacit) knowledge of (the grammar of) our language. This exam-
ination will, I believe, furnish additional evidence that Edgley
does indeeq hold the views I have suggested concerning. arguments
for knowledge claims; it will also lay the foundation for ,some
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critical comments on Edgley's views, and for a defense of the
rationalist claims about linguistic knowledge.
For expository convenience, I shall,discuss Edgley's second
argument first. Here is the central premise of that argument, in
Edgley's own words:
The claim that [a certain skill. or competence] is
knowledge is further strengthened precisely if the causal
or quasi-causal- explanation of how this competence was
acquired appeals to facts that, if they were attributable
to the person concerned as his reasons justifying the
claim to knowledge, would logically support that claim.
(Edgley 1970, 32)
An example will help to clari-fy this new cri terion of knowledge.
(This example also bears on another criterion, ,to be discussed
later~)
-In this way, for example, a woman may be said to know
intuitively or instinctively that her husband is worried
or anxious. The force of these ~dverbs I intuitively' and
'instinctively' is to imply on the one hand that the worry
or anxiety were not directly observed in any publicly check-
able sense, and on the other hand that she did not reason
it out, come to the conclusion, or infer, that her husband
was worried or anxious. We ascribe to her an intuition or
instinct for things of this sort if she tends to be right
about them on different occasions; and this 'faculty of
knowledge' can be explained, and confir~as knowledge,
if on this occasion, for instance, she thought that her
husband was worried or anxious because of the way he
looked at her or because of the set of his shoulders as
he walked or sat. The word 'because' here introduces a
fact that is neither simply an explanatory cause of her
thinking that he was worried or anxious, nor her reason
for thinking that he was',worried or anxious. But in being
a fact that would have been he~ reason, and in her circum-
stances of close acquaintance a good one, if she had not
only noticed, it but had drawn h~r conclusion from it, the
fact, in explaining her thought, also helps to justify it
as knowledge. This is not a central case of knowledge,
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but it is ~ufficiently like a central case to make the
application of the concept reasonable. (Edgley 1970,
32; emphasis ad-ded)
Edgley's new criterion of knowledge, expressed in the
'shorter of these two quotations, may be crudely restated as
follows:
(9) A knows that p if there is some fact ~, such that
(i) q is appealed to in the causal explanation of
how A carne to believe P to and (ii) q (perhaps in con-
junction with other relevant facts-which do not by
themselves support p)logically supports ~
Despi te ,i ts crudi ty, pr inciple (9) is close enough to Edgley's
intent for our purposes. If'we had a better paraphrase than
(9), that paraphrase would still succumb, I think, to my argu~
ment against (9) (cf. pp. 102-103 below). Moreover, the whole
of Edgley's discussion seems to accord fairly well with (9).
Edgley's example, from the underlined clause on, is meant
~o_~hed light on the criterion formulated in (9). Suppose we
call the woman Brenda, and- her husband Harry. Brend~ is able
to determine Harry's moods. According to the underlined clause,
this ability is an instance of knowledge. But further along in
the passage, it becomes clear that it is her thought, namely
'(10) Harry is worried.
(10), which is to be "confirmed as knowledge",_ The fact q
(11) Harry's shoulders have set S.
which confirms (10) as knowledge, by appearing in the causal
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explanation for Brenda's belief in (10) and by log~cally
supporting (10), is (11). But (11) does not support (10) all
by itself. It is only oecause of Brenda's "close acquaintance"
(12) Whenever Harry's shoulders have set S, Harry is
(almost) always worried.
with Ha~ry tnat (11) PXQvides a good reason for believing (10).
Her experience with Harry has made Brenda,highly competent at
determining his moods, and I sugg~st that '(12) -expresses part
of the intuitive knowledge underlying her competence. And of
course (11), .when conj oined wi th (12), 199ical1y supports (10).
The principle (9) seems to be derived from the justification'
condi tion, the third of the" condi tions whic~. (according to· Edgl~y) -
define the paradigmatic sense of know. In 6rder'for"someone to
know p in the paradigmatic se~se, that condition required that
the person in question have ngood reasons for being certai11"
that E (Edgley 1970, 29); the individual must know facts which
support p, and his belief in E must have arisen £rom an infer-
ence to p from those facts. The second.clause of (9) require~
that there be good reaso.ns for believing p, bu t (9) does not
require that the knower'have those (6r any other) reasons for
believing p. All (9) requires is that some of the facts that
could serve as the knowerls reasons, should play an essential
role in the causal explanation for the knower's belief in p.
Edgley appeals to the criterion (9). in giving a deductive
argument for the claim that a native speaker knows (the grammar
of) his language. Before we look at that argument~ let me .
, .
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explain why, in alluding to this argument, I have heretofore
enclosed the words the grammar of in parentheses. Edgley
(1970, 32-33), in describing the thesis to be argued for,
only calls it a thesis -about "knowledge of the language II , not
about knowledge of a. grammar. There are two reasons why -I
take him to be arguing for a thesis about propositional know-
ledge (of a gra~ar). First, if the thesis were that native
speakers know their language, i.e. that they know how to speak
and understand it, the thesis would be too trivial to warrant
an argument. Second, Edgley appeals to a principle that is
formulated in terms of logical support, and logical support is
a relation that holds between statements or propositions. If
certain facts provide logical support for what'the speaker
knows, then it must be a proposition (or something very much
like one) that he knows. But a proposition that formulate~
a speaker's knowledge of -his na tive language is a granunar.
Edgley's usage to the contrary notwithstanding, then, I shall
'henceforth abandon cautionary parentheses.
Edgley's argument from principle (9) runs as follows:
the child has been taught the use of words, i.e.
he has been exposed to the input data, and ... these data
constitute positive evidence that he could, if he were a
scientist, cite in justification of his claim to knowledge.
If this evidence is not only not evidence ,to him, in the
sense in which he literally uses it to test hypotheses,
but is moreover from the point of view of a formal recon-
struction logically inadequate to generate what he con-
sequentailly knows, an explanation of the child's competence
that links input to output through a mental structure that
the child shares with all other language users will confirm
rather than undermine the characterisation of the output as
knowledge; for.it will confirm the important practical·
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~mplication of "this characterisation, that the child's
ability to use \vords correctly was ,l10t just a fluke,
but will survive in unforeseen circumstances in the
future. This will not be a central case of knowledge;
but ,e •• it will be considerably closer to the centre
th~n Chomsky's alternative of innate knowledge. (Edgley
1970, 33)
In this argument, the IIfact n SI. which logically'supports
the speaker's belief (his grammar) is the body ~f primary lin-
guistic data to which he was exposed as,~ child (D in. the
~raves-Katz argument). These data are not sufficient to sup-
port the grammar on their own, however; they support it only
wh~n conjoined with principles of universal grammar. Edgley
presumably has such principles in mind when he ~peaks of a"
lI.mental 'structure that the child shares wi th all other lan-
g~age users n • T11e data thus sati sfy clause (i i)" of (9). But
these data play an essential role in determining. the specific
character of t[le acquired grammar (wi thi"n -the .limits imposed
by linguistic theory), so any adequate 'explanation of·the
acquisition of that grammar must take those data into account.
Hence the data also satisfy clause (i) of (9)'.
One might think that (9) could ~lso be used to argue that
we know at least some principles of universal grammar. For
many of those principles can be expressed in the form of
(13) Every psychologically possible human language has
a grammar with property P.
statements like (13). We do not as yet ,have a physiologic~l
explanatiori foi the origi~ of our belief in such principles,
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(14) ,Every normal child is born with genetic structure.
g.
but when such an explanation becomes available, it will pre-
sumably appeal to facts about genetic structure, like (14).
In conjunction' with information abou~ effects of structure ~
(15) Normal children 'are capable of' learning only thos~
languages whose grammar$ have rroperty,p.8 .
on l~arning and maturatio~, these genetic facts wilt pres um-
ably ent~il so~ething like (15). But (15) is equivalent to
(i3). Hence (l~) satisfi~s, c~~use (ii) of (9), for' it, (in con-
j?nction with other ielevant fac~s) logically support~ (13),
a principle of universal grammar. But (14) also s~tisfies
clause (i), since (14) is appea led to "in a cau.sal explan?i tion
of how we come to believe (13). Principle (9), as it is now
formulated, can be used to argue that we know universal as well
as particular grammar.
There is a fairly natural way to amend (9) so as to exclude
the argument just given. In the case of Brenda qnd Harry, the
fact q (that Harry's shoul¢lers had s'et S) was a 'fact that
Brenda was' at least tacitly aware of. The set of Hariy's
shoulders registered somehow in her nervous system; it was
the sort of thing psycholog~sts refer to, I believ~, as a
perceptual cue. Similarly, in the language acquisition case,
the primary linguistic data were facts that the child was aware
of.. In both cases, the causal ~xplanation of t11e resul tant
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belief cites not me~ely the truth of a certain fact (Harry's
shoulders have_set Si goed is not a correct past-tense verb form),
-"--
but the subject's awareness of that fact. I propose, therefore,
to add a third clause to_(9), requiring that the subject, A, be
aware of the fact~. The requisite.sense of aware may be tricky
to spell out, but let us suppose that the spelling can be done.
Such an amended version of (9) would, I think, exclude the argu-
ment of the previous paragraph, for there seems to be no reason
whatever to suppose that children are aware of their own or any-
one else's genetic- structure. The explanation of how we come to
have beliefs like (13) can proceed perfectly well 'without any
such aW,areness a,ssurnption.
I think Edgley would approve the suggested -amendment of
(9), motivated as it is by his own examples. But there is another
reason he might be expected to welcome the amendment. For in the
·amended version of (9), we have a criterion of knowledge under
which we know particular, "but not universal, granunar. Edgley
needs such a criterion, for we.found that his arguments against
innate knowledge work just as well against the claim that we
know the grammar of our native language. (That was perhaps to be
expected, for he was arguing that'we have no innate linguistic
knowledge of the paradigmatic kind, and he -holds ~hat our know-
ledge of particular grammar is not paradigmatic ei~her). As
.amendedi (9) provides the_first .motivation we have seen for
Edgley's discrimination against innate linguistic beliefs.
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But that motivation is not adequate, for (9) is false,
even in its amended version. For a counterexample, let us
revisit Brenda and Harry. - Let us suppose that they have
(16) There is a burglar in our room.
t~ken a hotel ro6m, and are now out on the town, trying to enjoy
themselves. Harry, however, is worried. If asked, he might
express his worry by asserting (16). Harry has not come to
believe (16) through any process of reasoning; he merely happens
(17) Harry and Brenda's room is number 413.
to be a latently superstitious person, and as.he and his .wife
checked in, he became aware (perhaps only vaguely) of "the fact
(18) There is a burgJ_ar in every odd-numbered room on
the fourth floor.
expressed in (17). Sornehow~ his awareness of that fact caused
him to believe (16). But (17) logically suppo~ts (16), when
conjoine,d with another fact, expressed in (18). (Perhaps the
leader of a gang of thieves, himself ,superstitious, saw an
oddly-shap~d numeral four in a dream the previous night.)
Thus (17) figures in the causal explanation of Harry's belief-
in (16); (17) logically supports (16) when conjoined with
another relevant fact, (18); and Harry is aware of the fact
expressed by (17). Clearly, though, Harry does not know (16)
under, these circurns tances, though (9) . (as amended). implies,
that he doesIl 9
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This countere~ample shows that Edgley's argument for tacit
knowledge of particular grammar is unsound, bec~use it refute~
(9'>, a key premise in that' argument. rrhe counterex~mpl~ does
not, however, refute the converse of (9). T~ough the ante~
cedent of (9) does not state a sufficient cond.ition for
ascribing knowledge, it might (for all my counterexample shows)
,s.tate a -nece-ssary cond'ition on kno'\vl.edge .ascriptions. If that
were the case, then Edgley would still be· able to argue, by
appeal to the converse of (9), t·hat we have no innate knowledge
of universal gramma~.lO· And since the antecedent of (9) is
weaker (easier to satisfy) than the justification conoition, it
would be plausible to argue, on the basis of- (9) 's converse,
that our innate linguistic beliefs do not even constitute a non-
paradigmatlc instance of knowledge. I shall comment. on this
possibility later, when I reply to Edgley's argument, based on
the justification con~ition, that ~e have no innate knowledge.
As we saw earlier, (9) is· a weakened version.of the justifica-
tion condition, and it seems to .me that (9) and the justifica-
tion condition are subject to the same difficult,y.
Before we turn to Edgley's other criterion of non-paradig-
matic knowledge, I wish to point out an ·a~ditional moral of 'the
counterexample just adduced. As noted earlier, it seems to be
Edgley's view that knowledge claims may be supported by appeal
to criteria other than the usual ones (truth, certainty or
pelief, and justification), provided that the criteria appealed
to are derived in some way from the standard criteria. Our
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discussion of (9) ha~ shown that a criter~on of knowledge must
-have more goirig for it than its relationship to one of the
conditions that i~ E tlgley ' s view define the paradigmatic sense
of know. If Edgley'~ other criterion is more plausibl~ than
(9), its plausibility will rest on something .other than simply
its resemblance to 0ile -of Edgley's conditions on central cases
of knowledge.
Edgley states his other criterion of non-paradigmatic
knowledge in the following passage:
..• as we telax the third condition in-my paradigm,
the condition requiring that the person ·to whom knowlegde
is ascribed ShO\lld .have reasons justifying his assurance,
the ap~lication of the concept demands, in compensation,
more stringent conditions of other kinds. The first con-
dition, or some analogue, is tightened up, and ~e require
not .simply that the person concerned should believe what
is true, or mor8 generally get something right, on one
occasion, but that he should continue to get things of
that sort right on other occasions: one and the same
skill or competence is then attributed to hi~ as being
exercised on these different occasions, i.e. his getting
these things right is an exercise of knowledge. (Edgley
1970, 32)
I shall call this the reliability criteri~~. I shall not argue
that the reliability criterion.is false. Rather, I shall suggest
that this criterion 1s a plaus.ible one, and that Edgley is mis-
taken about the sou~~e of its plausibility.
Recalling Edgleyls example, Brenda had reliable beliefs
.about Harry's moods, Because of this reliability, "we ascribe
to her an int~ition ~r instinct for things of this sort ll
(Edgley i970, 32). Now just what is .the knowledge that Brenda
105
exercises, on the various occasions when she assesses Ha~ry's
,mood correctly? I suggest that part at least of her kno~ledg~
is expressed by sentence ('12), which state_s that I-Iarry is always
worried when his shoulders have set S. When conjoined with a
relevant datum, to the effect that Harry's shoulder? now ~ave
set S, (12) entails the proposition Brenda believes on this
occasion; conjoined with similar data ~n other ~ccasions, (12)
(or 'some ,similar statement) will similarly entail .the other
statements about Harry's moods which Brenda knows on those
occasions.
Concerning our knowledge of particular grammar, Edgley
writes: liThe chief criterion for the application of the con-
cept of knowledge in this case is the fact that the child is
able to use w6rds correctly) i.e. that he can get things right
in a variety_ of situations" (Edgley 1910, 32-33). Now the
reliability criterion r~q~ires that there be- a class of state-
rnents concerning which the-knower must exhibit reliably correct
judgmen~. In Brendals case, these were statements which, like
(10), concerned Harry's mood. In the linguistic case, I
suggest that the appropriate class of statements includes state-
ments abou t the grammaticali ty and meaning of En'glish sentences.
(19) The men went home is grammatical ..
(20) Please pass the salt is a request that someone pass
the sale- -- ---
Statements (19) and (2-0) are two examples. When- a chi,ld uses
~he sentence The _men went home, he gives evidence tha t he
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believes the proposition expressed by (20): when, in response
to an utterance of Please pass the salt, he passes the salt to
the speaker, he gives evidence of a belief in th~ proposition
expressed by (20). Gradually, ,a child I s beliefs about meaning
alld grammaticali ty become highly reli,able. Th·is reliabili ty,
according to Edgley, const~tutes grounds ·for maintaining that
·the child kriows .some p~6position which entails .all his correct
jUdgments about meaning and grammaticality, and the grammar of
,English expresses just such a proposition.
The rel~ability criterion can also be used .to argue that
we know the theory of universal grammar, as it happens. For
there is a class of statements (name.ly, the class of -grammars
of natural.languages) such ~hat,.whenever we believe a state-
ment in that class, it is true; and the theory of universal
gramnlar, in conjunction with relevant data, entails each of
the particular-grammars. To be sure, most .people only know the
granuna'r of one language; they exercise only once in their lives
the competence they have in virtue of. their knowledge.of univer-
sal grammar. But the .scarcity of language-learning performances
in most of our lives should not be taken to show that"no com-
p~tence underlies that performance. To adapt a remark of
Edgley's, the child's learning to use words correctly was not
just a fluke; it was a highly reliable performance. This
. reliability is, I think, generally recognized; few would
. (21) For any human language L, if'A had been reared by
speakers of L, A would have learned the grammar of
.L.
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dispute the truth of (21), but (21) expresses a very strong
claim about the rel.iabil,i~y o'f children as lan,guage learners.
Edgley's reliability criterion is quite plausible, I
think. 'Now Edgley seems to think his criterion inherits its
plausibili ty from the truth condi tion, but I, .think this plaus-
i~ility has a different source: The reliability ~riterion
describes conditions under which an ascription of knowle~ge
has certain prima facie explanatory power. If someone's beliefs
about rna tters of a certain. kind (say, Harry I s mood's, or tlle
meanings 'of Engl_ish sentences) are. very oft.en correct, this
reli~bility calls for an explanation. One natur~l ex~lanation
i,s that the person in question has, some general knowledge about
such matters, and that his judgments. in individual cases are
derived from that general knowledge,. It is also natural 'to
.sugg~st (though Edgley does not) that the derivation of those
highly reliable individual judgments takes the form of an'
inference or a deduction.
There may be other grounds for rejecting such an explana~
tion, in terms of deduction from background knowledge. ,We may
i~agine that a certain person's winnings at the racetrack are
based on an unusually good knowledge of horses, but we may later
discover that he has been doping several horses in each race he
bets on. But if no such evidence turns up, and if 'we are unable
to discover, any better expl~nation for the reliability of a
~erson's beliefs on a certain subject, we do well to accept the
attributi'on of, knowledge fl But i't i·s misleading to ,suggesti as
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Edgley does, that the attribution -is justified by the satis-
faction of some criterion peculiar to the concept of knowledge .
.The ~'criterion" involved is merely that if some collection of
statements provides the best available explanation for some
phenomenon or other, we ought to accept that collection of
m '
statements, simply on the basis of their explanatory value.
This principle bears no special relationship to knowledge claims;
·it is sure'ly not a "criterion for the applicati,on of the concept
of knowledge".ll
It may be worth pointing out, before leaving this discussion
of ,Ed9~~Y'~ criteria 9 f no~-paradigmatic knowledge, that the cer-
tainty"or belief condition has dropped out of sight altogether.
We have seen a weakened version of the justification condition,
and a strengthened version of the truth condition, but no ver-
sian at all of the Gertainty condition. Why didn't. Edgley feel
the need for some such requirement, in the course of his dis-
oussion'of non-central knowledge? The reason, I suggest, is
that where a knowledge claim has explanatQry value, it is simply
unnecessary to provide direct evidence, showing that· each of the
defining condi tions of knowledge (or "natural ana'logues" of those
conditions) is satisfied. This would be true even if we knew
what those' defining conditions were, though as Gettier has shown,
we do not know this.
Some pages back, we saw that Edgley has three objections to
.the rationalist argument for innate knowledge: f.irst, any innate
linguistic beliefs we .have cannot be justified beliefs, even "if
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they happen to be true; second, an examination of what "language
leaLners say provides no direct evidence for the claim that th~y
be~ieve (let alone know) the principles of universal. grammar;
and third, though we know the grammar of Eng~ish, we do not
literally know it "on the basis of ... evidence or data", so
our knowledge of particular grammar does not satisfy. the an~e­
c~dent of Hurne's principle. It is now time to take a critical
look at these objections.
Edgley introduces his first objection by remarking that
Hurne's condi tion is II too stringent 11 a C011di tion on knowledge.
In support of this remark, he points out (correctly) that one "s
in,nate linguistic beliefs do not sat~sfy "the justific~tion con-
"dition. But the argument from Burne's principle can be seen as
~art attack on the justification tondition; that ii in fact how
Edgley seems to see it (cf. Edgley 1970, 29-30). Edgley thus
appeals to the ·justification condit~on in his objecti6n to Hurne's
principle. But this appeal begs the very question at issue:
must all (contingent) knowledge be justified?
The argument from' Hume 's principle is a redu.ctio ad absurdum.
To avoid the absurdity, .we must reject one of the p~emises from
which it was deduced. What are those premises? First, there
are two premises missing from the list given above (p. 83). One
of these is the justification condition, a. controversial premise.
The other is aCGepted on b9th sides: the premise that our innate
linguist~c beliefs lack justification.
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Second, there is p~emise·(l) (p. 83), which states that
a speaker knows a p"artic,ular grammar, and know,s it on the basi's
of primary linguistic data~ Edgley accepts the first assumption
.(cf. pp. 97-98 above). He denies the second~ but I shall argue
below (pp. 1~6-123) that he should not do so·.
Both sides in the dispute accept premises (2) and (3).
This leaves only one further prem~se: 'Burne's principle,. which
Edgley ~ould deny. I shall try to block this move, and force
the rejection of the justification condition, by arguing for
(22) 'A does' not know p if (i) A .came to beli~ve p.6n the
basis of a.valid inf~rence from a set S of premises;
(ii) A does' not know any oth~r set S' of premises
whichvalidly support Pi - (iii) q is a member of '5;
'(iv) elimination of q from S would render the in-
ference to R invalidT and (v) A-d6es not know ~.
(2~), a s6mewhat revised version of Hum~'s principle.
To refute (22), we would have to find a propos~tion E
that we know, which also satisfied conditions (i)-(v). Is
there any such proposition?, Well, no directly evident pro-
position can fill the bill (cf. p. 168 below, and the re~er­
ences ci ted there); condi.tion (i) is· meant to say tha t p must
be a piece 'of "consequential knowledge n (Edgley 1970, 30) e
(Conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) have inductive as well as
deductive validi ty in view, by the way.) Nor can- a,ny neces-
sary proposition be a counterexample to. (22)'" Any set of
premises entails a necessary proposition, so if, £ is.neces-
.sarily tr~e, it will violate conditions (ii) and (iv) ~
III
Any counterexample to (22), then, must b~ indirectly evi-
dent, and logically contingent. Here is a possible counter-
example, which lowe to Ned Block: Suppose ~hat I have seen
the Loch Ness monster swimming. I know, then, that Nessy can
swim (this is E). However, I believed in Nessy's swimming
ability long before seeing her. Someone told me that she was
a huge eel (call this ~). Knowing that. all eels can swim, I
inferred ,that Nessy could swim. But suppose that Nessy is
really an elongated whale. Then ,q is false, 'and I do not know
q · I d~J however, know E.
Condition (ii) is intended to block counterexamples of
this sort. My seeing ..Ness'y swim gave me addi tional (and ade-
quate) reason to believe p; hence Nessy can swim. does not
satisfy' condition (ii) ..This condition imposes a v~ry severe
restriction on-E' and makes (22) quite weak. 'It would 'be sur-
prising if such a weak piinciiple turned out t9 be fal~e. But
we have some linguistic knowledge that satisfies condition
(ii), de~pite its stringency, and that is all we need for our
reductio against the justification condition.
Suppose' a foreigner asks ,me whether se11tenc~ S is gram-
matical in English, and I have never before heard sentence S .
. As a native speaker of English I I know' tha't ,8 is gramma tical.
By the rationalist acocunt (cf. pp. 116-123 below) I know this
on the basis of a deductive inference. My internal grammar of
English is an intermediate ste~ in that deduction. The ultimate
premises are my primary linguistic data, and the theory of.
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universal grammar. Without the latter premise, I cannot validly
infer that S is grammatical; nor do I have any other reason to-
believe that S is grammatical, since I have neve~ heard ·any
English speaker use S. Now if I do not know·the theory of
universal graw~ar, then by (22), I do not know· the grammar of
English; nor do I know that S is grammatical. But a·s Edgley
admi ts I -this' is absurd". We have some independe.~t basis for
accepting (22). The source of our absurd 'conclusion, then,
-.must lie in the justificatio~ condition, and that is the pre-
mise we must reject ..
We turn now to the .second of Edgley's three objections to
the rationalist argument for innate knowledge. According to
. this object.ion, it is nessential~y disputable'~ whether we have
any beliefs (and hence whether we have any knowledge) about
universal_grammar, because the 'rationalis'ts .are unable to show
that naive subjects ever utter sentences expressing those be-
liefs. Otherwise put, the objection is that the rationalist
al"gumen~ fails to provi.de direct evidence that the belief con-
dition is satisfied by. our alleged innate knowledge. Against
this objection, I shall argue tha~ direct verbal evidence of
th~ kind Edgley. has in mind is not necessary.for the establish-
ment of belief claims, and that in any case, establishment of
a belief claim is not a necessary step in every adequate argu-
ment for a knowledge claime
'On the first point, there are-circumstances in which verbal
evidence is not necessary to justify belief claims. A dog, for
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ins~ancie, may be said to believe (and indeed to know) that his
supper is under the basement stairs, though of course he never
utters sentences, that express his belie~~ , Our evidenc~ for a
-
belief claim in this case consists of the dog's behavior on
_returning from a hard day in Harvard Yard wlthout food. He
heads directly down the basement and under the stairs, sali-
vating heavily, immediately on arriving home~12 Or consider
another ex~mple of "irremediably nonverbal knowledge ll , discussed
by David Lewis (1969). Suppose you and I are rowing together in
rhythm.
• .. I cannot describe ... how we are .rowing ... but
I can keep on rowing that way; I can tell whether you
keep on rowing that yJeiy; ~ater,- I could probably demon-
.strate ~o somebody what the rhythm was; ... and so on.
Now there is a description that can identify the way
we ar~ rowIng. We take 1.4 + .05 seconds for the
stroke and . 9 + .1 for the return', exerting a peak
force of 70 + 10 'pounds near the beginning of the
stroke, .•• and so on, in as much detail as you
please~ But, as we row, we have no use for this sort
of description. We can neither give it' nor tell
whether it is true if somehow it is given. (Lewis
1969( 63-64)
Non~theless., it' is reasonable under the circumstances to say that
we know what rhythm we are rowing in. The examples of the dog
"
and the rowers indicate that the availability of direct verbal
'evidence is not a necessary condition for belief ascriptions.
Edgley's se~ond objection, and the concept of essential
disputability on which it is based, seem to me to grow out of
;
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a latent operationism. To support a claim that someone believes
a proposition ~, we very often (perhaps even usually) try to
show that on some occasion he has uttered a sentence that ex-
presses E.- Observation of verbal be11avior is thus the "opera-
tion II we perform whel1 we verify belief claims in the usual,'
standard, or direct way. Equating ,the meaning of belief claims
with the method usually used to verify them, Edgley concludes
that any ,belief claim not supportable by this method must 'be
either false, or true only on some non-standard reading of
believe. But since verbal expression of a proposition is neither
a ·sufficient nor a necessary condi tion on be'lief in, tria t proposi-
tion, su.rely it is a mistake to identify the meaning of a belief
claim with the operation of observing the verbal behavior of
the putative believer.
But 'there· is another difficulty with Edgley's second objec-'
tion. Let us suppose t~at the concept of belief is related to
that of knowledge in just the way Edgley says it is.. Edgley
apparent~y thinks that this fact about the meaning of knowledge
claims places a constraint on ~he methods or strategies avail-
able for s~bstantiating knowledge claims .. He seems to think
that" a legitimate argument for a knowledge claim must contain
a separate subargument showing that the belief condition is met;
and similarly for the truth and justification conditions. But
of course it is not in' general true that the analysis of a con-
cept states the only set of conditions sufficient for the
application of that concept.
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Consider, for example, the concept of ellipticity~ The
analysis of this concept may tell us that a figure is an ellipse
just in case it is the locus of all points, the sum of whose
distances from two given points is a constant. One way to show
that a given figure is an ellipse, then, is to find a pair of
points within the figure, and show that ~any randomly chosen
points on the figure have distances from these "two interior
points which sum to the very same distance. 'But there is -another
way to argue for the ellipticity 9£ a given figure. We can also
choose an appropriate system of Cartesian coordinates, and show
that many points on the given figure satisfy an equation of the
x 2 y2
form a 2 + ~ ~ 1. The latter method is certainly an
adequate way of arguing that the given. figure is elliptical.
But unlike -the method suggested by the analysis of, tl!e concept
of ellipticity, the latter method does not require that we
determine distances from points on the f~gure to a pair of
f'ixed poi'nts i rather , it ~nvolves finding d'istances from points
on the figure to a pair of fixed lines.
As with ellipticity, so with knowledge: The conditions
stated in the analysis o.f the concept of knowledge may not be
the only set of conditions jointly sufficient for ~pplication
of the concept. It nlay be that Hume's principle .(equivalently,
(22) states such a set of conditions, for example, for all
Edgley has shown. But Hume I s principle do'es not require tha t
w~ pay sp~cial, separate attention to the question of belief.
~ fortiori f - _it does not require tha t we' present "9.irect II or
uobservational" evidence of belief. ~~gley complains, in his
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second objection to the argument from Hume's principle, that
the argument is ins.ufficient 'because it adduce.s no direct
evidence of belief in the proposition alleged to be known.
,But if the argument has true premis~es (cf. Edgley's third
objection, which is directed against premise. (1)), and is
. deductively valid, it is hard to see 'why this objec~i~n need
~e taken seriously.
For several paragraphs, I have been talking about sets of
conditions logically sufficient to warrant knowledge claims. I
do ,not wish to ~all in with what appears to .be.Edgley's view,
howeyer, that any adequate 'argument tor a knowledge' claim' must
show 'that some such set of conditions is satisfied. This view
amounts to the requirement that know.ledge claims can only b-e
supported_by deductive, and never in~uc~ive, arguments. For
·most. empirical claims, we are willing to' accept either deduc-
tive or inductive arguments, and I can.see no reason what~ver
for treating knowledge claims differently.
Now let us consider Edgle~ls third and final objection to
the rationalist argument. According to that objection,. we do
riot literally know the grammar of English lion the ba~is of
evidence or data 1f j that is, we do not litera~ly infer our
grammar from primary linguistic data. Therefore our knowledge
of particular grammar does not satisfy the antecedent of Hume's
condition, and the rationalist argument is unsound.
Edaley's third objection, like his second, reflects his~ .
operationist assumptions (and indeed Ed~ley did not distinguish
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these ,two objections himself) ~ Usually, a process of inference
leaves certain traces which we may bring to light by aski~g the
subj ect such questio11S as,' n I-Iow did you find out that E.? II Clearly,
few if any adult speakers ,of English are able to verbalize the
inference which led to their knowledge of English g~ammar. But
failure to observe the usual traces of an inference process does
not show t11a t th'e 'process is ficti tious, as Edgley apparently
believes~
J.J.C. Smart has discussed a somewhat similar situation in
the philosophy of physics. Ther~, the fictionalist (or as Smart
c~lls him, the phenomenalist) may argue against,th~ reality of
electrons as follows: If someone claims that a 'certai~ physical.
object is present in a certain region, we can ordinarily check
his claim by looking in that region, p~rhaps using an opti6al
or an' ele'ctron _nlicroscope . We conclude tha t the obj ect is really
there if we can see it, and that it' i? not really there if we
cannot see it. But physicists freely admit that el~ct~ons are
in principle invisible; the nlook-and-see n test can never turn
up evidence that an electron is pres~nt, however much we refine
the art of microscopy. From this, the fictionalist concludes
t,hat' electrons are not real physical objects.,
~gainst this argument, Smart writes:
One can readily admi t I then, tha t there are;i>f,theoret-
ical reasons why however small we were we could~see the
theoretical entities of physics. In this respect theS~
entities do differ from bricks, microscopic crystals; and
. bacteria, arid even perhaps from pr'otein molecules. But
is this a good reason for putting them into a' different
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ontological category? The mere fact that there are
theoretical reasons why they cannot be ~een gives no
ground for saying that they are in any sen$e fictions.
Theory asserts the existence of the elementary particles
and also explains their non-visibility. Surely we need
not fall back to Berkeley and suppose that esse is
percipi. (Smart 1963, 38)
There are two ways in which,the ~ituation in psycholin-
guis tics di ffers from tha t . in pllysics 1 and these two di f fer-
ences cancel each other out. First,' there is to the best of
my knowledge no explanation available for the adult's inability
to recall and state the inference which led to his knowledge
of particular grarrrrna'r, though in physics tllere of course is an
~xplanation of why electrotis are invisible. On the other hand,
the inference from universal grammar plus. data to particular
grammar is _not altogether l1 unu tterable ll I in the way in which
electrons are altogether· invisible. It is conceivable that a
person might be able to reconstruct and state the argument which
led him to accept the grammar of English, if he had access to an
adeq~ate theory of language learning, and to sufficiently de-
tai~ed records of his linguistic experience in childh~od~13
According to prese~t-d~y,physics, however, nothing will ever
make electrons visible.
These two features of the language-learning case seem tb
me not to affect Smart's point~ The fact that an inference
process was subconscious, and did not leave the usual sort of
memory traces, does not s~ow that it never took"place. The
compariS9n to Berkeley is an apt one. ,But Smart has an addi-
tional arg':lment:
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••,. if it be granted that we need not fall 'back into
phenomenalism it 'may be replied that there is neverthe-
less no reason why we should not. I wish to argue, 'on
the contrary, that there is a most telling theoretical
reason why w~ should not adopt a phenomenalist interpre-
tation.. 8. If the phenomenalist about-theoretical enti-
ties is correct we' must believe in a cosmic coincidence.
That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc.,
are of only instrumental value: they simply enable -us
to predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and
cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove the' surprising
character of these phenomena. Admittedly the physicist
will not be surprised in the sense that he will find
these phenomena arising in unexpected ways: h~s theory
will nave instrumental value in preventing this sort of
surprise. But he ought still, if he is'reflective, find
it surprising that the world should be such as to contain
these odd and ontologically disconnected phenomena: i.e.
'the phenomena are connected only by means of a purely -
instrumental theory. Is it not odd that the phenomena
of the world should be such as to make a purely instru-
mental theory true? On the other hand, ,if' we interpret
a theory in a real~st way, then we have no need for such
a cosmic coinc~dence: it is not surpri'sing that galvan-
ometers and cloud chambers behave in the sort of way they
do, for if there really are electrons, etc., this is just
what we should expect. A lot of surprising facts no longer
see~'surprising~ .•. On theoretical grounds, then, we
should 'reg'ard ph'enomenalism as both unproven and un-
plausible. (Smart 1963, 39; emphasis Smart's)
Smart takes' his earlier argument to show only that "we
need not fall back into phenomenalism". The "cosmic coinci-
dence ll argument just quoted 'is meant to establish the stronger
conclusion that H we should not ll adopt a fictionalist attitude
toward theoretical enti ties. I ·am not sure tha t the difference
in st~ength between ,the first and the second arguments is as
great as Smar't takes it to be, but the point of the "cosmic
coincidence" argument, i,s nonetheless well worth, making.
The, fictioI:,alist must ~dmit that, current physical theory
.has a ,g~eat deal of predictive (instrumental) value. He contends,
however, that t~at 't.t,."'leory is false when taken Ii terally. Now a
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false'theory cannot explain phenomena; it can at best only
predict ~heme The phenomena remain unexplained, or as Smart
says, II surprising" ~ But there is another su~p'ris'e, in addi tion
to the phenomena themselves~ How are we to explain the pre-
dictive success of a false theory? To dispel our su!prise at
that success, we need a theory that is true, when taken liter-
ally; such a theory will hopefully explain not only the pheno-
mena, but the predictive. capabilities of our current, literally
false theory. For example 1 Newt9nian mechanics \\1as a li terally
fals'e theory; as was known from the rota tion of the axis of
Mercury's orbit. Still, Newtonian mechanics had considerable
instrumental value. The general theory'of relativ~ty explained
the phenomena p~edicted by Newtonls physics, and ~lso ~xplain~d
how a l.i terally false tlleory' enjoye'd .such. great ·pre,dictive,
success. (Hempel 1966, 54).
Actually, no new theory i.s required to show that' a current
theory is l~terally false; one contrary-to-fact prediction is
enough .. Against the rationalist theory of lang~age learning,
however, Edgley adduces no such recalcitrant facts. L~cking
such a factual refutation, he mi~ht be able to justify his
fictionalist attitude toward tacit linguis~ic inference ·by
putting forward an alternative t~eory of language learning, and
providing a compelling methodological argument for its super-
iority over the rationalist account. This alternative theory
might then be used to explai11 the abili ty of the. false th,eory
to save the appearances .. Lacking such a theory, supported by
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methodological argument, Edgley's fictionali~m is a tune whistled
in the dark. It is prima facie implausible that a theory with
great instrumental value should be a false, and, hence a non-
explanatory, th"eory. Smart IS "cosmic coincidence n argurnent
points out that implausibility, but prima facie implausibility
may be dispelled by approp~iate arguments, empirical or methodo-
.logical; For the pres~ht, however, ~ realist ~nterpretation of
rationalist language-learning theory seems as reasonable as a
realist interpretation of physics'.
There is one other consideration affecting the prospects
for a vindication of Edgley·s fictionalism via the theoretical
route. In attempting to formulate a, true theory of language
learning, E.dgley will presUInably be bound by operationist
s~rictures. Hempel, ~peaking piimarily of the physical sciences,~
has argued that IIlaws ... formulated at the observational level
generally turn-out to hold only approximately and within a
limited range ll (Hempel 1966, 77; cf. also Hempel 1952, 20-50).
If operationally defined vocabulary i~ inadequate for .the forrn-
" .
ulation of explanatory. theories in physics, we may expect , that
psychological .phenomena will prove even less amenable "to explan-
ation in operationally definable terms. For as Edgley himself
points out, "behavioural, and in general observable, character-
istics .•. seem logically less than adequate." for the expression
of criteria for the application of psychological terms (Edgley
1.9'7 0 f 28).
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Edgley',5 thirq. objection ,was directed specific.all.y against
the inference to a parti~ular gramInar from unive'rsal grammar
plus data. But a similar operationist objection CQuld be raised
.against the claim that native speakers tacitly infer facts about
the grammaticality and meaning of par~icular sentences from the
grammar of, their language. After all", consc'ious f"ormula tion of'
in'ference from a particular grammar (of English, say) is no,
easier than conscious expression of the inference to such a
grammar. Operationism implies that neither sort of inference
really takes place.,
This conclusion ought~ I think, 'to embarrass someone· who
holds' tha t we Ii terally know the grammar of English., and' par-
ticularly someone who holds this view on the basis,of the kind
" of argument offered by Edgley. For. according to this 'view, we
~now' the grammar of English, and we know.var~ous facts about the
grammatical and semantic.properties of various Epglish sentences;
but the latter knowledge is not inferred from the former, al-
though the appropriate entailment relations hold. What, then,
is the psychological relationship between these two kinds of
knowledge? In view of their close lqgical relatio~ship, it'
seems gro?sly implausible that they should not be psychologi-
cally related'in some way or other~
Moreover, Edgley holds that all paradigmatic initances of
knowledge must be justified, generally by a process of inference.
If we do not infer our knowle~ge about barticular seritences from
our knowledge of Engli sh grammar I then D.ur knowledge about.,
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sentences must either be inferred from something else we know
(but what?), or else our knowledge about sentences is not a
paradigmatic case of kno~ledge (surely a counterintuitive
supposition). Actually, Edgley's fictionalism with respect
to tacit inference processes is inimical to his argument that
we know the grammar of English. That argument appealed to a
w~akened cri"terion of knowledge, the. reli'abili t:( principle ..
The plausibility of that principle, I argued, rests on the
',potential explanatory value of th~ knoWledge claims licensed
by the principle. If someone's beliefs on a certain tppic
(e.g. Harry's moods) are highly reliable~ then the explanatio~
qf this reliability may refer to some gener~l background know-
ledge the person has. But ~uch an ascription of general back~
ground knowledge has no explanatory value all by itself~ it
must be supplemented by the "supposition that the person in
question can a~d does use his background knowledge as.a premise
in inferences to his (highly reliable) particular beliefs. Witl1:-
out an accompanying inference claim, a knowledge c+aim licensed
. .
by the reliability condition loses its ~xplanatory value, and
thu.s -its motivation. The moral of this argum_ent is that one
must ei ther hold that we know, both tlniversal and particular.
grammar, or that we know neither. Edgley's fictionalism seems
to commit him to the latter course.
To summarize this discussion of E.dgley' s three objections
to the rationalist argument for innate knowl,edge: First, "Edgley
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is' quit~ correct in pointing out that our ihnate l~rig~istic
knowledge does not satisfy the justificition condition, but
that is no reason to hold that our innate linguistic beliefs
are less than knowledge. Our knowledge of universal grammar
must be exempted from the justification condition on pain of
apsurdity. Second, direct verbal evideQce is not necessary
to establish tha t an individual believes. a, cert9.in propos i tion ~
In any case, it is possible to establish. a knowledge claim with-
out first establishing a' related belief claim, and not all
~rguments that. est~blish knowledge claims are deductive argu-
m~nts·. Third, Edgley's operationism and his fictio.ri.alism wi th
respect to tacit inference processes are no more reasonable than
a're simil~r attitudes toward theoreti'cal enti ties in physics.
Thus none-of these objections seriously impeaches the ration-
al:'- st argument for innate knowledge of .universal grarrunar.
Our discussion of Edgley's paper sheds some l.ight, r·' think,
on the relationship between the analysis of the concept of
k~owledge, on the one hand, and the explanation of various
instances of knowledge, on the other. First, an adequate anal-
ysis 'of a concept does not and need riot automatically provide
explanations for all known exemplifications of that concept.
My reply to E.dgley 1 s first objection might seem to rest on a
denial of this principle, since that reply bears.some resem-
blance to the following argument, which does assume the denial
of the principle just enunciated: "If vie incorporate the justi-
fication condition into our analysis'of the concept of knowledge,
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then certain paradigm cases of linguistic knowledge will be
unexplained. Therefore, the justification condition cannot
be part of the analysis of- knowledge. II
This argument, like my reply to Edgley, has the form of
·a reductio; but this arga~ent, unlike ,my reply, represents as
absurd a situation that is entirely possible. There is nothing
absurd in supposing that a particular instance of. knowledge is
unexplained, even if we had an adequate analysis of the concept
of knowledge (and Gettier has shown that we do not). On the
at,her hand, it is absurd to, suppose that a certain paradigm
case of knowledge is not knowledge, and that is. the absurdity
I pointe'd out in, my reply to Edgley. (That reply assu,med, of
course, that we- literally deduce those items of paradigmatic
knowledge from tacit linguistic belie~s.)
We have also see~ that an analysi~ of a co~cept does not
"establish a unique meth6d for determining wh~n it is correct to
apply the concept. To analyze a concept is not to specify a set
of operations that must be performeq, and a set of results that
must .be obtained, in order to justify application of 'the conce"pt.
- .~pplication of a concept in a particular instanc~ may be justi-
fied, for example, by showing that such application of the con-
cept plays a role in the best available explanation of some
phenomenon or otller. But any number of "operations 11 may be-
involved in assessing the relative merits of competing explan-
ations of a given phenomenon, and surely it is not necessary
to spell out all these operations in an' analysis of the c~ncept
of 'knowledge.
._---~~----_/
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Finally, ari explanation for some exemplification Of a
concept may be availabl~ before we have an analys~s of the
concept. Thus Gettier has' shown that we do not. as 'yet have an
adequate analysis of knowledge, but the rationalist account
seems to provide an explanation for our lingui~tic knowledge.
Nonetheless, explanation requires some insight into the concept
exemplified by the explanandum. On a de~uctivist theory of
explanation, of course, we must know of at least one condition
or set of conditions sufficient for applicatio~ of the concept.
Premise (5), on which the rationalist explanation of linguistic
knowledge is .based, meets this deductivist requirement, though
of course (5) offers a great deal less than a full analysis of
the concept of knowledge.
lIs QUINE: TRUTH
. We turn now to a thesis of Quine's: The thesis that radical
tra~slation is'subject to a radical indeterminacy. Ultimately,
r· shall argue that Quine I s thesis amounts to an empirical hypo-
the~is about language learning, and t~at the availabl~ evidence
weighs against this hypothesis. 14 F~, however, we shall
. .
examine Quine '.s argument' for indeterminacy, and two llrlSUCCess-
ful counterarguments that fail to deal with Quine's assumptions
about language learning. Before we undertake any of this,
however, let us see what Quine's thesis is, and what it irnp~ies
about linguistic knowledge.
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Quine sums up the thesis as follows:
... the analytical. hypotheses, and the grand synthetic
onethat they add up to, are only in an incomplete sense
hypotheses. . ~ e The. POi11t is' not tha t we cannot be sure
whether the analytical hypotheses is right, but that there
iS,not even an objective matter to be right or wrong about.
(Quine 1960, 73)
·An analytical hypothesis is an hypothes1S to'the effect that a
given word or phrase is synonymous with some other word or phrase,
.
generally in some other language. One such hypothesis, then, is
tha t the English phrase p.;L,ickly pear means the same, thing as the
Spanish word nopal.- Given a system of such hypotheses about
English and Spanish words, ~~gether perhaps with "supplem~ntary'
semantic instructions" and syntactic explanations (Quine-1960,
70), we can translate English ,sentences into Spanish sentences,
and vice versa. The trouble with such' translations, according
to Quine's thesis, is that some of them ~ill inevitably be
neither correct nor inco~rect, but unverifiable.
·It is not really necessary to "resort to a remote language il ,
such as Spanish, in order to find examples of indeterminate
~ynonymy claims, for according to Quine, IIradical translation
begins at home'l (Quine 1969, 46). 1£ the equation' of Spanish
napal and' English prickl~ pear is neither objectively true nor
false, the same can be said. about the equation, within English,
of hare and rabbit. IS The ~ndeterrninancy of synonymy between
words infects synonymy relations between sentences which contain
(23) Polly saw a rabbit means t.he same thing_ as .Polly'
saw a. hare-:-
. .. ,"
--_.~-~~----'
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the words in question. If rabbit and h~re are not objectively
~-'
synonymous~ then proposition (23) is neither true nor false, and
, , '
, hence cannot be known. But when the rationalist argues that
English speakers have tacit knowledge of the grammar of English,
one of the premises in his aigument is ~hat English ,speakers
know propositions, like (23). Tacit knowledge of particular
grammar is postulated to explain the latter 'sort of knowledge.
Innate knowledge of universal grammar is then postulated in
order to explain our knowledge of particular grammar. But the
argument for innate ~nowledge cannot get started unless it is
admi tted tha t we know some particu,lar grammar, and Quine I s
indeterminacy thesis threatens a crucial premise in the argu-
rnent that we know a particular grammar.
If Quinels thesis is correct, then we cannot know the whole
transformational grammar of English. We still might know part
of that grammar, however .. Quine's thesis only impeaches certain
semantic consequences of generative grammars, and it is an easy
matter to rid a grammar of the disputed consequences: we need
only cut all semantic inforrnati~n out of the lexicon. 16 The
grammar would retain its, syntactic and phonological components
in their original form, and the lexicon would still describe
the syntactic and phonological peculiarities of every word in
the language. The truncated grammar would still have consequences
(24) Polly wants ~ cracker is grammatical in English.
(25) The first syllable of,telegraph bears primary stress.
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(24) and (25). Quine does not dispute the determinacy 'of syn-
tactic and phonological" judgments. It would be consistent TNith
the indeterminacy thesis, then, to claim that w~ know proposi-
tions like (24) and (25), and to explain this knowledge by
postulating tacit knowledge of a truncated, gen~rative grammar 0
Similarly, we could argue·for innate knowledge of a truncated
theory of universal grammar, by excising. ,all constraints on the
semantic part of lexicons in particular grammars. 17
We could save many of the rationalist's claims about lin-
guistic knowledge, even if we granted the truth of Quine's
indeterminacy thesis. But with such an admission, we would
lose some of our most important and philosophically' interesting
linguistic knowledge:, knowledge about meaning and synonymy
of sentences, and the general gr~atical kno~ledge, from which
this knowledge is derived. A refutation of the indeterminacy
thesis is therefore well worth attempting. Let us now take a
closer look at the thesis itself, and at Quine's argument in
support of the thesis.
Suppose that we have just been transported to the village
of some tribe which speaks a language never before encountered
by the outside world. None of the natives of this village speaks
any language but the tribal one. Under these circumstances,
Quine asks, how can we learn to translate native sentences cor-
rectly into English? Otherwise put, how can we acquire knowledge
abou~ the meanings of native sentences? .Quine's answer is that
we must take note of what stimulations p~ompt.the natives to ~~~
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various'sentences. Take, for example, the native sentence
Gavagai. If natives utter this sentence' only' on espying
rabbits, pictures 'of rabbi ts I . toy stuffed rabbi ts" etc c, \ve
may suppose that Gavagai means something like La, a rabbit.
(Quine "1960 I 29)
Once we have amassed a small stock of such sentences, we
can use them to elicit the natice word$ for Yes and No. For
.
example, we might take advantage of a moment when our infor-
mant" s a ttention is focused on a tapir, and utter .the sent.ence
Gavagai. If our or'iginal translation of Gavagai was correct,
this remark is sure to elicit qissent. To learn the word for
No, we need only note how the native expresses his di~agreement,
on this and similar occasions _. T.he word fo~ Yes can be, elici ted f
hopefully, by uttering Gavagai in the presence of rabbits.
1 9 6 O. , ·2 9 - 3 0 )
(Quine
With native Yes and No safely in our vocabulary, we can
put our studies on a somewhat more systematic footing. We
define the affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence as the
set of all stimulations that would prompt our informant's assent
to that sentence~ Similarly, the ne~ati~e stimulus meaning of
a sentence' is the set of all stimulations that would prompt
dissent from tha t sentence. The stirnulu,s meaning of a sentence,
finally, is the ordered pai~ of these two sets. TO determine
the stimulus meaning of a sentence, we use what I shall call the
method of prompted assent and dissent: a se,leqtive "querying of
native sentences for as se,n t and .disserlt under vary i11g circums tances"
.(,
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(Quine 1960, 68,). For .simplicity, we may. take stimulations to
be "ocular irradiation patterns" (Quine 1969, 32). Also, it
may be impossible fO'r the native to distinguish between a rain
dance and.a war dance, if we cut the stimulations too short.
Consequently, we must choose some appropriate standard duration
for stimuli, say n seconds. This standard time period is called
the modulus of stimulation. (Quine 1960, 32-33)
As our mastery of the language improves, we will no· doubt
be. able to distinguish various kinds of native sentences, using
the ~odest technical apparat~s just described. Some sentences,
Gavagai among them, will elicit assent (or 4issent) from an
informant only after he has been subjected to relevant stimuli.
(If we blindfold him, and then ask, ·Gavagai?, he. will presum-
ably not know what to say.) Other sentences ~ilr not exhibit
this dependence on recent stimuli. Consider, for example, the
native sentence which translates as The coconuts are ready to
harvest. The first time we think to ask whether the coconuts
are ready to harvest, we may have to let our informant examine
the appropriate trees. Once.he has checked the trees, however,
he.may .. continue to a~sent throughout the day, the week, or even
the fortnight (for all I know about coconuts), without each time
having to revisi t the village ,palm grove. Sentences like Gavagai,
whose truth value18 may change within a period less than or
equal to' the modulus of stimulation, are called occasion sen-
tences. Those whose truth values persist for ionger than the
modulus; Quine terms standing sentences. ',(Quine'1960, 35-36)
Even within the class of occasion sentences, we will be
able to distinguish tw~ types of sentences. Some, like Gavagai,
will have the same·stimulus meaning for eadh member of the ~ribe.
Each native will assent to this sentence on ~ei~g shown.a rabbit,
and each will dissent on being shown a non-rapbi't. The native
version of He's ~ bachelor may not elicit such uniform response,
however. If the jungle tribe is anything like our .own, each
native will· know'the marital status of only a few men. He will
be ignorant of the marital status of all others. Thus it will
not be sufficient to show our informant just any bechelor, in
order to elicit his assent to the relevant sentence. We must
show him a person whom he knows to be a bachelor. Another
,informant, from the other side of town, might have a very dif-
ferent circle of acquaintances, and consequently a very dif-
ferent stimulus meaIling for the translation of He' s ~ bachelor",
i.e.• a different set of assent-prompting (and dissent-prompting)
stimuli. Where the stimulus meaning of a sentence is uniform
throughout the community, as with Gavagai, Quine calls the
sentence ob-servational. Where stimulus m,~aning differs from one
informant to another, the'sentences may still be an occasion
sentence, but a non'--observa,tional one. (Quine 1960, 43)
It is not just in the native language, of course, that we are
able to distinguish standing sentences from occasion sentences,
and observational from non~observational occasion sentences. The
same distinctions can also be applied t,o English". The job of
translating native sentences into English can now be 'described
as follows·. We mus,t pair each native observation sentence wi th
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an English observation sentence that has the same meaning; and
~imilarly for each non-observ~tional occasion sentenc~, and for
each standing sentence, of the jungle language. Briefly, we
·must pair each native sentence with a synonymous English sen-
tence. It is initially plausible to suppose, that two sentences
are synonymous just in case they have the same stimulus meaning.
Like English, the jungle language' presumably contains an
infinite number of sentences. We want our theory of Junglese-
English trans lation to be"complete: it must give us the correct
Eng.li.sh translation for ev_ery Junglese sent,ence ~ and vice versa.
M.oreqver, we want· a ~tmanage'ably limited" theory (Quin~' 1969 r 3)
B'ut the method of prompted assent .and, dissent can never yield
a theory ~hat satisfies both these requirments. After a finite
. riumber of.stimulus-and-query experiments, we have t~ansl~tions
·for -at most some finite set of Junglese_sentences, and our
theory is incomplete. If it were possible to carry out ari in-
finite number of experiments, we might'get a complete theory,
but not a manageable one: it would consist of an infinite" list
of sentence-to-sentence equivalences. On the practical side,
the sentence-by-sentence approach to translation~ is grossly
inefficient, 'since the meariing of one sentence often gives clues
to the meanings of other sentences. Part of one sentence (a
word or phrase) may recur in another sentence. ,If we can deter-.
mine th~ meaning th~t sen~ence-part has in the .first sentence,
we will have a head start on the translation of the ~econd sen-
tence.
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Both practical and theotetical problems thus attend the
prompted-assent method of translation. To circumvent these
,problems, the linguist adopts the method of analytical hypo-
theses. But if Quine ,is right, this method of translation has
a problem all its own: logical indeterminacy. Let us turn now
to Quine's. argument for the indeterminacy thesi~.
Earlier on, we met the Junglese observation sentence
Gavagai. On syntactic analysis, this sentence may turn out
to consist of a single word, which also occurs in longer, more
complex sentences. Given the stimulus meaning of the sentence
.Gavagai, the most natural analytical hypothesis about the word
gavagai is that it means rabbit. Quine argues .that this analyt-
ical hypothesis has some highly counterintuitive rivals, and
that no exper~ment can ever verify our intuitions in the matter.
Note., for example, that whenever ,we present our informant
with a view of a rabbit, we also present him with a view of a
part of the rabbit (his head, say, or his right side), still
attached to the rabbit~ Similarly, if we think of rabbits as
objects with a temporal dimension as well as spatial ones, then
every view of a rabbit is also a view of a time-slice of a
rabbit, a t~poral stage of the whole spatia-temporal rabbit.
Also, when we point' to a rabbit, we point to the rabbit fusion
in Goodman's sense, and to where rabbithood is manifested.
(Quine 1960, 52-53) Thus we could, consistently with the
stimulus meaning of Gavagai, render gavagai into English as
rabbit stage, integral rabbit part, rabbithood, or rabbit fusion.
I
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With a slight distortion of English gra~ar, we may grant
the status of sentencehood to Rabbit, Rabbit stage, and the rest.
Each of these laconic occasion sentences has t.he sam,e stimulus
meaning as Gavagai. The assumption of Quine~s indeterminacy
argument can now be put very simplye , If two terms (such as
gavagai and rabbit stage) ~re stimulus synonymous when used as
.occa~siort sentences, then there is, no. way .Jco ref,ute the claim
that these two terms are ,synonymous in the strict, intuitive
sense. Otherwise put, if the meanings of two terms cannot be
experimentally disti,nguished \vl1en the terrns are presen.ted wi th.-
qut preceding or following context, then no distinction will
emerge in experiments with sentences that contain other words
before and/or after the terms in question.
Quine indicates that he is arguing here for something more
than, "normal inductive" uncertainty (Quine 1960, 68). To illus-
trate, let us suppose that there are two kinds of rabbits in
the tribal territory, the common furry variety, and a very rare
hairless species. At ~irst, we might,encounter only ~urry rabbits,
and conclude (wrongly), that Gavagai means There 1 s a rabbit.
(Actllally I Gavagai means' There 1 s ~ furry rabbi til) Clearly it
is possible that we shall discover and correct our error on some
future occasion. Our mistake results from a deficient sample.
All empirical hypotheses are subject to this kind of induct~ve
_uncertainty. The indeterminacy ~f radical translation arises
when errors of translation cannot (even in principle) be experi~
mentally detected, when natural-sounding translations and
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deviant translations al~ke !Iaccord perf~ctly not only with
behavior actually observeq, but with all dispositions to
behavior on the part of all the speakers concerned ll
'1969, 29).
(Quine
In some passages, Quine writes as though indeterminacy of
translation were a problem peculiar to the translqtion of a
certain class of standing sentenc~Se19 Thus he writes' that
~-
Uobservation sentences ca11 be translated", subject only to
"normal inductive" uncerta'inty (Quine 1960,68.). And it is
not. just 'observation sentences that "peel n.icely", he writes ~
The s-ame is true' of "occasion 'sentence.s more generally_', since
the linguist can go native n (duine 1960, 76). If .Quine's argu-
ment about the word gavagai is correct, however, then radical
~ in~etermi~acy must attend the translation of more-than just the
-standing sentences which contain occurrences of gavagai. The
observation sentence Gavagai, for ex~mple, will have no deter-
minate translation: Therels a rabbit stage will do as well as
There's a rabbit.
-What could have led Quine to suppose that indeterminacy
occurs only in the translation of standing sentences? On this
we can only g~ess, but there are some remarks scattered through-
out Chapter 2 of Word ~~d Object which add up to a half-way
plausible argument for this· view.. F'irst, Quine points out that
the affirmative stilnulus meaning of a sentence should include
only those stimuli which prompt the native .to. assent to-that
sentence, not all stimuli that a·re 'followed by assent. Suppose,
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for example, that our sentence is the native equivalent of
Sam is away tracking a giraffe. Quine writes:
All .day long the native will assent to [this sentence]
whenever asked, under all manner of irrelevant stimulations;
and on another day he will dissent,£rom it under the same
irrelevant stimulations .... there are formal considera-
tions which, under favorable circumstances, can assure [the
linguist] of the prompting relation. If" just after the
native has been asked S and has as~ented or dissented,
the linguist springs stimulation ~ on him, asks S again,
and gets the opposite verdict, then he may conclude that
c- did the prompting. (Q~ine 1960, 30) 2D
To determine whether a given stimulus prompts' assent, or
merel.y happens to precede assent, the linguist needs "favorable
circumstances": a change in· the truth valu~ (cf-. note 17) of
the sentence in question. Now occasion sentences change truth
value-more frequently than standing sentences, and some standing
sentences retain their truth values longer tban 6thers. The
t~l.ith value of an.. occasion sentence, such as He's ~ 'bachelor,
may persist for a se-cond or less. It is easy to utter this
'sentence five times in five seconds, while pointing consecu-
tively to. five different men: first a bachelor, then a married
man, then a bachelor, etc. A standing sentence like The Times
has come retains_its-truth value much longer. This sentence is
false all day, until the Times arrives; then it remains true
until the following day. The truth value of The crocuses are
out stands even longer, changing only twice' a year.
1960, 35-36)
(Quine
Now after five years, a foreign li~g~ist studying English
would have (at most) teri observations bearing on the stimulus
/
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meaning of The crocuses are oute 21 For He's.~ bachelor, or
That's a rabbi t, the linguist may have hundreds, or even thou-
sands of relevant observations, carried out under ~favorable
circumstances"~ At the end of five years, he may formulate an
hypothesis about the kind of stimulus that prompts assent to
The crocuses are Quto Thi~ hypothesis will have weaker induc-
tive support, all other 'things being equal,22 ~han a similar
hypothesis about That's ~ rabbit. This is because our linguist
has a larger nUITlber of evidential- instances for his hypothesis
about the occasion ~entencee To this extent, translation of
standing sentences may be more uncertain than translation of
occasion sentences.
But Q~ine holds a stronger view than this; he also maintains
that standing sentences have "s'parser" stimulus meanings than
6ccasion sentences (Quine 1960, 63). I take it he means that the
affirmative stimulus meaning of a standing sentence contains
fewer stimuli than the affirmative stimulus meaning of an occa-
sian sentence. Now we have seen thatour lingui'st t· in the course
of five years, observes only five stimuli that prompt assent to
The' crocuses are out. But this tells us nothing about the number
of stimuli that would prompt assent to this sentence. Unless I
misunderstan.d Quine IS clairn about sparseness, t11at claim does
not follow from his earlier remarks about standing sentences and
occasion sentences .
. In the translation of a standing s~ntence, there is usually
a greater degree of inductive risk than in the translation of an
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oc~asion sentence., This much.does follow fr6m the ,remarks cited
above. ,Those rema~ks do not point to any difference in the- kind
of ris}( involved, however. Irl particular, they do' not show that
,bad translations are in principle undetectable, w~ere standing
sentences are concerned. To conside~ an ext~erne exa~ple, let
us suppose that the Junglese tribe obse~ves 'a year of jubilee
every fifty years, and a centennial feast every other jubilee,
when jubilee falls on a leap year~ On tne basis of indirect
~vidence, we have mistakenly translated the standing sentence
S as This is a leap year. Actually, S means This is the year
of 'the centennial feast. Is it possible in' principie for us
to detect our error, -·and correct it? ·Certainly. After a w-ai t
of at most four years, we will discover that S is not true in
all leap years. Perhaps at this point we will decide that S
me<;.J..ns This is "the year 9£ jUb_ilee. In principle, VIe can rectify
even' this mistake, though we ·may n~1: be' willing or able to wai t
forty-six more' years to do so. It seemsi ~hen, that, we can
correct bad translations even of extremely long-standing sentences.
All we need is patience and long life. 23
Let me recall the point I made .at the beginni,ng of' th·is
digression: If Quine's argument about gavagai is correct, then
translations -even of observa tion sentences (e. g., Gavagai) are
indeterminate. Robert Kirk (1969) has attempted to refute
Quine's' thesis, and his refutation has drawn comment from Quine.
Here is Quine's summary of 'Kirk' s pape~:
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... my indeterminacy thesis was that two translators
could disagree on a translation and still agree in all
speech dispositions, in both languages, except translation~
Kirkls reflection, to the contrary, is that the conflicting
translations would entail conflicting speech dispositions
also within the home language, at the level of indirect
quotation. DC. I grant Kirk his critical point: the phrase
11 except translatiorl If in my s tateme11t of i11determinacy of
translation needs to be elaborated so as to except also
indirect quotation and related idioms of propositional
attitude. All these devices reflect interlinguistic cor-
relations int:ralinguistically. Niceties of formulat.ion
aside, however,. Kirk 1 S observa-ticJn can be seen as chal-
lenging not the indeterminacy of translation but the
determinacy of indirect quotation. (Quine 1968-69, 267)
According to Quine, Kirk's paper shows that intralinguistic
indirect quotation and interlinguistic translation are in the
same boat epistemically: either both are determinate or both
are indeterminate. If this is correct, then by Quine's
argument we should expect indeterminacy "within the home language,
at the level of indirect quotation ll • Kirk does not (and does not
mean to) establish this conclusion, but if he had, he would
have brought a refutation of Quine's argument within easy reach.
If we were to apply Quine's argument to synonymy in
the home language, we 'would argu~ tha t har~ is not obj ectively
synonymous with rabbit, and objectively heteronymous with rabbit
stage, because the three terms are all stimulus~synonymous as
occasion sente11ces. But there is an easy 't·llay -to test the inter-
substitutability of these terms in indirect-discourse contexts.
(26) I just saw a hare.
(27) She said that she just saw a rabbit.
(28) She said that she just saw a rabbit stage.
.!"-
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We procure a tape recording of a woman's voice, uttering sentence
(26) ~ We play this recording to a large number of English speakers,
privately in each case to avoid interactions betwee~ su~jects.
After this stimulus, we query either sentence (27) or sentence
(28), choosing the queried sentence at random.. I feel safe in
predicting that our subjects will overwh~lmingly dissent from (28),
and that they will overwhelmingly. assent .to (27) .24
Surely these results would provide an objective basis for
.claiming tha t hare and rabbi tare synonymo11s, whereas hare and
rabb~Lt stage _are not. I f Quine's reading of Kirk were· correct,
then we should have refuted the assumption underlying Quine's
se~ond argument: that if two terms ~re intersubstitu~able in
the null context, then they· are intersubstitutable everywhere.2~
Below, however, I shall suggest- why, on Quine~s view, we might
expeqt a difference between the intralinguistic and the inter-
l~nguistic cases. For now, I wish "to examine
Kirk's argument itself. That examination will show, I think,
that Kirk provides no grounds for linking radical translation to
indirect quotation "within the home language".
Kirk (1969, 334-33~) argues that it is 'Sobjectively discover-
_ab"le l1 whether a given sentence or sentence se~uence is intellig~
ible to native speakers. In the same passage, he lays down the
assumption t~at a system of analytical hypotheses is objectively
·incorrect unless it prese~ves intelligibility. Then Kirk (1969,
3'36) . invi tes us to cons ider two inpividuals 1 . Aman and Beeman,
who are bilingual in Martian and ,English. Aman and Beeman
disagree ove~ the translation of a certain Martian sentence'S.
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(29) Arnan's translation.
s = sA
s ~ T', sA t- sB
f30) Beeman's translations
s
T
=
=
sB
sA
s ~ T; sA ~, sB
Their views are summed up in (29) and (30).
Suppose now that Aman, in ·the course of a conversation in
Martian, ut~ers th.e ,senten.ce S ... B'eeman, .~l). C3. subsequent English
conversation, refers to this utterance as. "your remark that sB".
This is natural enough, since. sB is Beeman's English translation
for S. But Arnan objects that he never made any such remark.
Again this is quit~ natural, since Arnan translates .S, not as sB,
but as sA. Arnan and Beeman are agreed that sA and sB are in no
sense equivalent English sentences. Now in expressing his objec-
tion to Beeman's description, Arnan uses sentence (3l).
(31) I said that sA; my actual words were'S'.
This sentence (or sentence sequence, if you like) is intel-
ligible to English speakers. -Kirk does not argue the point, but
surely it could be argued to Quine's satisfaction, if he were
in any doubt. S~ntenc~ (31) has stimuli in both its negative
and its affirmative stimulus meanings, and surely this indicates
intelligibility. An English speaker would dissent from (31) if
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he had heard Aman utter some other sentence than S, or if a
large number of Martian-English bilinguals assured him that sA
\vas not a, good translation" for S; he \oJould assent. to (31) if
he heard Aman utter S, and if a large number of bilinguals agreed
that sA was synonymous with s.
But now consider how Aman and Beeman would translate (31)
(32) I said that
(33) P ; Q 1
( 34) PS; Q 'S I •
( 35) PT ; Q J S ' •
'0
my actual words were I. .. .
into Martian. Kirk (!969, 238-239) argues that both would have
to translate the English context (32) in the same way, represented'
here in' (33). Nor would Aman and Beeman disagree over how to
treat the occu~rence of the Martian sentence S in (~l). Since
,s occurs betwe~n quotation marks, it need not (indeed; 'must not)
be' translated; but even if this were not so, S'is alre~dy in
Martian, so there would be no disagreement. The rub comes rather
with' sA, Aman's translation of s. ~nan will of course translate
(31) "as (34). But Beeman cannot translate sA as SI' nor as any
sentence equivalent to S, for then he would have' translated two
non-equivalent English sentences (sA and sB) with equivalent
Martian sentences, and his system of translation would be empir-
ically refutable. Instead, Beeman translates sA as T, a Martian'
sentence that is in no'way equivalent to s. Beem~n',s translation
of (.31) is "(35) •
.;;
-~~---_. - ._>-
144
We saw that (31) was intelligible in English. Are (34) and
(35) intelligible to Martians? Well certainly sentence (34) is.
(36) I said that 'Brutus killed Caesar; ,by actual words
,were 'Brutus killed Caesar'.
(37) I said that Cicero was a Romani my actual words
'were 'Brutus killed Caesar'.
It is the Martian equivalent of a sentence like (36), and obvi-
ously (36) is comprehensible. But (35), on the other hand, will
not be intelligible, since it is li~e th~ English ~entence
sequence (37), which is objectively unintelligible. As Kirk
says, (35) and (37) are alike in that "ihe senterice in quotation
marks 'is in no way equivalent to the one introduced in the manner
of-a report" (Kirk 1969, 340).
The unintelligibility of (37), and derivatively that of
(35), can be explained in either of two ways. We may regard
~3?) simply as a conjunction of two statements, both purporting
to describe a single speech act. But -both descriptipns cannot
be correct. If my actual words 'were Brutus killed Caesar, then
I did not say that Cicero was a Roman. Thus sentence (37) can
be regarded as a conjunction of incompatible statements, and
. this· incompatibility cited as the 'source of the inc~mprehensi-
bility of (37).
-Alternatively, we may regard (37) as an argument with a
suppressed major premise. The conclusion of the argument is
-the firs~ sentence of (37), I said that Cicero was a Roman.
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The second sentence of (37), My actual words were 'Brutus killed
(38) If my actual words' were' 'Brutus killed C~esar', then
I said that Cicero was a Roman.
Caesar '-, is one of the pr'emises. The other, suppressed premise
is (-38) t -but this suppressed premise is fals,e, as every Engli sh.
speaker knows. The argument as a whole is thus u~sound, although
the premise which makes it so is not e~plicitly present., On
this view, the incomprehensibility of (37) is somewhat like that
of a sentence with a presupposition known to be filse. Both this
and the explanation of the previous paragraph can be applied to
(35) as well· as 'to (37).
Either way, Beeman's system of translation gives an unin-
telligible M~rtian translation for a perfectly comp~enen~ible
Englis~ sentence, (31). This refutes' J?eeman" Aman, on the other'
hand, seems to have a system of translation that preserves intel-
ligibility. His translation for (31)', Ylame.ly (34) t,' is as intel--
ligible as (31) itself. ,But notice that Aman and Beeman do not
exhibi t "conflic·ting speech disposi tions ... wi thin the horne '
language, at the level of indirect quotation" (Quine 1968-69,
2~7). Both find the Martian sentence (34) intelligible, and (35)
unintelligible. They agree that Sand T are not equivalent
Martian sentences, and that sA and sB are non-equivalent in
English. They disagree over whether (34) is an ac~urate tran~-
lation of (31) I and over wh~ther (31) is itself inte~ligible,
~ut.surely this latter disagreement is not a strictly intra-
linguistic refl~ction of their disagreement over translation.
, .
-------_..-/
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For while (31) is techniqally an English sentence, it nonethe-
less presupposes a controversial claim about translation.
Kirk's refutation is not directed specifically against
; .
Quine's indeterminacy argument. In describing the speech dis-
positions of AIDan and Beeman, Kirk has not mentioned· terms cor-
. responding to Quine's gavagai. He has only nam~d certain Martian
and English sentences (S, T,. sA, sB), without making any assump-
tions about their internal structure. In dealing so abstractly
with the sentences involved, Kirk has made it impossible to tell,
simply by looking at Aman's arid Beeman's translation schemes,
which is the standard hypothesis and which is the counteriritui-
. tiv~ challenge hypoth~sis "(cf. pp~ 147-148). This is a fatal flaw
in Kirk's argument, for Aman's system of translation can be"as
easily refut~d as Beeman~s~ .and by an"exactly parallel argument.
Suppose that Beeman~ in a Martian c6nversation, uses the
sentence T. Aman later -alludes, in English f' to "Beeman's remark
that sB". Beeman denies having made such a remark~ He insists
(39) I said that sA; my actual words were 'T'.
on (39). Now sentence (39) is intelligible to all English
speakers with the exception of Aman and his kind .. What about
"Aman's and Beeman's translations of (39)? Since Aman takes sA
to be synonymous with 5, he translates (3Q) as (40). Beeman,
,( 4.0) PS i Q 'T I •
( 41 ) PT ; Q ' T 1 • .
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who regards T as the proper translation for sA, -renders (39)
as (41). But this time it is Beeman's translation, (41), that
shares the intelligibility of the original, and Aman's trans-
lation', (40), that is incomprehensible .. Apparently,- both Aman
and Beeman give incorrect translations for the English sentence
sA. What is more remarkable,' we have been able to discover
- their errors without having any information on the structure
of the sentences involved.
Such linguistic acumen on our part is really too good to
be true. Neither Kirk's argument against Beeman, nor mine
against Aman, suffices to refute either system of translation,
for a correct system of translation would be refutable by a
parallel argument,_ given only a single dissenting bilingual.
A genuine refutation of Quine's indeterminacy thesis will have
to make use of information about the internal structure of the
sentences to be tr~nslated.26 Specifically, these sentences
will have to contain terms like gavagai. Let us shift our focus
from Martian to Junglese, and see whether we can refute ,Quine's
indeterminacy thesis by showing, contrary to Quine's
argument', that gavagai cannot be translated as rabbi t stage.
Let us suppose that there is a complete system of analyt-
ical hypotheses which. accords 'perfectly with the speech dispos~-
tions of both language communities, and which~translates gavagai
as rabbit. .We shall call this the'. 's't'a'nd'a'rd h'ypothesis. Now
consider the system of ~nalytical hypotheses Which results from
the standard hypothesis when we replace the gavagai-rabbit
.i
_-'-- •• 4'
equation with the analytical hypothesis that gavagai'means rabbit
stage. Let us call thi's' sys~ern o~ analytical. hypotheses Qu.ine' s
challenge hypothesis I or QO 'f~r s·hort,.
Now translation under the standard hypothesis always pre-
serves stimulus meaning. This is what we mean in saying that
the standard hypothesis "accords perfectly with the speech dis-
positions of all concerned. Quine's challenge hypothesis also
preserves the stimulus meanings of many Junglese senten~eSe All
.-
those which are free of the term gavagai (and its derivatives)
receive the same translations under QO as under the standard
hypothesis, so of course QO's translations ,of theie.sentences
are ~ll right. 'If QO mistranslates any Junglese" sent~nces, they
will'be sentences that contain gavagai. But we cannot use just
any such sentence to ~efute QO. The Junglese occasion sentence
.. Ga v:agai, for example, has the same stimulus meaning-, as its.
(42) He gavagai kai ho gavagai..
(43) This' rabbit is the same as tha t rabbi t.
(44) This rabbit stage is the same as that rabbit stage ..
Quinean translation, Rabbit stage. 27
Suppose that the standard hypothesis translates the Junglese
sentence (42) into English as (43). Quine's challenge hypothesis
will then give (44) as the translation of (42). But this trans-
lation is objectively incorrect, for (44) does not· have the same
stimulus meaning as (42). To ascertain the stimulus meaning of
(42), we may examine its standard translation,' (43), with which
it is ex hypothesi stimulus-synonymous., Now an English speaker
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will assent to sentence (43) if, while uttering (43), we point
twice to the same .rabbit. But this same stimulus will el,icit.
dissent if imposed during ~n utterance of .(44). The stimulus
meaning of (42) (which is-the same as that of (43)) thus differs
from the stimulus meaning of (44) I and QO is an obj~ctively- false
hypothesis about translation.
'We have refuted QO' but we have not.refuted the indeter-
minacy thesis. Quine dqes not claim that the translation of
gavagai as rabbit stage is immune against refutation if that
is.-the only change we make in the standard hypotllesis .. Rather,
he claims that we can save this counterintuitive analytical
hypothesis from refutation-"by cornpensatorily juggling, the tr~ns~
lation of numerical identity and associated particles" (Quine
1960, 54). Let us say that "a system Qi of analytic~l hyp~­
theses is- an .extension of QO if it includes aI-I the -analytical
hypotheses of 00 whic~ are not incl~ded in the standatd hypo-
thesis. In these terms, Quine is claiming that QO has .an empiri-
cally ir~efutable extension.
Quine has in fact suggested a way to juggle the translation
of identity ~o as to straighten out the problem with sentence
.142). Instead of translating the Junglese relation term kal as
. is the same as, he sugg~sts that we render kai as is a stage of
the same object as (Quine 1960, 72) e Let ·us make this amendment
in QO' and call the result Ql. Now Ql's translation for (~2)
(45) This rabbit stage is a stage 'of the same· qbject
-as that rabbit stage.
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is (45). Pointing twice to the same rabbit also counts as
pointing to two stages of the same rabbit. Hence the stimuli
which prompt assent to (42) will also prompt assent to (45).
Unlike Qot the revised challenge hypothesis Q 1 preserves the
stimulus meaning of (42).
(46) Yo gavagailo n~h gavagai.
(47) All rabbit stages are rabbits.
(48) All stages of rabbit stages are rabbit stages.
But there is another sentence which 00 translated.incor-
rectly, and 01 inherits this defect. Seritence (46), translated
as (47) under the standard hypothesis, gets paired 'with (48)
under both QO and Ql. Now (47) is stimulus contradictory, .and
hence its standa.rd Junglese translation~ (46) is ·al::?o stimulus
~ontradictory. But (48), the Quinean translation of (46), is
stimulus analytic (on one natural reading of s~age) ~ .It is hard
to imagine a worse blunder in translation .
. It will have been ~oticed that in concocting sentence (46),
I made the Junglese term 'for rabbit stages a complex term, derived
from gavagai .. But this structural decision on my part is not
essential to the argument. Thus suppose that Junglese also has
(49) Yo nematai nah gavagai.
(50) All rabbit stages are rabbit stages.
a,syntactically 'simple term for rabbit stages, say nematai~28
Then the standard translation for (49) is (47), brlt QO and Ql
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render (49) as (50). T~e Junglese sentence (49) is' still stirn-
ulus~c.ontradictory" and ·i ts Quinean translation, (50) is sti 11
stimulus-analytic.
Th~nks to the existence of the Junglese term nematai, Qo
and Q1 are many-one mappings of Jung~ese terms into Engl~sh oneso
Under these challenge hypotheses, both gavagai and nernatai get
mapped to rabbit stage. The argument against the Quinean trans-
. "
lation of (49) can be generalized, with an added restriction on
systems of analytical hyp6theses, to apply against all many-one
~halleng~.hypoth~ses.
We shall have to suppose that for any given class of synony-
mous ~nglish expressions, a given .system of analytical hypotheses,
contains no more than one analytical hypothesis that mentions a
mem~e~ of t~at synonym class. The sta~dard hypothesis already
contains an analytical hypothesis which, mentions the term,rabbit,
equating it with Junglese gavagai~ Our restriction' says that the
standard hypothesis must not contain any analytical hypothesis
equating hare wi th some Junglese 'term, since hare is synonymous
with -rabbit. Translation of sentences that contain hare will
thu~ be a two-stage process. First we shall have to replace
hare. with rabbit, and in general to replace expressions not listed
in the standard hypothesis with their listed synonyms. Once this
step is.complete, we can translate the resulting sentence by
means of the standard hypothesis. The first step in.this pro-
cess requires a method for reducing any Englis~ sent~nce to a
t-ranslatable normal forlu. v~i tho'ut 'such :a method, the proposed
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constraint would destroy the ability to translate any English
sentence into Junglese. We might accomplish the transformation
to a norm~l form by means of a sort of intralinguistic system
of analytical hypotheses not subject to our.anti-redundancy con-
straint. Such intralinguistic systems of paraphrase. will be
needed in Junglese as well as English, since we intend.to
generalize our constraint to apply to both sides of a. sys~em
of analytical hypotheses.
By thus generalizing our anti-redundancy constraint, we
g~in an important advantage. To see what that advantage is,
l~t us take a second look at the way th~ sentenbe (49) caused
ihe"downfall of QO and Ql.- The Junglese terms gavagai. and
(51)· Yo
.(52) All
nah gava-g~i •
s are rabbit stages .
.nematai would still appear twice in the standard hypothesis,
under the new constraint, since according to that hypothesis
these terms are heteronymous. But their heteronyrny implies that
there is some sentence frame which t~kes on one stimulus meaning
when gavagai fills its blank, and a different stimulus meaning
when nernatai fills its blank. One such sentence frame i's (51).
Its Quinean English equivalent is (52),. The anti-redundancy
constrai11t .assures us that for every pair of Jl.~nglese te'rms.
t l , t 2 mentioned in the standard hypothesis, ~~~e will be a
sentencie frame F , ~ike (51), ~hich t~kes on ii~tinct stimulus
meanings depending on whether tl or t2 fills its blank.
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Now QO and Ql give precisely the same English translation for
(53) Yo nematai nah gavagai.
(54) YO,gavagai nah gavagai.
(55) All rabbit stages are rabbit stages.
nematai ,as for gavagai. For this reason, both (53) (previously
(49» and (54) are translated as (55), though (53) and (54) have
distinct stimulus rn~anings. Thus one sentence that is incorrectly
translated by QO and QI is (53). But there is another, more
(56) (Yo nematai nah gavagai) gesso (yo gavagai nah
. gavagai) •
(57) (All rabbit stages are rabbit stages) iff (all
rabbit stages are rabbit st~ges) .
complex sentence we could have used to ,refute QO -and Ql- That
sentence is (56), which happens to be stimulus-contradictory.
But (57), the Quinean translation of (56) ,. is stimulus-analytic.
Every non-redundant system of analytical hypotheses trans-
lates some stimulus-contradictory sentence into a stimulus-
a~alytic one, if (relative to the- standard hypothesis) the
syste'm-' is a many-one mapping of Junglese terms into English.
_Suppose, for example, that the Junglese terms ,t1 and t 2 are,
heteronymous according to .the standard hypothesis, but that some
challeng'e hypothesis tra,nslates, them both into English as e _29
There is at least one Junglese sentence frame, say F , which
, --
is sensitive to the difference .in meani~g ,between tl and t2-
From this sentence frame, we form a new ,sentence frame with two
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bl~nks, using the Junglese biconditional operator g~sso.30
This new frame is F gesso F ••• 'j its Engli sh -translation-
will be, say, G if and only if. G.... Now the result of
.inserting tl and t 2 into the blanks of the Junglese sentence
frame, will be a stimulus-contradicto~y sent~nce. But the
Quinean translation of this stimulus~c~ntradlctoryJunglese
sentence will be stimulus~analytic, since e goes into both
blanks of the English sentence frame.-
We have just seen that all many-erie systems of analytic~l
hypotpeses are re,futable., It is e~sy to get rid of the many-
one ~haracter of QO ~nd °1 ,- however •. In translating gavagai
as rabbit stage rather than as rabbit, Qo and Ql have left rabbit
without a Junglese equivalent., If w~ as~ign rabbit to nemata~~
the resulting ,system of analytical hypo~heses (call',it Q2) is
.one~~ne, except pe~haps for its treatment of the Junglese iden-
tity predicate kai.
Unfortunately, Q2 is no better off than its predecessors,
(58) Yo nematai nah gavagai.
(59) All rabbits are rabbit sta.ges.
again because of the way it treats sentence (49) (here repeated
as(58). For remember, (49), i.e. (58), is stimulus-contradic-
tory. But its translation under Q2 is (59) and (59) is stirnulus-
analytic. (I take it that rabb~t stages co~e in various lengths,
~nd that the longest possible. stage of ~ g~ven'rabbit is ident-
ical with the whole spatia-temporal rabbit hirnself~)
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There are other, more complex ways to derive a one-one
hypothesis from Ql- Rather than giving non-standard transla-
tions for'just gavagai and nematai, we could switth the trans-
lations of a larger class 'of Junglese terms. Suppose, for
example, that the standard hypothesis includes the five
(60)
. ~l = e~(gavagai) (rabbl t)
t2 e2
(nematai) -- (rabbit stage)
t3 = e3
(r.abbi t part)
t4 = e4
.(rabb.i thood)
ts = e5
(rabbit fusion)
ana~ytical hypotheses listed in (60) _ Clearly, this is o~ly one
. of 5: distinct· one-one mappings from {tI' t 2,t3 , t4' t s} to
{el' e2' e3' e 4 , es} Another such mapping is shown in (61),
(61 ) tl = e2
t2 = e3
t 3 = e4
t4 = eS
t s = el
and there are plenty of others. Perhaps one of these will pro-
vide an irrefutable translation for (49), and for all other
cate~o~ical Junglese sentences involvin~ tl~t5.
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Such widespread ta~pering with the translations of Junglese
terms is liable to ,have adverse ,effects on the, translations of
sentences other than (49). To counter these effects, it would
,be necessary to adjust the translations of other Junglese expres-
sians, and who can tell in advance whether it will be, possible to .
. make all the necessary adjustments? 'Also, notice that no such,
amendments as those listed in (61) would give us a satisfactory
translation for sentence (46), our earlier counterexample. 31
rt'is not a very promising strategy, then, to ame~d 'Q1 by alter-
I
ing only the transl'ations of terms that are stimu1~s,-synonymous,
,( as' .Decas ion sen'tences) wi th gavagai.,
'Nor is it likely that Quine ~ould resort. to this"strategy,
when ~e consider that both couriter~xarnples to QlI ~entences' (46)
.. and (47), were (according to the standa~d hypothesis) categor-
.
.ical, statements of the form A. In defending the translation of
gavagai as rabbit stage, "Quine's usual move is to juggle the
tr~nslations of "numerical identity ref. his dodge with sentence
(42), ppo 148-1S0above] and associated particles" (Quine 1960,
54; emphasis added) e Among these associated particles are
quantifie~s (Quine 1969" 2-3) and ncatego~ical copulaIs] 11 '(Quine
1960, 70),.- Both our troublesome sentences, (46) and (49), con-
tain the quan'tifier yo and the categorical copula nah.' To give
stimulus-contradictory translations for (46) and (49), Quine
would most likely change the English .glosses fo~.~ nah and/or YE...
As we saw in connection 'with sentence ,(42)', Quine does offer
an example of h6w the identity p~ed~cat~ can be reconstrued ·to
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avoid counterexamples. Unfortunately, however, he never indicates
what sort of adjustments he has in mind 'for quantifiers and cate-
gorical copulas. Nor have· I been able to come up wi th any adj ust-
ments that would deal in a sat~sfactory way with (46) and (49).
It seems, then, that we have no compelling reason to believe that
we can render Ql irrefutable by al teri'ng its treatment of yo or
nah.
On the other hand, I have clearly given no ar'gurnent to
show that all extensions of Ql are refutable. I 'have failed,
as Kirk failed before me, to refute Quine's thesis. There is
a,common explanation for both failures: neither Kirk nor I
h,ave cha,llenged Quine' s as~umption,s about language. learning.
Quine assumes that people are psychologically able to acquire
a translation scheme like the Qi. Kirk and I have accepted this
a,ssumption, and we have tried (wi thout s'uccessJ to show tha t
people with such translation schemes are objectively mistaken.
By accepting Quine's assumption, Kirk and I have given the
entire game away, for this assumption is the ,heart of Quine's
thesis. 32 In one passage, Quine sums up his thesis in.the
following way. Suppose we have found a bilingual whose trans-
lations are exactly those of our favorite system of analytical
hypotheses. Now, Quine writes,
My point remains; for my point is then that another
bilingual could have a semantic correlation incompatible
with the first bilingual's without deviating from the,
f{rst bilingual i~ his sp~ech ~ispositions within either
language, ~xcept in his dispositions to translate~ (Quine
1960, 74; emphasis added)
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What is meant ,here by could? Quine can "hardly be claiming
logical possibility for the described situation" given his views
about modality. Rather, I' think he has psycholOgic~l p~ssibility
in mind. His very next paragraph confirms t~is reading. There
he hints that a linguist could tra~sl,ate gavag.ai as rabbi t part,
without doing violence to ~ny f1 substantive law of speech be~
.havior"'- (Qu'ine 1960, '74). But the linguist's translation would
violate a psychological law (in the relevant sense), if that law
prevented natural bilinguals from translating gavagai as rabbit
part._ (The linguis~ ai~s to translate in just the way a natural
bilingual would.) Quinels thesis, then,' denies the existence of
any such law.
A numper of questions 'arise when we view Quine" s thesis in.
this light: What bearing could a psychological hypothesis have
on the logical determinacy of synonymy claims? What could have
led Quine to accept this psychologlcal_hyp~th~sis? Is the hypo-
thesis true? We shall take up each of these questions in turn.
On' the first point, I shall assume that two expressions are
objectively synonymous (9r heteronymous) in L just in case they
are synonymous (heteronymous) in the idiolects of ,(almost) all
speakers of L. To allow for questions of. interlinguistic syn-
onymy, we may consider the two languages spoken by a bilingual
to be a single uunion ll language. 33 Thus an expression e of'L
is synonymous (heteronymous) with an expression e' of L' just
,in case e and e' are synonymous (heteronymo1)s) in the' idiolects
of (almost) all speakers of LULl, i.e. in the idiolects of
'(almost) all. bilinguals in Land L 1.34
\
\
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This cri teri.on 'for the truth of synonymy claims is, I think,
in accord with Quine I s views on ,the subject. ,In one place,; he
writes:
..• the question whether two expressions ,are alike or
unlike 'in meaning has no determinate answer, known or unknowti,
except insofar as the 'answer is settled in principle by .
people's speech dispositions, known or unknown. (Quine 1969,
29)
Section 11 in Word and Object provides an especially revealing
case study in how people's speech dispositions are to settle
questions of synonymy. There Quine points out a problem con-
, ,
cerriing n6n-obse~vational occasion s~ntences, such as Bachelor
-and Unmarried man. p'resumably when I 'call someone a bachelor,
I mean just what you would mean in calling·him an unmarried man.
But my Ba~helor and y6ur, Unmarried man' do not have ~he same
stl~ul~s meaning. Many stimuli that wpuld prompt me to assent
to (or dissent from) Bachelor would. move you.neither to assent
nor to dissent~ These stimuli consist in exposure.to men whose
marital status is known to mer but not to' you.
Despite all this, Quine points out, lithe stimulus meanings
of Bachelor and Unmarried man -are .• '. identical for anyone
speaker . '. '. s'ameness of stimulus meaning is as good a standard
of synonymy for non-observational occasion sentences as for
observation sentences as long as we stick to one speaker"
(Quine i960, 46). He proposes to count two sentences as synon-
ymous in L, then, if and only if they are stimulus~s~nonymous
tor each speake! of L. This criterion is simply a m6re specific
version of the criterion I proposed three paragraphs back'.
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I have been unable to find an explicit endorsement of such
a criterion in Chomsky's writings, but I nonetheless suspect that
he and most other proponents of linguistic" r~tionalism accept
some such criterion. For·instance, Fodor and Katz (1963) argue
\
that it is an empirical question whether inadvertently and'
automatically are synonymous in English, and that their inter-
changeability iri the speech of a single. individual (an eccentric
baker) does not settle the question. They write: .
•.• anything we learn about ourselves when we describe
. the language we speak is. a].so something we learn about every
other speaker of st~ndard English qua speaker of ,standard
English. Conversely, anything we can I-earn about English
by studying our own speech, we can in principle learn"by
studying the speech of speakers other than ourselves.
Put' it another way: "any facet of a speake'r IS· use. of
E'nglish that is not shared by other speakers' is ipso facto
not relevant to a description of English. (Fodor and Katz
1963·, 7,0)
In shbrt,' Fodor and Katz. argue here that t~o "expressioris are
. . .
synonymous in English j~st in case they are synonymous in the
idiolects .of a substantial 'majority of English speakers. Dis-
senting ~diolects do not overthrow a synonymy claim if they form
only a small minority.
There i~, I think, good reason for rationalists and
empiricists alike to accept this view about the truth conditions
'of synonymy statements. For suppose, first, that expressions e
and e' are synonymous in a substantial majority of English idio-
lects. It is hard to imagine what grounds there could pos~ibly
be, under these, circumstances, -for claiming that e' and'e' really
have distinct meanings nonetheless. These expressions may be ,
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non-synonymous technical terms in a jargon spoken by specialists
in some field or other, but such a technical dialect surely
enjoys no privileged st~tus. Nor do the protests of the pre-
_scriptivist carry weight. He can at best show that e and e'
used to be heteronymous j or tha t they, remain S'o in some restricted
population.
If, on the other hand, e and e' are ~e~eronymous ·in almost
all idiolects, what could justify the claim that there is really
-no difference in meaning between them? Here we are dealing with
cases like that of Fodor and Katz's eccentric baker, and to such
objectors, we say: sorry, but in describing e and e' as heter-
onymous, we weren't talking about your dialect.
Finally, suppose that the idiolects of English. are more or
less equally divided between those in which e and e' are synon-
ymolls, and those in which e and e I ·are het~ronymous. . In this
case, we would be inclined to suspect that-at least one of the
expressions has no clear and established meaning in English. 35
We would be unwilling to describe e and.e' as synonymous, but
then 'we would also hesitate to-describe them unequivocally as
heteronymous. Where the idiolects show no unanimity, the ques-
tion of syno'nymy has, as Quine says, .. no determinate answer,
known. or unknown" (Quine 1969, 29). Perhaps, indeed, it is
analytic that two expressions are synonymous in L iff they are
synonymous in almost all i,dialects of L.
We can now see how th~ psychology of language-learning
affects the logical determinacy of synonymy claims~ Synonymy
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craims are objectively true o~ false (in a speech ~o~unity)
only if. idiolect v~riation is highly restrictad~ If the la~s
of language acquisition permitted different children to acquire
,widely different idiolects, then synonymy claims might gradually
lose their determinacy.
Now, Quine "holds that· indeterminacy is consistent with the
laws of grammar acquisition. What led him to this view? In
seeking the answer, we rn~st remember that Quine"'s indeterminacy
thesis is a limi ted one. ,He does not hold tha t all synonymy
claims lack truth value. Quine even concedes the truth of
certain statements about synonymy between terms,' at· least. with-,
in Engli sh I or in 1I1angu9.ges whose _translations of I all' ,. 'are'
and ,~, are somehow ~ettled in advance" (Quine 1960, 55). AII-
English speakers have substantially the same speech- dispositions
toward bachelor as toward unmarried rnan._ And it is not just
that we all more or less. unconsciously use these terms inter-
changeably in all but a few contexts. -We also feel intuitively
that these words are synonymous .
. Now wha t could be _the source of our intui tioI1s that ba~chelor
and unmarried man are syhonymous? bne possibiliti is that our
intuition is based on a belief about the speech dispositions of
the rest of our community. Each of us could have made nan implicit
sociological guess that Ieven] under extraordinary- stimulation,
most people would hold bachelor and unmarried man coextensive"
(Quine 1960, 56). But Quine does not think that our intuitions
about synonymy 'arise in this way.
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Rather, he suggests, it is a peculiarity in the ~ay we
.learn the term bachelor that gives, us our intuition. As .an
occasion sentence, Bachelor is non-observatiqnal;' Indian nickel,
by way of contrast, is an· observational occasion sentence. Now
when we learn the term Indian nickel, we can and do. learn it by
lIiearning directly to associate the term with sample objects ll
(Quine 1960 I 56)'.' This is possible, because be'ing an' Indian
nickel i~ an observable property. But the property of being a
bachelor is not an observable property. Hence we cannot very
well' learn the term bachelor ~imply by observing a collection
of sample objects to which' the term applies.' Rather, we learn
this term by "learning appropriate associations ,of words with
words" (Quine 1960,56). Specifically, vle learn bachelor by
assoc"ia~ing i t with the phras,e unmarried man.
One looks to ·unmarried man' as semantically·anchoring'
'bachelor.' because there is no socially constant stimulus
meaning to govern the use of the word; ~~ver its "tie with
'unmarried man' and you leave-it no very evident social
determination, hence no, utility in comrnunication~ .... it
is only the few verbal links that give the terms the fixity
nee.ded in conununication (Quine 1960, 56),
-Now perhaps we do learn bachelor through word-word, rather
.tnan word-object, associations, and perhaps this is why we have
the intuition that bachelor and unmarried man are synonyms.
Still, the content of this intuition might. be a ·'sociological
guess". Indeed, when people use the term·bachelo~,they do so
in the conviction that·their association of bachelor with un-
married man. is not idiosyncratic, but ~onventional (cf~ Lewis
1969), and widely shared in our society. Recall Fodor and
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Katz's point: when we study English gra~nar~ we learn something
not just about ourselves, but about every other, English speaker
as well.
Strong intuitions about synonymy are not confined to terms
'. that. are non-observational when used ~s 6ccasion sentences, how-
ever. The term hare (and for that rnatte~, lapin) is' intuitively
synonymous with rabbit, and emphatically not synonyrn~~s with,
rabbit stage. By Quine's account, we learn to use these terms
'by associating them with ostended objects, rather than with
other words. Osteniion, however, is according to Quin~, power-
tess to distinguish rabbits from their stages. Whence, then,
the strong convictions about the sem~nti~ relationships between
hare (or i~terlinguistically, lapin) on the one hand; and rabbit
and rabbit stage on the other? . And more particularly, does a
.language learner encounter evidence that -would justify the con-
victions he acquires?
Quine and the rationalistic linguist give very different
answers' to these questions. Let us t~nd first to Quirie's answers_
He can, I think, provide.a plausible explanation for the feeling
we have about 'hare (or lapin) and'rabbit stage; or ,rather, I
think I can supply such an explanation on his behalf. A child
(or a Frenchman) learning English is almost certain to learn
(quite possibly by ostens~on) rabbit before he learns rabbit
stage. We rarely talk about rabbit stages, and since rabbit
is syntactically a constituent of rabbit stage, it make~ ped-
agogical sense to introduc~ the former term first. Perhaps,
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then, rabbit stage is normally learned, not by ostension, but
by "learning appropr.iate associations of words-with words", i.e.
by definition in terms of the antecedently available word rabbit. 36
The definition will very likely make it clear that- rabbit stages
are not rabbits. Quine himself, for example, introduces the
term by suggesting that gavagai may ·refer "not to rabbits after
all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits"
. (Quine 1960, 51). This is doubtless where' many of us first
encountered the term rabbi t stage. Similarly', har~ may be
learned, not by ostension, but by definition in terms of the
more commonly used"rabbit.
On this account, the intuitive synonymy of hare (lapin) and
rabbit, and the intuitive heteroriymy of hare (lapin) and rabbit
stage,3? arises from causes similar to those 'which make bachelor
and unmarried man intuitive synonyms. In both instances, we
have learned nappropriat~ associations of 'words with words",
rather than associations between words and sample objects. The
claim is that although rabbit stage perhaps could b~ taught by
ostension, it is normally introduced by definition. Where this
ter~ .iB taught osten~ivelYI ~ verbal warning not. to confuse this
term with rabbit may accompany the ostensio~, of course.
To eliminate the possibility of a lang~age learner being
taugllt word-word associa tions, Quine concentrates on II radical
translation, i.e., translation of the language, of a hitherto
untouch~d people ll • Thus naIl help of i~t~rpreters is excluded ll
(Quine .1960, 28). The linguist (or the incipient "natural
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.bilingual", (Quine 1969, 6) must base his inte~linguistic "assoc-
iations of words with words" solely on ostensive evidehce. 38
There is no pre-existing population of bilun9uals, available to
inculcate "a traditionally evolved dictionary" (Quine 1969, 5),
a uniquely "correct" system of analytical hypothese~. Indeed,
on Quine's criterion of synonymy, there are no correct analyt-
ical hypotheses~ For lithe question 'whether two .expressions are
alike or ,unlike in meaning" (Quine 1969, 29) is settled, if
at all, by the speech dispositions of the relevant.speech com-·
munity, and we are being aske~ tq consider a situation in which
the ·relevant bilingual community does not as' yet exist. " When
our ling,uist becomes the first (and only) biiingual in the two
languages involved, his system of analytical hypotheses will
on Qu'ine',s criterion be correct, whatever it is,· provided qnly
that it p~eserve stimulus meaning.
The rationalist may 'concede that where radical translation
is concerned, ostension provides the only available evidence
about th~ meanings of Junglese expressions. He may concede that
ostensive evidence is not sufficient r all by itself, to settle
questions of translation. He denies, however, that ostension
provides the language learner IS (or the lingui st ' s) only. infor-
mation about the language he is learning. Besides the evidence
he gathers ·from speakers of Junglese, the language learner (and
derivatively, _the linguist) has knowledge of the principles of
universal grammar. 39 These principles help the C;h·.ild to ~ake
his -II implicit sociological guess II • Taken together·_ wi th the
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evidence, the principles of universal .gr~mmar rule out many
semantic hypotheses that are compatible with the evidence alone.
In fact, the language learner is able to '~ule out all systems of
ana_lytical hypotheses but one, using the principles. of' universal
grammar as well as the evidence.
Actually, the language learner does not directly acquire
a sy~tem of analytical hypotheses; I suspec~.40 Rather, he
acquires a'_grammar of Junglese, including a lexicon in which
the meanings of Jungles~ terms are represented in the vocabu-
lary of universal semantic theory (cf. Katz 1972, 1l6n.). The
learner already has a _granunar of English", in wh,icn the same
vocabulary is used to describe the meanings of English terms.
Junglese and English terms can thus be correlated via their
representations in the vocabulary of a language-independent
semantic theory: If a Junglese term has the same lexical read-
~ng as an English term, the child's· two lexicons entail, in
effect, an analytical hypothesis: the hypothesis that these
two terms are synonymous. In this way, a pair of back-to-back
lexicons yield a whole system of analytical hypotheses. To-
"gether ~ith the assQciated granunars, this system yields trans-
1ationsfor all seritences of both languages.
According to the rationalist hypothe~is, each child is born
with the same information about.linguistic universals. All
children who are expose~ to a typical sample of Junglese usage
will thus develop substantially the same Junglese grammar, up
to idiolect var_iat.-ionQ> (For -an argument that such variation
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need not jeopardize the determinacy of synonymy relations, cf.
the Appendixc .) Similarly, children who encounter distinct but
typical corpora of English data will all come to have the same
English g~ammar. The rationalist claims, then, that all bi-
linguals who have had access to a normal body of evidence about
both English and Junglese, will exhibit the same set of dis-
positions to translate. Two bilinguals cannot have rUdically
different translati9ns of the same sentence, unless one of
them has been exposed to a radically atypical body of evidence
in the p~ocess of learning one of the languages in qUQstion.
This means, by the way, ,that the rationalisti~ linguist
claims the support of an hypothetical population of bilinguals,
even when he engages in radical transla tion. "True e110ugh II ,
he ~dmits, "there does noct now exist a conunurii ty 'of Junglese-
English bilinguals. But if there did exist such a con~unity,
I can predict that (almost) all its member,s would have such-
a"nd-such translation disposi tions. " (Cf. note 39) The ration-
alist, in justifying his radical translations, uses a sub-
cjunctive version of the kind of argument Quine would Use to
show the synonymy of -bachelor and unmarried man. Similarly,
the natural bilingual makes a sociological guess about the trans-
lation dispositioffiof an hipothetical society of bilinguals.
It.seems fair enough to appeal to the speech dispositions
of potential as we~l as actual bilingual populations. The
point of contention between Quine and the rationalist is the
cempirical claim I made two paragraphs back': that two bilinguals,
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both exposed to typical bodies of English and Junglese sentences
during the learning process, cannot have radicaliy- different
translations of the same sentence. Quine denies this. Quine
also holds that intralingui$tic indeterminacy is psychologically
possible. I think Quine may have come to this position by
reasoning from the supposed limitations of ostensive learning
(of. pp. 162-16.3 above). This leads us to our third question:
As an empirical hypothesis ~bout languag~ learnin~, h~w weil
does Quine's indeterminacy thesis accord with the available
evidence?
Quine's position is difficult to ref~te, b~c~use it is
comparatively weak. guine_ claims that variation among bilinguals
(or among rnonolinguals, with respect to indirect quotation)' can
develop, but he does not specify the conditions ~nder which he
expects that it will develop. His discti~sion,of th~ synonymy
between bachelor and unmarried man 'tells us something-about the
circumstances in which Quin~ expects variation- not ,to develop,
however. Words that are learned via "appropriate associations
of words with words", and not merely by word-object associations,
(ostension), will typically stand in deter~inate synonymy and
'heteronymy relations with other words and ph~ases.
In testing a given pair of expressions for synonymy, then r
we must assure ourselves that the subjects have not learned, one
of the expressions by definition in terms of the other. Other-
wise, any objeqtive synonymies.we uncover will be useless ~gainst
Quine's indeterminacy thesis. Within the limits imposed by this
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restriction, we shall have to vary the conditions of learning
in every way that could conceivably lead to the. development of
idiosyncratic patterns of translation behavior .. If .all.bi-
linguals 41 translate in the same way, despite wide variations
in learning experience, then the rat~onalist hypothesis will
be confirmed, and Quine's'denial of that.hypothesis propor-.
,tionately disconfirmed, 'though not 4ecisively ~efuted. If, as
I suspect, Quine's indeterminacy thesis is false, then we will
be able to achieve any desired degree of disconfirmation of
that thesis.
There is one other kind of experiment that might be useful
in settling the issue. The rationalist predicts that among all
the hypotheses compatible ~ith the evidence alone, languag~
iearners will h~ve a strong pr~ference for one hyp6thesis in
particular, and a strong prej udice against all others. Quine',
on -tIle other hand, seems conuuitted to the view that th.ere is
no psychological basis for any such prejudice. To test these
predictions out, we mi~ht depart fro~ the policy of isolating
our subjects from all .other bilinguals." We might deliberately
try to convin~e them, for example, that the proper translation
for lapin is rabbit stage. (This one deviant analytical hypo-
thesis will call for adjustments in other analytical hypotheses,
as we have seen.) If this suggestion encountered severe resis-
tance, the rationalist hypothesis would be confirmed. If our
'subjects accepted this hypothesis readily, and integrated -it
smoothly into their performance as translators, this would
'confirm Quine's views.
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Experiments of the latte~ sort have never, to ~h~, best of
my knowledge, been .attempted. But many people h'ave learned' a
second language without being-contaminated by contact with other
,bilinguals. The "direct method" of foreign language instruction
is based on the supposition that expl~cit instruction in trans-
lation hinders, rather than facilitates,. the'. process of second--
language learning. For this reason, instructors at "direct,
method" or "total immersion ll language inSjtitutes carefully avoid
using English, and outside of class, students are fined for
speaking English with faculty or fellow students. I have never
heard it reporte"d'that students ,emerged from· such an institute
tran~lating lapin as 'rabbit stage. 42
It may be objected that this is an artifact of the language-
learning 8i tua tions . In _English, w,e talk abou t rabbi ts much more
often than we discuss rabbit stages. Perhaps if Fi~nch instruc-
tors were to use phase ~~un lapin frequently~ and unadorned
lapin rarely, there would be less unanimity in their students'
translations. 'Or perhaps English and French share some struc-
tural peculiarity which facilitates translation between these-
two languages.
Both objections are of course subject to empirical test.
In principle, the French instructors can control the relative
frequency of lapin and phase d'~ lapin in their conversations
with students, though they may find this di~ficult in practice. 43
We can search for a more suitable test language than Fr~nch,
once we have been told what structural ~eature of French is
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supposed to be responsible for the artifa9tual ease and uniformity
of translation between ~rench and English~ If every language in
the world turns oQt to have the structural- feature in question,
this will be prima facie evidence that all possible human languages
have this feature. In principle, we could test this hypothesis
by attempting to teach English speakers a concocted'languag~
(perha~s a structurally doctored-up French) 'that lacked the
suspected feature.
But enough of these imagined objections, and imagined
experiments to. tes·t them. The point is this. Quine IS indeter-
-minacy thesis is an empirical hypothesis about the kind of
evidence (~elective reinforcement) needed to establish syn-
onymy relations within. or between languages. For practical
reasons, it is difficult to test the implications .0£ this hypo-
thesis with respect to intralinguistic synonymy. Our informa-
tion in the inter-linguistic case ~s scanty, anecdotal, and not
altogether conclusive, but. that information seems to suggest
that Quine's thesis is more likely false than true. The seman-
tic knowledge native speakers. have about the-sentences of their
language.(s) is in no great jeopardy from Quine, since there are
no strong grounds to suppose that Quine's indeterminacy thesis
is true, and some grounds to suppose that that thesis is false.
Ill. STICH: BELIEF
Edgley's argument against innate knowledge was based on the
justification condition: the requirement that in order to know
--~--_.~""
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a proposition, one must have good reasons for believing that
proposition. Quine's indeterminacy thesis threatened our seman-
tic,knowledge (and hence our semantic knowledge, ~t the level of
particular and universal grammar) because of.the truth condition:
the principle that we can only know propositions that are true.
Neither Edgley's argument ~o~ Quine's proved compelling l however.
,l,t remains' t-o consider" '\~hether our a.llege·d knowledge of parti-
'cular and universal grammar satisfies the "belief 'condition:
'" the requirement tha t in order to' know a proposi tion, one must
believe that proposition. Relative to this question, ~e shall
exanline a paper by Stephen Stich, in which he argues that lithe
speaker has no such beliefs" as those repres"ented in the graItLmar
of his language, or in ling~istic theory (Stich 1971, 494) ~
(62) John overestimated himself.
(63) *John overestimated themselves.
Graves, Katz, et al.' (in press) point out that a native
speaker of English is able to determine whether or.not any given
string of English words is grammatical. He can determine, for
exa~ple, that (62) is g~ammatical and that (63) is no~, even if
he has never before encountered eith~r (62) or (63),. To explain
this ability to determine the grammaticality of strings arbl-
trarily drawn from an indefinitely large class, Graves, Katz,
et ale postulate that English speakers know the grammar of
English. Stich suggests that a weaker hypothesis would suffice
to explain the open-ended ability -of English speakers' to recog-
nize grarnmaticality.
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This suggestion arises in the course of an argument intended
to refute a view not held by the people Stich means to refute .
. Stich writes:.
My opponent places the time of acquisition of know-
-ledge about particular sentences in childhood; I would
maintain we have no such knowledge ~ntil we hear the
sentence in question....on the view I would disparage,
the beliefs speakers express when we inquire after their
linguistic intuitions are long-standing beliefs. The
speaker acquired them on learning his language. The
questioning we subject him to merely brings these beliefs
to consciousness ... (Stich 1971, 493,495)
Thus on the view Stich thinks he must refute, every English
speaker knows that sentence (62) i.s grammatical, whether or
not he has ever encountered sentence" (62). Indeed, every
native speaker knows, concerning each of the infinitely many
sentences of English, th.at that sentence is grammatical.
I know of no evidence that Chomsky ever held this implaus-
ibly strong view. But however that may be, Graves and her
colleagues repudiate this view early in their reply to Stich.
They "agree that-the k~owledge that ~ particular expression has
certain grammatical property is only acquired upon encountering
the expression, not when the language is learned by thechild"1I
(Graves, Katz, et ale in press). This agreement deprives Stich's
conclusion of its interest, but his argument for that conclusion
nonetheless remains worthy of our attention.
When I hear a sentence for the first t1me, and come to
believe that the sentence,is grammatical, my belief cannot be
a long-standing one, Stich argues, because such beliefs are
·il
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,"directly evident perceptual judgments", in Chisholm's sense
(Stich 1971, 496; cf. Chisholm 1957, 1966). Now directly
evident p'erceptual reports, Stich wr i tes, ," cc;>mmon"ly express
something known to the reporterl~, but they " 11eed no further
evidence or justification" (Stich 1971, 495). Moreover, such
reports' are not "open to further justifications" (Stich 1971,
496) ~ If this is' correct, then it is neither necessary nor
(64) The cat is on. the mat is grammatic~l in English~
possible for· an English speaker to justify his belief in (64),
in order for that belief to count as knowledge. A fortiori,
it is nqt necessary'for h~m to justify that belief by tacit
deduction, nor to know (or believe) a grammar tha-t would pr.Qvlde
(65) I seem to see a yellow object.
a ,basis for such a deduction. In Stich's view, our knowledge
of (64) is analogous to our knowledge of propositions like (65).
In both instances, we "just know" the proposition in question,
directly and immedia tely,. In nei ther case does our knowledge
rest on a foundation of prior knowledge. And if kno~ledge of
. a g~ammar is not needed to explain our knowledge. of (64)"f tllen
there is no reason to postulate even so much as belief in a
grammar.
Now Graves, Katz,' et ale argue that propositions like (64)
are not directly evident, as Stich claims, because "there. is
always evidence that bears on their truth or falsity, e.g.,
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evidence. regarding the .intuitions and behavior :of other speakers,
comparison with other sentences, etc. Hence, judgments [like'
(64] are capable of "justification", and this shows that they are
not directly evident in Stich's sense (Graves, Katz, et ale in
press). One might think that if (64) is not directly evident,
then surely (66) must be. Not so, according to Graves and her
(66) The cat is on the mat is, granunatical in my idiolect.
associates.' Again, "there is always evidence available about
whether a sound sequence is well-formed in an idiolect ll , because
"any sentence in a-speaker's idiolect is related to infinitely
many other· sentences II in that idiolect (Graves , Katz, et ale in
press) .44 These critics of Stich concede, however, that "judgments
(67) The cat is on the mat seems to me to be grammatical
in my idiolect-.-
about what sound sequences~ well-formed in our own idiolect
[for example, (67) above] might be directly evident in Stich's
sense" (Graves, Katz, et ale in press; emphasis added).
Now if any prop~sition is directlyievident, (65) is. Un-
fortunately, we can argue that (65) is not directly evident,
using the same kind of argument that Graves, Katz, et ala
direct against (64) and (66). There may be. physiological
evidence to show that I seem to see a yellow object. This
means that'pro~ositions about .visual appea~anc~s, such as (65),
are "cap.able of justification ll (Graves, .Katz,' et ale in .press),
and .hence. (according to the Graves-Katz argument) not directly
evident. 45
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Perhaps, then, ~(64) and (66) really.are directly evident,
'despite the. Gr·aves-K-atz argument. But if judgments ,like .(67)
are directly evident', as Grayes and he~ co+leagues sugg~st,. then
it seems to me that knowledge of propositions liI~e- -(64) is explie-
able without assuming knowledge of a particular grammar. The
explanation I have in mind might still appeal to tacit inferences
(68) Usually if a sentence seems to me to be grammatical
in my idiolect, then it really is grammatical in my
idiolect.
(69) Usually if a sentence is grammatical in my idiolect,
then it is grammatical in standard_ English.
from tacitly known premises, but the grammar of English would
not be among those premises. Rather~ the premises would be
(68), (69) I and propositions like (67). Propositions (67), (68),
and (69) seern46 to, support (64), though without entailing it,
as the grammar of English does.
The plausibility of this explanation depends on whether or
not we can be.shown to know (68) and (69), without assuming that
we know a particular grammar. Presumably 'we_ could arrive at (68)
(70} SentenCG S seems to be grammatical in my idiolect.
(71) Sentence S is really gramma~ical in my idiolect.
(72) -Sen·tence S is grammatical in sta,ndard English.
and (69) by induction from,appropriate evidence statements. In
the case of (Ga), the relevant evidence statements would be con-
junctions of statements- like (70) and (71); to confirm (69) we would
need many.conjunctions of_statements like ·(71) and (72). But_do
178
we ever know propositions like (70),. (71), and (72) without
deducing them from an explicitly or implicitly known grammar?
Earlier on, we saw the Graves, Katz, et ale tentatively
concede that judgments like (67) are directly evident. But
(70) is a judgment like (67), so (70) must. be directly' evident.
This means_that (70) is something we know, which is, however,
not inferred from any prior knowledge. Now if (70) were deduced
(even tacitly) from a grammar, it would be an lnstance of in-
directly evident knowledge. As Stich puts it, directly evident
beliefs "stand at the end of chains of evidence we might marshal
for other beliefs" (Stich 1971, 495; emphasis Stich IS). If we
attempt to follow a chain of evidence back beyond the l-evel of
directly evident beliefs, we find that these beliefs arise, not
from a process of inference, but from "the mechanica'l operations
of a·piece of compu:ting machinery ... a IIwhet.?ls-and~pulleys"
device" (Graves, Katz, et .al. in process), namely the human ner-
vous system. Directly evident perceptual beliefs, if such there
be, stand at the boundary of inner space (Nagel 1969b), at the
boundary between a person and_ his_nervous system.
At one point, Graves, Katz, et ale claim that they "know
of no case where it is plausible to suppose that beliefs and
knowledge are the end-products of "wheels-and-pulleys" opera-
tions" (Graves, Katz, et ale in press; emphasis in original) .
But their own account of language acquisition seems to contain
.such a case, if directly evident perceptual beliefs were not
enough of a counterexample. Presumably our "alleged innate
./
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knowledge of linguistic universals does not come as the conclu-
sien of an argument i but rather as the culmination of a geneti-
cally controlled process of maturation. But if, on the
rationalist account, no inference (tacit or otherwise) underlies
our innate knowledge, then the rationalists agree with Stich
that knowledge and belief can arise~out of l~he mechanical oper-
ations of a piece of computing machinery". They only disagree
with Stich over the precise point,at which merely mechanical
operations leave off, and knowledge (or belief) begins .
. Leaving' aside the question of just which beliefs are directly
evident, and which inferred,' there are two reasons why chains of
evidence must have ends, somewhere or other. The first reason is
an ancient one. If chains of justifying arguments are circular,
or if they extend back indefinitely far, then we"face Pyrrhonistic
skepticism. The second reason is related to a point made by
Thomas Nagel. As we analyze mental processes such as inference
(Nagel wrote about actions, e.g. shoe-tying), we eventually pene-
trate
to the level of changes in the permeability of cell walls
and in the pote~tial gradient at nerve synapses, down
·beyond that to alteration in the large molecules at the nuc-
leus of the cell, or.to the subatomic events on which that
. depends ... [There is] no inc~ination to ascribe tacit know-
ledge at the level of atomiC'structure, because we cannot be
said.to move the atoms in our bodies ... (Nagel 1969b, ~53-4)
~agel's point. is that long before our regress of arguments and
premises threatens to become infinite, we reach a point at which
"it is implausible to identify physical processes with inference
processes or human actions.
______ ,l
180
It seems, then, that some beliefs must "stand a.t the ends of
chains of evidence", and Grave.s, Katz, et ale have given given no
cogent argument against suppostng that· the beliefs expressed by
statements like (70) have this status. Let us suppose, then,
that a native speaker knows propositions like (70), without infer-
ri!1g them from any other propositions. (e.g., ·a grammar) 'which he
....... - .
might know. 47 Wh~t, now, about proposition (72)?On the ration-
alist theory, could a person know that a ~iven sentence' is well-
formed in standard English, without knowing a grammar from which
'·he deduced this fact? If not, then the rationalist account of
.~a~guage iearning is bankrupt. For according to that account,
~ proposi tions like (72.). are' among the cD-ild' s pr imary lingu"istic
data c A ~hild corrects his early grammatical hypotheses on the
b.asis of primary linguistic data whic'h conflict with those crude
"ear',y h~lPotheses. Clearly, a child' s k~owledge of recalcitrant
data 'cannot be inferred from ~he grammar-he. has internalized.
The' rationalist. theory of' language learning is firrril.y commi tted
to the view that a child knows propositions like (72), without
,deducing them from'his knowledge of particular grammar. And
s~rely this is plausible enough. The knowledge that S is gram-
rnatical in English need no~ come from an i.nt'ernal·i zed grarnrriar;
it can also come from "evidence regarding the •.. behavior of
other speakers, comparison with other sentences, etc." (Graves,
Katz, et al. in press) •
Finally, does a child need to know a grammar in order to
know propositions like (71)? 'To answer this question~ let us
turn back for a moment to the child's k~owledge of propositions
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like (72). Presumably the child acquires this knowledge by
noting II the ... behavior of other speakers, [by] compa:r;is.on
10f 5] with other sentence's, etc. II (Graves, Katz·, et ale in
press). Now if, by observing the behavi.or of other speakers,
and by comparing the structure of S with that of otner sentences
in their speech, the child can determine that S is grammatical
in standard Engiish, then he should be .able to qetermine that S
is grammqtical in his own idiolect, by applying the same methods
to the study of his own speech behavior. Indeed,' Graves and her
associates concede that I1there i~ always evidence available about
whether a sound sequence is well-formed in an idiolect" (Graves,
Katz, et al. in press) .
.A grammar comes into play, to be- sure, when the child com-
pares the structure of S.with that of .other sentences in hls
idiol'ect ~ B-pt- as I read Stich I s account, the granunar merely
directs the nwheels-and~pulley's11 operatiC?ns 0,£ ~the ~hild' s
perceptual equipment. Th.e· gram.mar does not function as a premise
in a tacit deduction. ,Without knowing or believing a grammar,
then, a child could (even on the rationalist theory) arrive at
(possibly ,taci t) knowledge of proposi tions 'like' (70), ..(71), and
(SO). From such knowledge, the child could arrive at (tacit)·
knowledge of principles (68) and (69) ~ by m~ans of a tacit
inductive inference. Given a previously unencountered sentence
T, the child uses (68) and (69), plus. his directly evident per-
ceptual belief about T, to infer (tacitly) that T,is gra~atical
in standard English. Parallel accountS. ,can be given for properties
182
and relations other than grammaticality. ·,On this view, linguistic
universals ·are not pre'mises in a deduction of a particlll,ar grammar,
which we then know. Rather, linguistic universals are constraints
on the development of a perceptual system, ~hich ultim~tely'comes
to 'operate in conform~ty with the rules of English granwa~.'
Stich agrees that there are internal (perceptual) structures which
correspond to principles of. universal and particul~r gl~ammar, but
not that this internal structure is knowledge.
(73) The cat is on"the mat is grammatical in English.
The rationalists p,ost.ulate knowledge. of particular and
universal g~arrunar in or,der ·to explain our knowledge of proposi-
tions like· (73). We now have an alternative explanation of this
knowledge. How are we to adjudicate between the account just
'sketched, and that.of Graves, Katz, et al.? Not, presumably,
by_means of empirical tests. Stich's internal perceptual struc-
tures reflect exactly the principles reckoned as tacit knowledge
by the rationalist, so Stich's (= my) account and that of Graves,
Katz, et ale make preci,sely the same predi~tions. One might,
however, argue ~hat one account or the other includes ~mong its
, -
explanantia claims which are f~lse or implausible on philosophi-
cal grounds. Against Stich, one might argue that we have no
directly evident perceptual'beliefs at all, or that linguistic
propositions like (70) are not among them. One might ~rgue
that perceptual competences, unlike grammars, a~e innate and not
acquired. One might argue that only an inferential, and not a
perceptual process, could be as complex as a derivation generated
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by a tra,nsformational g,r~mmar. One might observe that sentences
are a peculiarly abstrac't, ob.ject ,for perceptual or directly
evident knowledge, but on the latter point at any rate, the
,'rationalist inhabits a glass house; he claims that we have
dir~ctly evident (though not perceptual) knowledge about the
class of all possible human grammars, i~e. that we do not acquire
that knowledge by any 'process of infe~ence, explicit ~r tacit.
None of these lines' of argument, with the pO,ssible excep-
tion of the first ~nd second, seems very promising to me. Nor
d9,Graves and her colleagues seem inclined ,to defend th~rnselves
, .
by attacking Stich's'.account of linguistic knowledge .. Instead,
they sugg~st that Stich's account 'is ·not incompatible with their
,own, and that consequently there is 'no need to choose oetween
th~: two .. They write that judgments like (73) (or (64)?)
certainly may be-pe~ceptual judgments. 'But ~ven if they
are, perceptual in some appropriate sense, still there is
no reason to think that no tacit deductipns underlie them.
Until we are given some reason to think that perceptions
do not involve tacit deduction of the kind postulated
here, lit is] a non sequitur Ito argue from the perceptual
character of (73r-to the claim that no tacit deduction
from a tacitly known grammar underlies our knowledge of
propositions like (73) ] . (Graves, Kat,z, et ale in pr,ess)
It surely does Stich no justice to suppose that his explan-
ation merely claims that beliefs like (64) are perceptual. Rather,
he claims tha t such belief s., besides being perceptual, are not
deduced from anything else we believe or know, 'least of all from
a grammar. This is clearly ~n~ompatible with the rationalist
explanation of·our knowledge about,individual sentences. If
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Stich's account provides. an adequate explanation' for the
explanandum knowledge, then Jlgood sense sharpened by Occam's
Razor ll (Stich 1971, 486) must reject the gratuitously strong
explanantia of the rationalist account~ 'At the very' least,
I think we may conclude that the Graves-Katz account is no
better that the account I have worked out on the basis of Stich's
·paper.
Actually, Occam's Razor as I understand it cautions against
multiplying entities beyond necessity, and the rationalist
theory is gratuitously strong in its epistemic, rather than its
existential, commitments. But this seems a mere quibble. I can
think of no reason why needlessly strong knowledge claims in an
explanation should be any more acceptable than needlessly strong
existence claims. The only salvation for the rationalist theory
of linguistic knowledge, so far as I can see, would have to come
from an argument supporting one of the following three conclusions:
that principles (68) and (69) do not have the reliability needed
to support· conclusions like (73) (cf. ~ote 46); that Chisholm's
theory of perception does not provide an adequate account of any
sort of perceptual knowledge; or that some profound- (and relevant)
di-sanal-ogy between color judgments and grammaticality judgments
excludes the latter from· the scope of Chisholm's theory, or any
reasonable extension of that theory. Unfortunately, I do not
know how to provide such a defense of the rationalist theory.
Propositional knowledge of particular and universal grammar
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survived Edgley's attack, via the justification condition, and
Quine's, via the truth condition. But unless some defect can
. ,
be. found in Stich's account of linguistic knowle~ge, there
would appear to be no explanatory value in the claim that we
believe the principles of universal o~ particular grammar.
;
/
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Footnotes
*I wish to express my appr~ciation to my advisers, Sylvain
Bromberger and Ned Block,' for their help ,in eliminating some
gross defects in earlier drafts of this chapter. I, not they,
am responsible for all remaining errors.
1 For a general discussion of the theory of universal gram-
'mar, and of its relationship to pa~ticular grammar (the grammars
of particular languages), c'f. Chomsky 1965, 24-59; ,Chomsky 1969a.,
5'9-65.
2 As we ,shall s~e, Edgley does nqt regard justification as
a -necessa~y condition on knowledge "tout court, but only on
"central" or 'paradigm ll ,cases of knowl'ed.ge (Edgley 1969, ,28-2'9).
"In ,order to argue that we know (the 'grammar of) English, he sug-
gests', we must "relax. II. the c~ndition requi~ing that the person
to \~hOrrl knowledge is ascribed should have reasons j·u,stifying his
assurance u (Edgley 1969, 32).
3 This designation of the argument is merely a convenienceG
The unnamed co-authors deserve equal credit for the argume~tG
4 Gettier's counterexample poses no problem for (5), for
the following reason. Smith validly deduced (e) from (d), but
since (d) was false, Smith did not know (d). There~ore (5) does
not imply tha t Smi t11 knew (e ) '.
In describing (5) as "something 'like the converse of Hume's
princ,iple n , I mean to call attentiol1 to ,the following fact:'- - that
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in (5), the clause about consequential (derived) knowledge forms
the consequent of , the conditional, whereas in Hume's principle,
that clause occurs in the antecedent.
5 I shall discuss Edgley's "paradigm example" below, when
I attempt to state his position on the substantiation of knowl-
edge claims. Cf. pp. 92-93 of this paper.
6 Edley's_remarks about criteria for applying psychological
concepts, partially quoted above on p. 90, also suggests that he
regards an appeal to criteria as an essential feature of any
acceptable 'argument for a knowledge claim.
7 Graves , Katz, et ale _ (in press) deny that statements like
(13) formulate principles of universal grammar. Rather, they
maintain that such statements formulate claims to the effect that
such and such a principle is a principle of universal grammar •
.In the Appendix, I shall argue that the principles of universal
grammar must (with one exception) conform to schema (13). Other-
wise the conjunction of linguistic theory with primary linguistic
data ceases to entail particular-grammar~, and the ascription of
innate knowl~dge loses its explanatory value.
8 Actually, children may be able to learn "impossible"
grammars, using some learning mechanism oth~r than that involved
in normal first-language learning; cf. Chomsky 1965, 56.
9 One way to evade this counterexample would be to require
that A be aware not only of q, but of all the "relevant facts"
(if any) that must be added to ~ in order to yield a conjunction
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that logically supports p. This move is not likely to appeal to
. Edgley, however, for in the language acquisition case, it would
amount to the demand that language learners be aware of the
principles of universal grammar. If we say that this demand is
met, why not say that the child knows ,these principles, and uses
them to infer his grammar from his data? If we say the new
requirement is not met," on the other ..hand, we c~nnot use the
newly amended (9) to argue that a speaker knows the grammar of
·his native language.
10 Such an argument could not be brought against our claim
to know particular gramm~r, of course, for that knowle~ge satis-
fies the antecedent of (9).
11 Of cour~e, idiosyncras~e~ of the concept. o~ knowledge
will determine what constitutes a possible explanation of any
given instance of knowledge. For example, it is in virtue of
(5), a principle which concerns the concept of knowle~ge, that
the rationalist account is even so much as a pos~ib~e explana-
tion of 'our knowledge about individual English sentences •
. 12 I am indebted to Ned Block for. suggesting this example.
13 But cf. Nagel 1969a, 175-178, and Stich 1971, 485-486,
488-490, where it is observed that such a reconstruction of the
inference. would not be accompanied by the ah-ha! Erlebnis of
genuine recall. This observation does not seem to add much
strength to the fictionalist account, however.
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~14 I am.not the fi~st person to take this view of Quine's
indeterrnin'acy thesis •. Cf •.Chomsky.1969b; Katz 19.72, 286-292.,'
15 Biologists make a distinction between rabbit and hare,
but I suspect that most Englis~ speakers do not.
'. 16 Here and throughout, I assume the· '.'standard' theory"
(Chom~ky 1965) about the structure of particular g~arnmars.
17 Quine is prepared to admit 'that some clai~s about'syn-
onymy' (~.~., that bachelor is synonymous with unmarried ~, and
that alligator is no~· s¥nonymous with cypress) are objectively
true' •. Cf. pp., 157~158 below. Consequently, i't m:l.-ght -be possible
to retain some, sort of 'lexicon in particular grammars, and in
.·linguis~ic .theory -some _constraints on such lexicon~~ without
running afoul of Quine I s' thesis.
1"8 I use 'truth value in,terchangeably, wi th "asserit value",
assuming that our informant always knows and ·tells the truth when
he .assents to (or dissents from) a queried sentenc'e.
19 Sylvain Bromberger has pointed out to me that a truth-
functional c~~pound of observation sentenGes may be .a standing
sentence. ,(One example is: If 'that is a rabbit, then that is
not ~ pterodac~yl.) If both observation sentences and truth-
functional particles can ~e translated without indete~minacy
. (cf. Quin~ 1960,68), then so· can standing sentences' of this
sort.
20 Note ~hat Quine's rule would not ,screen out all lrrele-
vant stimuli, however. An English speaker might dissent from
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You have a toothache, see a rabbit, and then assent to You have
.....-.... _ .._ ,--- _nzv __
a toothache.
--.ali ......
21 I .'assume, unrealistically, tnat the. linguist uses only
one informant.
22 I do not think that this proviso" threatens the weak
~n.determinacy thesis with vacuity.. In isqlated cases, the effects
of sample size may be offset by lack of variety in the 'sample, or
'.by the circumstances under which ,the sample was collected. A
sample of 100 stimuli may not tell us much about the stimulus
meaning of Gavagai if the sample consists 'of 100 distinct views
of the same furry rabbit' (identifiable, say, .by a collar around
his neck).' Or our sample may have been gathered on the testimony
of an unreliable. inform~nt, who t-ried to ,ple~se us by, dlssenting
before, ~nd assenting after,. every stimulus we tried. But I see
no reason to suppose that such factors will systematically, or
'. normally, offset the effects of sample size.
23 An exception arises in the limit~ng case of eternal'
sentences, whose truth value never chang.es. All spinsters ~
female and No bachelor 15 married are intuitively heteronymous,
but these sentences have identical stimulus meaning~ Despite
this, we can give objective grounds for the claim that these
sentences are not mutual paraphras~s, using a natural extension
of the method o~ prompted assent and dissent. Cf. pp. 140-141
below. This .same extension provides an obje~tive check on.ana-
lytical hypotheses, Quine's second argument to the contrary
notwithstanding.
A:t
- ' _;0.....---- ":":'
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24 A careless subject might mistake (35) as an attempt at
direct quotation, and dissent for that reason. But presumably we
can sensitize our subjects beforehand to the difference between
direct and indirect quota tion, wi thout us'ing sentences that would
tend to inculcate any new beliefs about the meani~g of hare.
Also, as remarked .in note 15, I assume that biologists are pecu-
liar among English speakers in,disti~guishing between hare and
rabbit.
25 Note, incidentally, that tinkering with the meaning of
"nwnerical identity and associated particles tl (Quine 1960, 54)
is not likely to make room for the hypothesis that hare and
rabbit 'stage are really synonyms. The identity. predicate does
not occur in (27) and (28). We might read the indefinite article
as an existential quantifier, and make the meaning of this quan-
tifier d~pendent o~ the noun it precedes. But in making the
meaning of quantifiers sensitive to context, we would make the
challenge hypothesis more complex, and thus less plausible, than
the standard hypothesis.
26 One reason for the failure of Kirk's argument may be
.that he ignored the importance of internal structure in discus-
sions of meaning and translation. Another cause for its failure
"may be Kirk's reliance on the judgement of undiscerning subjects:
monolingual speakers of English. If the intelligibility of (31)
were judged by true bilinguals, rather than by monolinguals, the
.argument might carry some weight. Any sentence like (31) will
be lntelligible to English monolinguals, however much the indirect
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qu~tatton may.differ in meaning from the directly quoted sentence.
It is precisely the English speaker's ignorance that guarantees
the intell~gibility of such· sentences. The questi9n is whether
more discriminating sUbjects. (true bilinguals) will always in
principle be available. On this point, cf. pp. 167-169 below.
27 The plausibility of Quine's argument de~ives, it seems
to ·me, from Quine's concentration on sentence contexts, suc~ as
Gavagai, in which gavagai may be translated indifferently as
rabbit or as rabbit stage. We shall see presently that there are
other, more discriminating contexts.
28 In describing nematai, and earli"er gavaga,ilo, as terms
for rabbit stag~s, I assume the truth of the stan~ard hypothesis~
29 The challenge hypoth~sis would thus ment~on only one of
the terms' t 1 an.d. t2t equating (say) t 1 with e •. The ~upplementary'
system for 'conv~rting Junglese sentences to their' translatable
, .
normal forms would state that t 2 is synonymous with t 1 • Thus
many-one challenge_ hypotheses reflect deviant 'views about
synonymy within the home language.
30 Remember (Quine 1960, 57-60) that truth-functional con-
nect~ves are not subject to the alleged indeterminacy of "radical
·translation.
31 Of course Junglese might not have' contained. the deriva-
tiona~ ~uffix -10, meaning ~tage. But i~ Junglese~ ~nglish
translation-escapes' indete~minacy due to structural peculiarities
- o'f these two langu~ges, then Quine will have to say in general'
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what structural features make ,for indeterminacy. Then it might
turn out that no human, languages can have the requisite structure.
33 Tbis is merely a formal convenience. I do not mean to
imply that such a "union language ll can be generated by a single
Chomskian grammar.
34 If this definition is to work, there must of course be
at least one such bilingual. But if the rationalist theory of
language acquisiti~n is correct, we can always invoke a popula-
tion of h~pothetical bilinguals; cf. pp. 167-169.
~35 We may find two homogeneous regional dialects, but I
shall assume hence forth that idiolect differences are randomly
. distributed, and bear no systematic relat~onship to such factors
as geography.
36 Another possibility is that stage may be learned, like
'rabbit, by ostension. Quine apparently assumes that children
would be unable ~o learn stage by ostension, but this is an
empirical assumption about the character of the child's innate
language-I'earning equipment.
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It is incidentally strange that Quine' should admit that
objective synonymy relati0!1s may arise out.~ of "learning appropri-
ate associations of words with words" (Quine_1960, 56) •. A child
may determine inductively that All bachelors are unmarried ~,
and vice ,versa ~s stirnulus~analy.tic (Quine 1960, 53-54; 68).
But if the meanings of all and ~,are really ,indeterminate
(Quine'1960, 74), then how does the child determine', from the
stimulus-analyticity of this sentence, that bachelor and unmarried
~ are interchangeable in all but a few contexts? And·if the
child can recognize a test ,of synonymy in sentences of the form
All F's are G'~, and vice versa, why can't· th~ foreign linguist?
37 P~rhaps, in view of these heteronymy and synonymy rela-
tions, Quine's thesis is not that such relations are
indeterminate, but only that they could be. For a quotation that
supports this interpretation, ~f. p. 157 above. Another possible
interpretation of Qtiine's thesis, to much the same purpose, is
that determinate synonymy and heteronymy relations never arise
out of ostensive ,learning, but only out of "associations of words
wi th ords ll •
38 In one plac~, Quine intimates that the learner's "past-
"knowledge of langllages" (Quine 1960, 71) may influence his choice
of analytical hypotheses, but "he has nothing to say about the
nature of _the. hypothesize"d influence.
. .
39 Of course linguists. do not yet know very many of these
.principles, but such prin~iples are· accessibl to empirical
investigation.
I
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40 .Little is in fact known .about the process of second-
language l~arning, or the simultaneous learning of two languages.
My remarks on this sUbject are entirely speculative, but I think
they constitute one natural extrapolation from the rationalist
theory of first-language learning.
41 We could in principle use monolingual subjects, and
study their paraphruse behavior. but it would, be more difficult
to protect monolingual subjects from contamination, in the form
of exposure to other people's paraphrase standards.
42 If all these students were trained linguists, Quine
could blame their un~nimity on an artificially inculcated set of
"implicit supplementary canons" (Quine 1960, 74). But we could
surely eliminate all such n contaminated II . students from our sample.,
Quine would then have no explana~ion for the unanimity among the
remaining IInaive" sUbjects.
43 Also,' students must .have sufficient exposure to acquire
the native speaker's intuition that lapin .and phase d'~ lapin
are heteronymous.
44 To show that a sentence S is well-formed in an idiolect
I, one argues that S is structurally similar to other sentences
of I, or ~hat S has the structure of a sentence of I. Such claims
of course. depend on the.grammar of I, but that grammar can be
justified on the basis of a corpus that excludes S, but includes
.sentenc~s "related to" S in various ways.
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45 lowe this point to Ned Block.
46 The conjunction of (67) with the evidence for (68) and
(69) might not. support (64) at all, however, if the usually in
(68) and (69) turns out to mean in just~ 50% of all cases.
Chisholm (1966', 54n.) makes this poi~t in the following way.
Suppose that there are 100 Christtaris in Goleta, 51 of whom are
Protestants. Moreover, 26 of the Protestants are Presbyterians.
Under these
(a) Usually if a Goleten'o is a Chr:Lstian, then he is a
Protestant.
(b) Usually if ,-.! isa Goleteno a Protestan't, then he is
a-Presbyterian.
conditions, hypotheses (a) and (b) are true. These hypotheses
,closely resemble (68) and (69).
, .
Consider now Jones, an arbitrary Goletan Christian. One is
. tempted, on the strength of (a) and (b), ~o infer that Jones is
a Presbyterian. Relative to our total information, however, this
is improbable, since only 26 of the 100 Christians in town are
presbyterians.
47 Notice, by the way, that (70) would not follow from a
grammar alone, but only from a grammar supplemented, by a theory
of linguistic performance. A grammar would. at most entail that I
am able to recognize sentence S as grammatica~ in my idiolect
,(if -indeed· a gr,ammar says anything at all about me). Propositio'n
(70) states that sentence S actually does strike me as grammatical
in my idiolect, on one (or.perhaps on every) occasion when I
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encounter S. Graves and her associates emph~size in some passages
that grammars are theories about ,languages,· not.about speakers
anq their reactions to sentences. Cf. Graves, Katz', et ,ale in
press.
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Chapter 3
Linguistics and Language Learntng*
202
Noam Ch,omsky has ,argued that' when we II inve~tigate.. the
c'oncltisioris tha t can be ~stablishe-d concerning the na ture o,f
language, the ways in which language is used and understood., the
.basis for its acquisition", it turns out,that "these conclusipns
~ave interesting consequences for psy~ho19gi~al theory, in parti-
cular, tha t they, strongly support an 'acc.Qunt' .of mental processe's
t~at is, in part, familiar, from ration~list spectilation abou~
these matters" (Chomsky 1969a, 65)'. Many write~s have. argued,
c9ntrary to Chomsky, that the findings of transformational lin-,
guistics do not support a rationalist approach to'the psychology
of ~anguage ,learning, and that those findings d9 not refute
empir"icist pr'oposals' ,in this area. In this paper, I shall
examine three such a~guments against Chomsky's thesis.
B~fore d~scribing those arguments, however, I wi~h to
,indi9ate,the nature of the disagreemen~~betweenrafionalist and
empiricist theories of learning, and to emphasize my intention
of concentrating on psychological rather than epistemological
issues. On th~ first matter, Gilbert Harman writes:
TJ;le "empiricist" believes that the lingu.istic-
acquisition device can arrive a.t correct grammatical
rul~s by inductive inference from th~ primary' linguistic
data.. · The ,"rationalist" denie,s this and holds that the
linguistic-acquisition device ,requires further "information ll
in addition to the primary linguistic datao Such further
information consists of wh~t Chomsky calls lIinnate ideas
and principles." ... (Harman 1967, 84)
This is not a complete description of "the r~ti6nalist-empiricist
dispute. I shall fill in some, furth~r ',details ·.below (pp. 234~
236). For present purposes, however, H~rman's thumbnail sketch
wi 1'1 suff ice.
203
Many of Chomsky's critics object to the claim .that children
have innate knowledge of principles relevant to language learning,
or to the claim that adul ts taci t,ly know grammatical pr inc iples
.relevant t9 language use. Even if these critics are right, even
if we do ,not. know principles of universal or particul,ar grammar,
these principles may still play an impqrtant·role in describing
the psychology of language acquisition and· use. In a forth-
coming paper, Graves, Katz, et al~ emphasize that we must
I~dis·tinguish bet\veen the claim tha t sp,eakers know the gram-
matical rules of their language and the claim that theSe rules
-are, internally repre,sented. ... not all interna.lized structure
need be counted as knowledge" (Graves; Katz, et ale in press) .
I shall in large part avoid the question whether language
'learners know these principles, since -I have dealt with that
que~t~on elsewhere (cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis)., In this
paper, I shall be con~erned only with the weaker rationalist
claim that universal grammar tells us something important about
the child',s innate language-learning equipment. The theory of
universal grammar defines a class of grammars; the rationalist
claims that a child's language-learning apparatus ·can help him
to internalize any granunar' in this class, but none outside it e
The theory of universal grammar also defines a plausibility
ordering on this class of possible grammars; the rationalist
claims that this plausibili·ty metric determines which of, the
possible grammars a child will internalize,. on being exposed to
a given corpus of language data.
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First, we shall consider an argument by Sidney Morgenbesser
(1969), which (if it wer~ successful) would show that the ration-
alist approach to language learning is vitiated by an infinite
regress. Secondly, we shall examine Gilbert Harman's' attempt
(1967) to show that there is no empirical difference between
rationalist and empiricist theories of language learning.
Finally, we shall" look at an enrich~d themry of inductive
reasoning, which in the view of L. Jonathan Cohen -(197Gb) improves
the credibili ty of empiric'ism, at:ld invalidates anti-empiricist
arguments directed against mo~e familiar (but weaker) theories
of induction.
I .. MORGENBESSER: DOES RATIONALISM GENERATE'AN INFINITE REG~SS?
Mo~genbesser puts forward his infinite-regress argument in
response to Fodor's defense of liThe Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in
Psychological Explana~ion 11 (Fodor 19,6 8). . Morgenbesse~ is not
. -
'concerned specifically with the rationalist "account of language
learning, but more generally with accounts of, mental competences
that-postulate rUle-governed structures within the nervous
system. Now rati~nalist theories of language acquisition claim
that the operation of our innate language-learning equipment is
governed by principles of universal g~ammar. Such theories,
. then, are instances of the explanatory paradigm to which Morgen-
besser objects.
In Fodor's paper, the discussion focusses o~ our'acq~lred
shoe-tying competence, rather than on our innate language-
'"
---------'
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learning competence. Fodor suggests the following. account of
the process which underlies the act of tying one's shoes:
There is a little man who lives in one '.s head e - T11e
little man keeps a library., When one acts upon the in-
tention to tie one~s shoes, the little man fetches down'
a volume entitled Tying One's Shoes. The volume says
such things as: l1Take the left free end of the shoelace
-in .the left hand ... "
When the little man reads the instiuct~on 'take the
left free end of the shoelace in the· left h~nd', he
pushes a button on a control panel. The button is marked
'take the left free end of a shoelac~ in the left hand'.
When depressed, it activates a series of wheels, cogs,
levers, and hydraulic mechanisms. As a causal consequence
of the functioning of' these mechanisms, one's left hand
comes to seize the appropriate end of the shoelace.
Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the ,rest of the instruc-
tion's. (Fodor 1968, 627)
According to Morgenbesser, Fodor commits himself- (not neces-
sarily in the passage' just quoted) to the following principle:
(E) If any entity performs ari act that manifests
competence, then either that entity knows
(actually or latently) relevant' rules and is
guid~d by them, or one of its sub-systems is
in state s. (M~rgenbesser 1969, 462)1
But principle E, coupled with Fodor's account of, shoe-tying,' lays
on Fodor a responsibility which his pap~r fails to discharge, in
Morgenbesser's view:
it is, I think, up to. Fodor,to·show that, when.
his little man knows, it is not the case .that he knows
that and knows how .... without such showing he may not
have escaped Ryle's infinite-regress hold ...
We attempt ,to describe the little man at work, and
find it appropriate to say n·ot only that he knows the
rules but also that he knows how to apply them; for other-
wise how could he successfully guide our actions? .And,
once we n()tice tha t he is exhibi ting com'petence when he
applies the rules, we.are, given our commitment to Fodor's
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principle E, required to have the little man know rules
for the application of rules and~so, into the night.
(Morgenbesser 1969, 464-465)
In order to unqerstapd the import of Morgenbesser's argument,
~
it will be helpful to see what Fodor means by his picturesque talk
about the little man in one's hand. He writes that "the little
man stands as·a,representative pro ~ for psychological faculties
which mediate the integration of shoe-tying behvaior by applying
information about how shoes are ti~d .•. Assigning psychological
functions to l~ttle men makes explicit our inability to provide
an account of the mechanisms that mediate those functions" (Fodor
1968~ 629). The little man, then, is the nervous system, or a
subsystem whose function it is to execute the instructions in a
single bobk (o~ library). These functional systems cannot as. yet
be identified anatomically, nor their operation described physiol-
. ogically. The instructions in his books are information that is
in some way stored in the nervous system. Now cle~rly the human
nervous system has only finite storage capacity. But if Morgen~
besser's argument- is coreet, then rationalists (or at least
rationalists like Fodor) are committed to the absurd view that
there is stored within the nervous syst~m an infinite amount of
information essential to the language-learning (shoe-tying, etc.)
task. If this is really a conseq~ence of the rationalist approach
to language acquisition, then surely that approach does not
deserve serious consideration.
How c~n Fodor (and other rationalists) escape "Morgenbesser's
"infinite-regress hold ll ? Morgenbesser himself suggests a way
out: by showing that "when [the] little man knows, it is not the
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case that he {both] knows that and knows·how". And as it happens,
Fodor's article provides the basis for an'argument to the effect
that, when the little man applies rules, he does not exhibit
"competence or know-how'" (Morgenbesser 1969, 466) in tne relevant
. sense.
At one poin.t, Fodor contends that i-although an organism can
know how to ~ without knowing the answer to the question "How
does one X?" .i t cannot know how to X unless there is and answer
to the question IIHow does one X? (Fodor 1968',637) According,
to' Fodor, the act of X-ing exhibi ts competence (and thus satis'-
'fies the antecedent of principle E) only if there is an answer
~o the question, "How does one X?
Elsewhere, Fodor suggests that for some operations 0 of the
nervous system, there is no answer to the question, uHow does
the nervous system carry out operation O?"
Assume that there'ex~sts a class of elementary instruc-
tions which the nervous system is specifically wired to
execute. Each elementary instruction specifies an elemen-
tary operation, and an elementary operation is one which
the normal nervous system can perform but of which it can-
not perfor~ a proper part. Intuitively speaking, the
elementary operations are those which have no theoretically
relevant internal structu~e. Now to sayan operation is
elementary is to say that certain kinds of "ho\",rr_questions
cannot arise about it. In particular, we cannot ask for
instruct_ions for performing it by per forming some further
sequences of operations. (It makes sense to ask how to
spell 'add r but not to ask how to spell 'I n '.) ...
The nervous system carries out its complex operations
in some way or other (i.e., by performing one or another
sequence of elementary operations). But the nervous system
performs elementary operations in no way at all: it simply
per'forms them. It'~ 'YJe Iconstrain] a completed psychological
theory to be written in sequencffiof elementary instructions ...
(Fodor 1968, 629)
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It i~ not ·the case, then, that the little man knows how
to perform elementary operations, or that he exhibits competence
when he carries out elementary instructions. But Fodor proposes
to restrict the vocabulary of the little man's library strictly
to elementary instructions.' This means that the little man
heeds only one set of how-to books. ' Contrary to Morgenbesser's
argument, he does not need a, second set of books containing
meta-rules, a third- set containing meta-meta-rules, and so on.
It .may be objected that I have only ,succeeded 'in misinter-
preting the term c9mpetence, and the principle E in which it
occurs, because I have interpreted the term,.by a~peal to Fodor
rather than by appeal to Morgenbesser., Perhaps elementary
operations do exhibit competence, in Morgenbesser's sense of the
word. -If ~o, then I have not really shown that elementary oper-
ations lie outside the scope of Morgenbesser's principle E. But
no matter. For then E entails that further rule-knowledge under-
lies the little man's execution even of elementary operations.
Clearly, Fodor would reject principle E, on this interpretation.
Elementary operations are defined as ex~eptions to (this reading
,o~-principle E.
Of course, it is not a mere definition -that gets Fodor off
the. hook. It is the claim that there ~ s9me operations of the
nervous system that are elementary, in the de~ined sense, and
that "every op~ration of the nervous system is, identical with
some seq~ence of elementary op~rations" _(Fodor 1968, 629).
!
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Thomas Nagel (196gb) has challenged this ,claim~ Let us see
whether Nagel 'can restore Morgenbesser's infinite regr~ss, by
forcing the rationalist to give up his belief in elementary
operations.
Nagel suggests various ways in which "operations that are
not elementary for an organism" may fail to "consist of seq'uences
or, groups of operations .. that are elementary for that organism"
(Nagel 196~b, 454). Of these various .objections, Nagel attaches.
greatest importance to the following possibility:
'••. the way in which •.. elementary operations are
brought about as part of [a] larger act~on. may have nothing
to do with the way they are brought about when they occur
in isolation. (N,agel 1969b, 45.4)
To lend plausibility to this description of neural function-
ing, Nagel introduces an example. The abductor pollicis brevis
muscle in the ball of .the thumb plays a role in suc'h actions
as depressing the space bar on a typewriter. This. muscle con-
tains· three hundred motor units, each consisti~g of a single
mot~neuron ~nd a number of individual muscle fibers, all inner-
vated by that particular motoneuron. Nagel cites an experiment
...
in which human subjects were trai'ned to "activate selected
individual motor units in the abductor pollicis brevis at will ...
They were able to activate adjacent motor ,units separately, and
.' .even to bea t out rapid and elaborate drum rhythms... When asked
how they did, this r the subjects could not say, just as we cannot
say how we manage to move our .th.umbs" (Nagel 1969b, 455).
- l ..~
__ L __' __~ • __ ~ ~ ....... '- .... 'r ~~
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Since we can (after. suitable training) voluntariiyactivate
individual motor units, 'pres.umab~y such performances count'as
elementary operations for the human organism. (The anatomy of
'the situation makes it unlikely that this operation will have
any, "theoretic.ally relev:ant internal structure", since it results
'iri the firing of only a si~gle motoneur6n.) . It seems likely,
moreover, that I1 when I depress the space bar, all or most of the
motor units are activated at once ll (Nagei 1969b, 455). But it
do~~ not follow that when,'r d~press the space bar~ I do so by
'performi~g the' action of activating all the motor units at
once.
. I may be unable even to 'attempt that fe'at; or, if
.1 do attempt it, nothing may happen, or I may ,produce a'
dreadful cramp in my thumb. Of- course it is conceivab'le
that I should succeed; but what reason is there to believe
that. the 'method by which the ordinary thumb movement is
produced bears any interesting r&lation to the method by
which it might be produced through' the summation of three
hundred simultaneous intentional motor-unit innervations?
It is not. necessarily false that we· tie. our s~oes or play
musical instruments or speak by tne cornposition~ conscious
or unconscious, of distinct individual finger and tongue
motions (not to mention individual motor-unit innervations) .
It is just false. An answer to the question "What happens
when one says 'BeethovenJ?"is not ipso facto an answer to
the question II Bov] does one say 'Beethoven'?11 (Nagel 1969b,
456)
Fodoi's paper is about our tacit knowledge. I h~ve no
access to rules that I know tacitly, but the little man in my
head does have access to su~h rules, via his library. The most
straight-forward answer to Nagel's objection, I think, is to
·point out that Fodor i,s interested not only in, taci t knowledge I
but also in tacit actionS'i-- actions which my nervous sys~~~
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performs when I perform some compete.nt, voluntary act. 2 I may
never be able to achieve voluntary control over these actions,
just as'l may never be able to recognize the rules I know.
tacitly. It is the little man in my head that actually performs
my'tacit actions for me. Fodor's claim is not in the ordinary
sense a claim about what I do when I say Beethoven, or tie my
shoes. Rather, it is a claim. about what .the little man in my
head does on these occasions. Nagel might p~efer to describe
this as a claim about "what happens [in one's nervous system]
when one says 'Beethoven'''. But however we describe Fodor's
claim, Nagel's objection appears to rest on a misinterpretation
of that claim.
No doubt Nagel would object to the concept of tacit action,
just as he objects (Nagel 1969a) to the concept of tacit know-
ledge. The basis '.for that. objection is Nagel's claim that if
tacit knowledge were rea~ly knowledge, it would'at least be
"capable of reaching consciousness upon adequate reflection"
(Nagel 1'969b, 456). But Nagel' s argumen~ against knowledge
seems no more compelling than an analogous argument against
electrons: "Electrons are in principle incapabl'e of being seen.
Therefore electrons are not real. n3
Unfortunately, our appeal to the concept of tacit perfor-
mance, 'or action d.oes not altogether dispose of Nagel's objec-
tion. We have agreed that when I depress the space bar, ~ do
not activate each of the relevant motor 'units i~dividually.
But,Nagel may go on to insist, no little man does this for me
b · h 4either. And Nagel may e r1g t.
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- To see what is at stake, we shall have to complicate our
pictur~ of the nervous ~ystem, regarding it'not as a single
little man" but as a whole 'heirarchy of, Ii ttle men.' The com-
plication would have been needed anyway, however:
. • .• there can be no single button maiked 'take the
-left free end of a shoelace in the left'hand' ... grasping
a shoelace should be considered complex .bepavior, because
doing so involves .the production of motions.that also play
a role in other actions.
We might thus consider expanding the population in
one's head to include subordinate little men who super-'
intend the execution of the "elementary" behaviors in-
volved in complex sequences like grasping a shoelace.
When the little 'man reads 'take the left free end 'of the
shoelace. in the left hand', we imagine him ringing up the
shop foreman in charge of grasping shoelaces ... the shop
foreman might be imagined to superintend a detail of wage
slaves, whose functions include:' searching inputs for
traces of shoelaces, flexing and contracting fingers on
the left hand, etc. (Fodor 1968, 628)
In terms of this picture, the motoneurons' (or perhaps the
moto'r uni ts) may be regarded as "wage slaves ~I • They are under
th~ I1supervision" of a "S:QOp foreman" -- a.su1?systern of the,
nervous system. Now this shop foreman can ring up individual
wage- slaves; Nagel cites experimental 'evidence fo'r this. But
he may also be able to'call for the activation of all three
hundred motor units at once, without ~alling individually on
ea'ch of these "wage slaves". He may have ,a sort of limited
"public addresssystem ll , for example, as in Figure 1. 5 For
the little man on the left in this diagram~ there may be a
physiological difference between simultaneous performance of
~ e1em~ntary operations A, B, D, and E on the o"ne hand, and
__. ~.~.~~Jj
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performance of operation C on the other. Still, what happens
~m~ng his subordinates (the way they'perform) may be the same
in both cases. As I depre~s the space bar~ the~ the foreman
in charge of my abductor pollicis brevis may be doing. something
quite unlike perform~ng three hundred elementary operations.
Instead, he may be performing something like operation C in
. Figure 1.
Fodor (in conversation) has pointed out a way around this
. version of Nagel's objection. We ne~d only relativize the con-
'cept of elementary opera'tion, so that an operation is elementary
only, relative to a specific task.? I assume, with Fodor, that
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.in answer to the que~tion, "How does one !?", it is appropriate
(and possible) for the psychologist to describe the sequ~nce
of operations which the nervous system perfo~ms when one ~!'s.
For example, when we make visual depth estimates, our nervous
system monitors texture gradients, processes inforrn~tion'about
texture gradients, and computes the first derivatives of tex-
ture gradients (Fodor 1968, 631-632)'. Now suppqse that when
. .
I ~~ my ~ervous system performs operation C in Figure 1. There-
upon, various things happen. One of these happenings is just
like' the event that would have occurred if my nervous system had
performed operation A .
. ~ow my nervous system· can perform A in isolation,. so A
i·s a~ -elementary operation in the original, abso.lute sense. But
when I !, my nervous system-performs C, not A. ·(Pr~spmabl~ this
clai~ will eventually be subject to physiological test~) Con-
. '
sequently, operation A ~s .not an elementary part of the task of
!ingi A is not elementary relative to this task. Of course, A
is still an elementary qperation in the old sense, because it
may be elementary with respect'to other tasks. For example,
operation A will be elementary relative to. the task' of Ying
if I 'whenever I !, my nervous system performs. (say) operations·
A, B, D, and E. Similarly, operation'C is an elementary oper-
ation, absolutely and relative to the task of !i'ng, but not
relative to the task o£ !ing.
The pqint of this' relativization move was ~o 'forestall a
~efutation of rationalism that appealed to physiological
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evidence. It is still possible, of course, for specific
hypotheses about internal books to succumb to physiological
, .
objections. Now prior to this relativization, o~r foreman's
vocabulary included only the following elementary instructions:
A!, ~, Q,l, ~. We must now add. C! tc;:> his vocabulary. But his
vocablJ.lary remains fini te, ,and a.s long as he has a merely
~~nite vocabulary, there' will be no ~bsurdity in supposing that
the foreman "just knows" how to execute his elementary instruc-
.. tions,_ wi thout knowirig any rules - for interpreting or executing
those instructions (9£. ~he argument which begins in th~ next
paragraph). And clearly, the concept of an elementary opera-
tion can be a relative concept without haying an infinite
domain. Fodor's relativization move thus allows him to escape
Nagel; s obj ection, wi thout reinE~t'ating J'.1orgenbesser '.s inf ini te
regress. To be sure, it may· not be possible to analyze all the
behaviors of an organi~m into sequences of ~iementary operations
. performed by a single Ii tt-le marl. But we have seen no reas'on
to doubt the theoretical adequacy of a finite he~ra~chy of little
men, "each having a finite repertoire of operations that are
elementary for him.
Morgenbesser's infinite-regress argument. was intended as
an objection to rationalist (or intellectualist) explanations
in psychology. As we have seen, rationalist psychology is not
the easy mark Morgenbesser took it to be. We shall come presently
t~ ·an argument by Gilbert Harman, in which he· contends that
rationalist psychology is viable all right, but empirically
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indistinguisha~le,from empiricist psychology. Before we take
up that argument, howe,ver, it ma'y be of interest to see whether
Morgenbesser's arg-ument'can be made to work against the" ration-
alist 's epistemic claims. Agains t those c l~irns, Harman. gives
the following infini.te-regress ~rgument:
Taken ~iterallYI Chomsky would be saying that we
a.re to explain how it is' that Smith kno'ws how, to speak
and understand a language by citing his knowledge of
another more basic language in which he has (unconsciously)
"internally represented" the rules of the first language.
(It doe~ not seem to make sense to assume that S~ith can
represent rules without representing them is some "language.)
The main problem with such a literal interpretation of
these remarks would be the implausibility of the resulting
view. How, for example, would Smith"understand the more
basic language? In order to avoid infinit~ regress or
a vicious circle, one would have to suppose that Smith can
understand at least one language directly, without uncons-
ciously knowing the rules for that language. But if this
is admitted, there is no reason why Smith cannot know
directly the language he speaks. (Harman 1967, 76)
'Now the rationalis~ agrees that we know the language in
which we represeIlt the rules of English grammar. Indeed, he
agrees that we knew the rules D.£' this metalanguage. We know
substantive linguistic universals, which specify the vocab-
ulary used in formulating parti.cular granunatical rules (NP ,
VP, + vocalic, (Htlman), etc.), alnd we know formal universals,
which speci'fy a (presumably infi.ni tel class of "sentences"
(rules) that may be constructed out of this vocabulary (cf.
Katz 1972, 30-31). ,But the ratj.onalist need not admit that we
know the rules o£ the, language j_n which .. linguistic universals
are formulated.
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To see why this is so, we must recall the rationalist
argument for saying we know the rules of English. This argu-
ment begins by pointin_g out that when presented with a putative
sentence 6f English, we know whether or not t~at sen~ence is
grammatical in English. -Now this knowledge might be stored
piecemeal'in our nervous system, in the form of "dossiers" on
the individual sentences we recognize as gramn"tatical or -other-
wise, or it might be derived "from a stored set~ of recursive
rules that generate the class of all English Sentences. The
rat~onalist rejects the former account, because on that account,
we would have to postulate infinite memory capacity in order to
explain human competence. English s~eakers Cqn recognize grarn-
maticality in any of an infinite class of' sent~nces. A similar
argument can be used to show that we must k~o~ the rules of the
language in which we formulate _the rules of OLtr (English)
grammar (cf. pp. 238-239 below) .
The class of grammatical En,glish sentenc8s is infinite, and
an English speaker_ is competent to recognize ~hy sentence in this
class. The set of pos~ible grarrmars (sentenc8s in the language
of particular grammar) is infinite, and a nor!"\\al, child is com-
petent to {nternalize any gramma.r in this, set ( on being exposed
to appropriate -data. Now ,perhaps the languaga of universal
grammar is -,also' an infinite language. Assumi~\g this to be the
case, the relevant question is: are all sent~nces in this
language potential obj ects for some human coml~~etence, analogous
to our competence at sentence rE~cognition and grammar acquisi-
tion? I do not know of any sllcrL competence, q,nd Harman does
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not attempt to establish the existence of any such competence.
Unless ~nd until stlch a competence is demonstrated, the ration-
alist theory can do all its eXI)la'natory work on the assumption
'that h~man competence in the language of universal grammar
extends only t9 that finite set of sentences· which constitutes
the theory of universal grammar. Such 'an assumption implies
no claim of further rule knowIE~dge, aJ?d Harman I s II infini te II
.,'
regress of rule-sets terminates after two steps. The infinite-
regress argument is no mO,re of a threat tD epistemic ration-
alism, than it is io psychological rationalism.
"Morgenbesser's ~nfinite-regress argument was intended to
show that rationalist theories of 'language use and acquisition
are incompatible with .the finite character of the nerVQus
. sy~·tem I s storage capacity. Tha.t argument failed, however,
"because it ignored the concept of an elementary operation. We
turn now, to the argument by which Gilbert Harman attempts to
show, not that rationalism is incompatible with some obvious
~aet, but rather that rationalism makes no claims that ar~
~ncompatible with empiricism. If this is correct, then trans-
formational grammarians ca,nnot have 'found eviden-ce' that (as
they claim) both refutes empiricism and supports rationalisrno
I~. HARlv1AN: ARE RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM COMPATIBLE?
At the beginning of this paper, -r quoted Harman's character-
ization of an empiricist as SOlueone who "believes tha.t the lin-
guistic-acquisition device can arrive at correct graroIDatic~l
rules b~f inductive inference from the pr'irnary linguistic data II
(Harman 1967, 84). ·In the same passage, he goes on to point
out that the viability of empiricism, so defined,
depends upon what is to count as inductive inference~
On Some interpretation[sJ of lIinductive inference,1I
ernr~iricism can be ruled out directly, wi thout appeal to
trc\'ilsformational linguistics. 'On other interpretations,
e~~(iricism would not be incompatible wi th trans formational
l~:r\guistics. However, there does not seem to be any
r~~sonable interpretation on which empiricism survives
dl~ect and relatively a priori refutation but is refuted
by the appeal to transformational linguistics. (Harman
19fi7, 84)
Harm~n qomplains t~at C~omsky, in his critique of empiricism,
concentr~ates on a version of empiricism 'that "can be ruled out
directl~t without appeal to transforrna~ional linguistics".
Specifically, Chomsky attends only to the brand of empiricism
espouse4 by taxonomic linguists. But taxonomic linguists
"repres8J1t an anti-theoretical I=losi tion II among empiricists
(fI,arman "1967, .86). Unli~e Quine~t ,for example, the taxonomic
linguist does not, in Harman's view, see the need for a learning
device t·11~t can II infer the' truthl of theories as well' as general-
izations." (Harman 1967, 85).
Ha~llian also points out that there is another sort of empiri-
cist ·theDry that would be subjec~t ·to "direct and relatively a
priori :refutation". Appealing t:o Goodman's "New Riddle of
Inductic'tl" (Goodman 1965;' 59 -83), Harman notes tha,t "any con-
sis'tent set of inductive princit)les must favor, certain [kinds
of] gen6rali~ations over others" (Harman 1967~ 85-86; emphasis
added) 8 Harman clarifies this remark in a later publication,
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,writing that·"if we are to learn from experie~ce at all, then
,our initial assignment of probabilities must from'a certain
point of view arbi trarily "favor certain hypotheses over others II
'(Harman 1969, 150). Consider,~then, an empiricist proposal.
that fails to specify any initial ranking of hypoth~ses, with
~espect to plausibility. Such a proposal describes a device
that would be unable to "learn, from 'exp,erience ~t all~'. Hence
such a p~oposal can be refuted in a "direct and relatively a
priori" way.
F.inally, Harman sketches' an (allegedly) empiric,ist theory
t'hat avoids the defects of taxonomic linguistics, and thos'e of
iriduc~i~e procedures without initi~l biases. Harman ~uggests
that a "resourceful empiricist ... no ma'tter what the facts of
languag'e. turn out to be". (Harma,n 1967'" 87), will, be able to
. devi~e 'ari in~tial plausibility ranking that accounts for those
facts without postulati~g.any innate' princip'les.' He wri tes:
one cannot support rationalism ,by showing that
on~y languages with certai.n types of grammar (e.g., trans-
formational grammar) are learnable, since an empiricist
could reply that this sho~;s only that the principles of
iriduction used (which must be biased in favor of some
hypotheses) are biased in favor of gr,ammars of, the,
designat~d types. (Harman 1967, 86)
Later 6n (pp. 230-242) I shall uhdertake ,a closer examin-
ation of resourceful empiricism, and Harman's claims about it.
For now, ,1 wi~h to return to Hclrrnan' S, complaint tha ~ taxonomic
linguists hold a, radical'ly nani:i-~heoretical position" which
makes them inadequate represeni:atives of empiricism. I shall
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argue, first, that Harman is correct in suggesting that a device
can "be allowed to infer the truth of theories" of the relevant
sort (transforrnati'onal _grammars) wi thout des_erting empiricist
assumptions in favor_ of rationalist ones. However, I shall
argue (secondly) that taxonomic linguists are not -more "anti-
theoretical" tharl other empiricists, and that. taxonomic lin-
guists constrain their grammatical theories in ways that are
quite typical of classical empiricism. Finally, I shall argue
that such empiricist constraints make an empiricist lea,rning
device incapable, not of weighing the appropriate grammar
..against rivals and in£erring its truth, but inc~pable of form-
ulating such a grammar in the first ~lace. A learning device
can 'only infer the truth of a theory from relevant evidence if
it has previously formulated that. theory and decided to consider
it as a serious candidate for adoption. An empiricist learning
device, however, could not carry out this first step in the
~anguage-learningprocess, because no empiricist heuristic could
formulate or propose a transforrnational grarronar for testing.
Empiricist iearning devices have: adequate resources for testing
and inf~rence~ their failings lie r~ther in their heruistics.
On the first' point, there i.s an argument by Katz (1966,
,256-2·58) whic'h is meant to show that no eIl).piricist learning
device CQll'ld. infer the truth of the theory (grammar) of English,
but I believe that: Katz is mistclken. His argwnent concerns un-
observable you 8ubj ects in the cleep structure' of normal English
imperative sentences, such as (1) below. An empiricist might
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(1) Help the man.
(2) 'You help the man.
suggest that we interpret sentence (1) by correlating it with
sentence (2), a synonymous sentence in which the surface struc-
ture does contain the you subject.? But-Katz points out that
. you is not the only NP that may occur as the surface subject of
(3) John Jones help the man.
(4) Everyone help the man.
an imperative. Besides sentence (2), we also have sentences
.(3) and (4) to reckon with. Katz maintains that an empiricist
learning device would have no basis for "correlating sentence
(1) with sentence (2) I and for rejecting the alternative hypo-
thesis that (1) is correlated with (3), or with (4).
It seems to me, however, that an _empiricist does have
resources for eliminating 'these two incorrect hypotheses. First
consider the hypothesis that (2) is always correlated (and
synonyrnou~with (3). Surely it is possibie that a child will
observe utterances of (3) in circumstances that preclude this
correlation. Suppose, for example, that on some occasion when
(3) is uttered, there are only three people nearby: the child,
the speaker, and the addressee. (The man in need of help is
perhaps dro~ning some.distance, from shore.) The addressee is
a lifeguard named Rebecca, and t~he child can tell that she (and
not he) is the addressee, because the speaker is looking at her,
not him, when he, utters (1). If none of those present is named
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John Jones, and if the child knows that the speaker knows this,
.the child has very strong grounds for rej~cting the" hypothesis
that (1) is correlated with (3).
An alternative hyp~thesis, consis~ent'with evidence of this
so~t, might be that (1) is normally correlated-with .(3), but that
under circumstances precluding ·t·his intel:"'pretation, (1) is cor-
'r~lated -with" (2) • But this hyp()thesis is' clear.~Y more complex
than the hypothesis that (1) is always correlated with (2). An
·,.empiricist would. th,us prefer th~= latter hypothesis because of
its greater simplici·ty. There is nothing peculiarly rationalis-
tic .about such an appeal to simplicity, ~o long as we'invoke ~
general concept of simplicity, and not one that is applicable
only to grammatical hypothe$es (cf. pp. 234-235 below) .
What, though, about'correlatirtg (1) always with (4)1 Here
I wi.'sh to illustrate a somewhat more comple~ form of r.easoning
t~at an empiricist might use.. .~n empiricis·t learning devic:e
could, I think, rule out the correlation of (1) with (4), even
if it n~ver encountered sentence (1) itself in circumstances
that precluded this correlation. 8 The· class of subjectless
. . .
imperatives, which includes (1)/ cc?-n I think be defined in terms
of its surface-structure characte,ristics., To ,determine tha~
sentence (1) cannot be correlated with (4), it is enough to
(5) Hide behind the easy chair.
hear some subjectless imperative (say, sentence (5)) un~er con-
di tions which show that it. cann,ot be correlated wi th an i'mperative
having everyone as its surface subject.
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(6) Eve~yone hide behind the easy chair.
Now suppose that tWQ dozen people are in a room pr~paring
a ~urprise party. Under. these conditions, ~ome6ne might utter
,(S), but hardly (6), since one easy chair co~ld not provide c~n­
.. cealment for twenty-four people,. ~ Here, then~ is a, case where
it is inappropriate to, supply ev~ryone as the s~bject for a
sU·bjectless imperative. But this refutes the co·rrelation of
(I) with (4), if we assume that there must be s9me uniform,
,'simple way of interpreting all subjectless imperatives --
surely a reasonable assum~tion, on empiricist as well as
rationalist principles. It seems reasonable to suppose that
th~ correlation of (1) with (2) will be the only simple cor-
" relation to escape direct and indirect refutation.
Actually, of course, tne empiricist argument I have been
sketching 15 meant to support a general rule for correlating
a.subject-bearing imperative with each ~~bj~~tless one, rather
than merely to support a single such correlation. ' But even this
rule for correlating pairs of sentences is not the s~e as the
imperative rule in.the· t~ansformational grammar of English. I
have been discussing a ;ule that expresses" a transformational
relationship, in Harris 1 sense, between sur~ace structures o,f
two sorts (cf. Harris 1957). The imperative rule relates the
surface structure of (1), not tc? another s.urface structure (e. g.
that of (2)), but to a deep structure (which happens to under-
lie both (1) and (2»). Nonetheles?, it seems to me that the
considerations I have adduced i.n support of the Harris-style
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transfo~ation rule, can also be used to support the standard
(Chomskian) imperative rule.
Katz tried to argue' that an empiricist device could not
d~termine the correct deep structures for subjectless impera-~
, -ti\Tes, nor the transformation wh.ich maps .these deep 'structures
i,nto surface structures. T.his a.rgument .has fai.led, because
Ka"tz assumed' tha t 'the correct hy'pothesis (or something very much
like it) was among the hypotheses to be considered by the empiri-
'cist device. Once we have t::he c:orrect rule (or grammar) in our
field of candidates,' the learning device only needs to' weed out
all the false hypotheses. It may do this on considerations of
general simplicity, or it may rE~ject grammars which turn out to
- . - have false ~mpiric'al consequen~es, e. g. granunars which, generate"
. "
non-sentences, ,or fail to gener~ite,certain gr~atical sentences.-
So far as I can see, no ra~ionalist assumptions are needed in-
this weeding-out process, thougll ,rationali!:?,t assumptions may
be very helpful. 10
We' come now to Hatman's charge that ta~onomic liriguists
occupy a radically "anti~theoretical position in linguistics,
a position th~t wou~d sharply dis~inguish 'inductiv~ generali-
_ zation from theoretical II ~pecul,ation" so as to do ,wi thout the
latter" (Harman 1967, 86). Elsewhere, Harman indicates that
the anti-theorist IIpermi ts only rather weak generalizations,-
about ~nobserve~ speech" (Harman '1967, 84). His most specific
rema·rk is tha t
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Weak principles of gener~lizationwould not even ~ermit
the inferenc'e of' ,a' corpus of sentences from a record of
natural speech,. Given the lIdata" pess'essed by the language-
learning device, th~ notion of sentence is a theoretical
notion. (Harman 1967, 85)
Now it is just false that taxonomic linguists regard talk
about sentences as methodologically treife. Harris, 'for example,
thought he could "infer a corpus of sentences from ~ record of"
natural speech II • He \vri tes:
.'
The stock of recorded utterances constitutes the
corpus of data ... An, UTTER~CE is any stretch of talk,
by one person,. before and after which there is silence
on the part of the person. (~arris 19~3, 12, ~4)
Harri"s goes o'n to out,line a series of 'segmentation and' classifi-
cation operations, which he claims will eventually allow him to
distinguish sentences from non-sentences in the language or cor-
pus under 'inve~tigation; cf. Harris 1963', ISBn, 350 ff, 378.
Nor do taxonomic linguists confine themselves- to "weak
generalizations about unobserved speech", in any plausible sense.
Gle~son, for example, maintains that IIthere are several levels
of structure in a language lJ (Gleason 1961, 65), and Longacre
writes that tllanguage is ,structured in three sem~-~utonomous
modes, ph9nology, grammar, and lexicon" (Longacre 1964, 7).
Gleason's remarks about strata, and Longacre's about modes,
are put forward as empirically defensible hypotheses about the
structure of all lluman languages. Su~h hypothe,ses are hard'ly
"weak generaliz~tions about unoJbserved ~peech II •
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Harman is thus mistaken when he describes taxonomic linguists
.as l1 anti-theoretical". Nonethe,less I I think we can identify the
feature.of taxonomic grammars that led Harman to regard them as
. non-theories. Such grammars use many of the same theoretical
.terms as transformational grarnm.ars: Noun, Verb, Sentence, etc.
But a taxonomic grammar applies these terms only to continuous
stretches of observable acoustic signals, whereas a transfor-
~ational 'grammar also uses these terms to refer to unobservable
constituents, e.g. the deep-structure subjects oi English impera-
tives. A taxonomic lin~uist insists that the theoretical concepts
ip gralTUTlars must be derived fro1m experie,nce wit~ segments of
observable speech events, and t:ha t theoretical terms mus t be,
applied only to, such audible constituents. One might say sorne-
what paradoxically that taxQnoITlic linguists posi~ theoretical
en£ities, but 9n1y observable ones.
Taxonomic linguists, 'then, require a r~ t·her intimate con-
nection between sen.se experi'enc:e and grammatical concepts. But in
this res'pect, they resemble ottle'r empiricists, classical and con-
temporary. Thus Locke writes:
•.. even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever
they may seenl from sense, or from any operations of' our
own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames
to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas that
it ha~ either from objects of sense, or fro~ its own
operations about them •.• (Locke 1690, 217j emphasis
Locke1s)
Hume expresses the same sort o~ view:
2:28
Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than
the fhought of man ... ·To form monsters, and join incongruous
shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more
trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar
obj ects ...But ..". our thought:... is rea lly confined wi thin
very narrow limits ... all this cr~ative power of the mind
amounts to no more than thE~ faculty of" compounding, trans-
posing, augmenting, or diminishing the material~ afforded'
us by the sense and "experience ... all the materials of,
thinking· are derived either from our outward or inward
sentiment ... all our ideas or more feebl~ perceptions are
copies of our impressions or more lively ones. (Hume
1748, 28-29)
Similarly, twentieth-century learning theorists in the empiricist
traditi~n assume that the peripheral physiology of'an organism
is of primary importance in constraining the class of concepts
(and thus the class of hypothesE~s) accessib~e to· the organism
(Bever, Fodor, and Garrett, forthcoming, Chapter 8).'
We have seen that taxonomic linguists place certain restric-
tions on the sorts·of theoretical entities a grammar may refer
to~ But these restricti~ns.do not reflect a peculiarly anti-
theoretical orientation. Rather, they are quite typical of the
empiricist tradi tion in p~iloso]?hy and psy'chology. But now we
must .ask Tv'Jhether a language-lea~("ning device, working within these
constraints, could ever succeed in discovering the transforma-
tional gramm.ar of English. Qui,te clearly, the answer is that
such" a device could not be succles"sful. The' dev"ice might con-
"sider ·the ,hypothesis that every sentence consists of a noun
phrase followed by a verb phrase, but it would irrevocably reject
that hypothesis upon encountering "subjectless," imperatives such
as (1) and (5) above.
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The-device would never attempt to save this hypothesis by
IIresort to auxiliary hypotheses c:ind force"d interpre,tations of
various kinds", e.g. the supposition that the sUbject of an
imperative is "left unexpr'essed~' (Bloomfield 1961, 13). An
empiricist might possibly claim that the child can form the
ci~mplex concept of subject deletion, because of his e~perience
with "subjects of .declaratives, aJrld his experience of deietion of
ins~riptions (from walls or blackboards)~· lmplausible'as this
i~ (especially in preliterate societies), let. us for the sake of
argument grant the imagined empiricist his claim: that children
.. .
acquire the concept of subject deletion from exper~ence. Even so,
the_empiricist cannot explain why the child shou~d apply that
~~~~~~~, ,~o.form, a subject-deletion·hypothesis. F~r ac~ording_ to
~rripiricis~, exper ience II serves ..• t~ provide the" things to be
copi_ed by· the min4" (Katz 1966, 278n.), th~s "suggesting" the
;
,hypotheses to· be" tested. If the child had access to ,the minds of'
·ad~lt speakers,·he might·have iome ex~erience .of the subject
deletiori process, and this would suggest an hypothesis about
. sUbject deletion. But.the child has no~experience of this sort,
and consequently (on the empiric~ist theory) he never ~v~n con-
siders a subject deletion hypothesis. In fact, howe~er, a child
learning English apparently considers and ad_opts not only this
. hypothesis, but many other hypo1~eses about equally unobseravable
11transformational processes.
To summarize the argument 1:hus far: Harman was quite
~ossiblyright when he suggested that inference to the truth
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of a correct. grammar li,e~ wi thin the scope of an ernpiiicist
lear.nin'g device. (Katz t· s ar,guITleI1:t, at any rate, did not show
the inadequacy of an empiricist device, provided the.correct
'hypothesis is among those to be tested by the device.) He was
wrong, however,' in claiI11ing tha.t taxonomic l,inguists ·are more
anti-theoretical than other empiricists: Fihally, Chomsky's
critique of taxonomic linguistics can pe extended to apply to'
any theory of learning which shar~s with~taxonomic linguistics
a ce-rtain empiricist assu,mptioIl: the assumption that sensory
experien~e, rather 'than some innate mechanism, performs the
crucial heurist~c role in, gen<?]~ating. the gr'ammatical hypotheses
~o be tested against 'primary linguistic data.
We turn now to Harman's ll J::,esourceful empiricist ll • He "tries
~ to explain language learning witho~t appeal to innate principles,
"by postulating an innate bia~ instead, tha~ favors some kinds of
grammars. and f.rowns on o'thers. He need not be resourceful in
order to determine what sort of bias to postulate. He can simply
wait for a rationalistic linguist to tell him what kinds of
grammars are learnable, and which are unlearnable. He then
arranges his bias to favo~ lea:rnable gramma'rs over unlearnable
ones. Presumably this can be done 'mechanically, without any
resourcefulness, if it can be done at all. It is somewhat
ironi6, then, that Harman'~ hypothetical champiori 9£ empiricism
should be described as resou·rceful. ·-It, is 'also ironic that Harman
should appeal to Goodman in support of ,an innate bias that dis-
criminates against some hypotheses, and in favor of others. For
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in Goodman 1 s ,theory of projection, the difference between a valid
and an invalid coriclus,ion from experience "is not attributed to
. anything' inevitable ,or immutable in the nature of human cognition ll
(Goodman 1965, 96-97). Rather,' Goodman "regardIs] the mind as
in motion' from, the 'start, striking out w~ th spontaneous predic-
tions in dozens of'directions, and {only] gradually rectifying
and channeling its predictive 'processes" (Goodman 1965, 87).
But these are only ironies in the doctrine of resourceful
'empiricism, not arguments bearing on the truth or falsity of
that doctrine. .I wish first to argue that a~y adequate plausi-
bility ordering on grammatical h,ypotheses vlill have to use
devices more powerful than those of Goodman's theory of pro-
jectibility.. ~2 Second,' I shall point out two fun"damental
tenets of empiricist learning thleory which Harman's "empiricist II
seems quite willing to repudiate. Finally, I shall argue (con-
trary to Chomsky 1969 a,b, and i.ndeed contraryt'o Harman himself,
1969) that a rationaiist theory of language learning cannot be
stated within the fram~work ,avai.lable to.a resourceful empiricist.
If this is correct, then resourceful empiricism, like empiricism
properly so called, is disconfirmed by the eviderice favoring a
rationalist theory of l~nguage acquisitiori.
First, then, let us recall that Goodman proposes to measure
the lawlikeness (confirmability} of hypotheses primarily in terms
of the degree of entrenchment of the predicates they contain.
Complexity of logical form may also be ~ factor in determining
the prima facie plausib~lity of an hypothesis. Now transformational
----""
232
theorists, besides distinguishing between learnable and unlearnable
grammars, postulate .an innate evaluation procedure that imposes a
plausibility ordering on the class of learnable grammars. But
many of their hypotheses about the characte~ of this plausibility
6rdering seem quite unlike hypotheses about the entrenchment of
predicates.
Chomsky and Halle (1968, 404~407), for example, propose a
set of thirty-nine so-called marking conventions, in an effort to
account for some of the empirically established facts about natu-
ralness (~priori plausibility) in phonological hypotheses. In
eleven of these marking conventions, only a ,single phonological
feature (predicate) is mentioned. Clearly these conventions
cannot be telling us which of two predicates is the better en-
trenched. But even those conventions that mention more than
(7) [
+VQCaliC J~
-consonantal ~ [+ vOice).
one phonological feature c~n hardly be construed as statements
about the "relative entrenchment of the predicates involved.
Consider, for example, Chomsky and Halle's marking convention V~
here presented in abbreviated form as (7). This convention tells
us th"at vowels (i.e., segments that are vocalic and non-consonantal)
tend to be voiced rather than voiceless. By implication, the con-
vention tells us that vowel devoicing rules (such as that in
Cheyenne) make" a grammar less plausible. But convention V does
not tell us that the predicate ~oice is pe.tter (or worse) en-
trenched than the predicates ~alic and consonantal. It corrments
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'only on the naturalness'of vowel devoicing rules, telling us
nothing hbo·ut the inherent plausibili ty of at'her rules that
make use of the predicates in question.
One mig~t still suppose it possible to specify an entrench-
ment ranking that would duplicat:e the overall effect of all
thirty-nine marking conventions. This supp~sition seems quite
improbable, however, in the light of some of the phenomena that
(8) k ~ ~/
(9) ~ ~ k/
[~conS1~bac~
[
-conS)
+bac~
motivate the marking conventionS~ Chomsky and Halle cite rule
(8) as a highly plausible rule i:hat is "observed in many lang-
uages II, and rule (9) as unnatura.l and 1I qu i te extraordinary
de~pite [its] n s irnplicity ll II(Chornsky and Halle 1968, 401). Rules
(8) and (9) are 'virtually indis1:inguishable in formal complexity,
by any plausible measure, while on the substantive side, exactly
the· same predicates appear I wi tIl exactly t~e same number of
occurren~es, in both rules. Evidently, then, it cannot be dif-
, -
- ferences of syntac~ic complexity or predicate entrenchment that
make rul~ (9) so much less plausible than rule (8) .13 Rather,
the plaU~ibility of (8), and thE~ implausibility of (9) is
apparently related to wha~ Chomsky and Halle call the "intrinsic
content U of the phonological fecitures involved. If this is
-correct, then perhaps no general measure of a priori plausibili ty
can deal,in a satisfactory way ~vith the facts about (8) and (9).
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This raises. the question \Jvhether a "resourceful empiricist"
deserves to be considered an empiricist at all.- Bever, Fodor,
and Garrett· (forthcoming, Chapter 8) point out t~at empiricist
s·tudents of learning have geneJ~ally commi,tted themselves to the
view that a single mechanism ullderlies all hum,an le2..rning. On
this view, an adequate the9ry about the way we learn visual .
.discriminati"on tasks s'hould also be .able -to account for the way
we learn English. Empiricists see ~o need to postulate a task-
.specific language-learning mechanism, that is, a mechanism that
can accomplish only.a language-learning task. Cohen, .for example,
writes:
Children r, S taci t reliance ,. in their languag.e-learning r
on a principle of linguis-t:ic uniformity ... ma.Y be compared
with their tacit reliarice, in judgments about their siblings,
on a principle of fairnes~, impartiality, or universalis-
ability: fhe same underlying' principle is at ~ork. An
inductive language-learning device is thus structurally
isomorphic with an inductive ethics-learning device, as
with an inductive device for natural-s6ientific ~iscovery.
(Cohen 1970a, 179n).
Putnam, criticizing Chomsky's Ilinnateness hypoth:es~sn, expresses
a simil~r view in more polemical language:
Just how impressed silould we be by the failure of
current learnings theories to account for complex lear~ing
processes such as those involved in the learning of language?
If innateness \vere a geneJ:-al solution r ' perhaos we should be
impressed.' But the InnatE;ness Hypothesis ca~.'_not, by its
very nature, ~e generalized to handle all complex. learning
proces ses. .. -.-In the absE~nce of any knowledge of wha t.
general multipurpose learning strategies might even look
like, the assertion tha t suC;h s.trategies (which absolutely
must exist and be employed. by all humans) cannot account
for this or that learning process, that the answer or· an
answer schema must be 'innate', is utterly unfounded.
(Putnam 1967, 20, 21;. emphasis Putnam's)
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This empiridist belief in a single pattern for all le~rning is
implici t, I think, ,in the fo;Llo'wi~g remark by Hume:
From causes which appear similar, we expect similar
effects. This is the sum of all our experimental con-
cl'usions. (Hume 1748, ,50; cf. also p. 112)
On the whole, then, empiricists have sought a general theory
of human learning, eschewing task-spec~fic learning mechanisms.
But Harman's "empiricist ll apparently does not share these scruples.
He 'is willing to postulat~· a bias favoring "certai,n types of
grammar ., .. ,no' rna tt-er wha t the facts about language turn out to
he"· (Hume 1967, 86-87). In the later article, Harman indicates
that ,as far as he is ·concerned, "there is no real difference
between Professor Chomsky's "rationalist ll view and Professor'
Putnam's suggestion that we should attempt to account,. for language-
acquis.i tion in terms of general roul tipurpose learning strategies II
(Harman 1969, 150). Har~an exhibits no interest i~ the q~estion
, -
whether the innate bias favoring certain type~ o,f granunars is a
reflection of some more geneial bias, or whether this bias applies
to grammatical hypotheses. In this respect, the views of Harman's
I"' resourceful empiricist" are unlike the views of o"ther emp~ricists.
There is another tenet of empiricist learning theory which
the "resourceful empiricist ll seems willing to give up. That is
the view that language acqu~sit.ion is subject to't~e same psycho-
logical laws which govern le~rning in non-h~man animals (e.g.,
rats and pigeons). Empiricists generally resi~t the suggestion
that the mechanism of language ~earning is a species-specific,
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uniquely human mechanism (cf ~ Be~,er, Fodor, and Garrett forth-
coming, Chapter 8). Nowhere does Harman build this typical
empirici'st attitude into his des(:ription of the resourceful
empiricist. Resourceful empiricism contrasts sharply, in this
respect, with the empiricism of Skinner's' Verbal Behavior (1951),
o_r of Burne's discussion: nOf the ]~eason of Anima~s" in the
Treatise (1739, 176-179) .14
We have just seen _two important doctrines 'of empiricism
that a resourceful empiricist sec=ns willing to repudiate. There
,'is reason to .doubt, then, whethe:L a "resourceful empiricist" is
_a real empiricist, or merely a counterfeit one. I wish now to
dispute Harman's claim (1969, 151) that resourceful empiricism
II coincides with rationalism reso'urcefully defended". (Chomsky
agrees with Harman that "resourc,eful empiricism" incorporates"
as a special case, the "rationalist" approac~ that .[he has] bGen
trying to develop" (Choms~y 1969:b, 158), and that resourceful
empiricism is "immune to any factual discovery" (Chomsky 196930,
91) • )
Harman recognizes, of course, that there is a formal dif-
ference betwe~n the rationalist account _of language acquisition
and that proposed by the resourceful empiricist. According to
the -resourceful empiricist, only certain inductive principles,
and _a bias_ in favor_ of ,certain t,ypes of grammar, are innate. On
the .rationalist theory, there are innate linguistic principles,
as well as_an innate bias ~nd innate inductive principles. But
what are the linguistic principles which Harman regards as a"
237
HI Gl
H2 G2 [ GI , ,G2' G3 , ... , G. , ...J.
H3 G3 (Plausibility ranking oflearnable grammars only)
Figur~ 2' Figure 3
(P1auslbility .ranking of all logically
possible grammars, learnable or not)
Figure 4
dispensable part of the ratiQnalist theory? Appar~ntly he means
- ,
to do away with the principles used to ex~ress the finding that
"only languages with certain typ,es of grammar (e. g., transforma-
tion,al grammar) are learnable" (Harman 1967, '86) .. These are the
principles which define the conc~ept possible generative grammar
(Chomsky 1965, 30-31), and thus implicitly partition the class
of, all logically p'ossible grarnmaLrs into those which are learn-
able (in the normal way) and those which are not. This partition
is illustrated in Figure 2. In addition, the rationalist theory
includes an evaluation procedurE~ 'that establisheq a plausibility
order ing (Figure 3) ,on the learrlable grammars. Harman apparently
means to eliminate the partitioIl of Figure 2 by spe.cifying a
comprehensive plausibility ranking that is biased in favor of
the learnable grammars, a·nd (by implication) again~t the un-
-learnable ones -(cf. Figure 4). Intuitively.speaking, Harman
means to gloss the rationalist's unlearnable as very difficult
(but not impossible) to learn. No one will in fact learn any
2.38
. .
of these livery diffficul t" granulla~s, bgcause long bef'ore he
reaches HI" the first such graInInar in hhe' list, he will find
the grammar (say Gi) which govel~ns the speech of his cc)mmurii ty.
He will test Gi and, finding no counte~examples to Gi' he will
adopt Gi as his grammar, thus sllccessftllly completing his'
learning task.
Unfortunately, there cannot be any such ranki~g as that of
Figure 4, which "swallows up" trle' clasf3 of .unlearnable grammars
along with the learnable ones. IS For in order to favoi learn-
able over unlearnable grammars, the rahking would have to begin
.with a listing (If all the learnable grammars." The first unlearn-
able grammar in the list, HI' would have to follow the last
learnable grammar, say Gf , because HI ts less plausible than any
learnable grarnmare But there can' be no least plausible learnable
grammar, because the set of leal~nable ~Jranunars is infini te, for
much the same reason tha~ the class of English sentences is
infinite:· there is no upper bO.tlnd on t.he length of grammars.
(10) Dillinger kicked the bucket,
-rn",-.English, -as in other larlguages t there are idiomatic
expressions, i.e. expressions who~e meaning cannot be discovered
by the normal process of se~~ntic: inte~pretation. The verb
phrase kick the _bucket in senterlC~ (10 ~ is an example. The
lexicon of English must contain a, spec~i.al entry, indicati-ng
that this VP, d5Spi te appearancE~s', mea~\s di-e.· Now suppose that
Gf is some particular grammar, putatively the least plausible of
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all. It is easy to construct a learnable grammar that is less
plausible than Gf= we simply select an arbitrary VP (there are
infinitely many, since there is no upper bound on the length of
VP's) and an arbitrary ~exical l:'eading (other than the normal
one for the selected VP), put them together to form a lexical
~ntry, and add th~s new lexical entry to the ~exicon of Gfe
The resulting grammar is learnable, but ~ess plausible than Gf.
This rebuts th~ hypothesis, that Gf is the least plausible learn-
able grammar, and shows that thEl class of learnable grarmnars
Figtlre 5.
is infinite.
Of course there is a way of incorporating the,unlearnable
grammar"s into a sin'gle list wi tIl the learnable ones, despi te the
fact that both sets are,"irifinite~ We ~ould begin such a list
with a very long sequence of lea.rnable grammars, say 10 50 of
them. The last" grammar in this initial subsequence, GIO 50,
will be a learnable grammar, bu1: such a ,complex and implausible
one as to rule out the possibility that any human could actually
acquire GIOSO' in a lifetime. 1I1wediately after GIOSO, we insert
the first unlearnable grammar ill the list, Hl- Next comes
GIOSO +1' ,then H2 1 then G10 50+ 2' and we continue the list by
interleafing unlearnable grammars with learnable ones (cf. Figure
5). Every gramrna~, learnable 0:(" not, will appear in the resul t-
ing list.
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The difficulty with the list of Figu~e 5 is that this list,
interpreted as an hypothesis about our innate capacity for
language~learning, is palpably in conflict with the rationalist
hypothesis (Figures 2 and 3). Fi.gure 5 claims, for example, that
. "
HI is more plausible than Gl050+1 . The rationalist hypothesis,
on the contrary, implies that Gl050~1 is the ~ore plausible
grammar, since every learnable srrammar is more plausible than
any unlearnable one.. Our intent: in constructing the list of
Figure 5 was to duplicate the claims of the rationalist hypo-
thesis , without resort to a part:i tioning 'of the class of all
pos.sible granunars. - Clearly, our efforts have not been succ'ess-
·ful.
Thus far, I have been assunling that the list representing
the.resourceful empiricist's innate bias must be 'of order type U)~
Gl' G2' G3' ..., Hl' 1-12' H3 ' •••
Figure 6
But suppose we allow a list of ()rder type W + "', as in Figure 6.
Surely this will do the trick. fc)r Harman?
Here the resourceful empiricist face's a dilenuna. For each
finite set of possible sentences, he must predict what grammar
a child will acquire if he is expo~ed to ju~t that corpus of
possible sentences. 16 (The resourceful empiricist',s theory will
'be incomplete if it does not meet this require~ent.) Conse-
quently,' ei ther there is or theJ~e is not some collection of
primary linguistic· data which would, according tq the resourceful
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empiricist, refute everyone of the Gil 'a'!).d thus indu-ce the child
to adopt H1-as- his grammar. If the resou~ceful empiricist claims
that there is such. a corpus, he clearly is 'asserting something
the rationalist denies. If, on the _other hand, he denies that
there is such a corpus, he is in effect,sayin~ that the language-
learning mechanism is structurally incapable of ever consid~ring
any of the Hj (the unlearnable grammars). In this case, the
resourceful,empiricist is in perfect agreement with the ration-
alist, but he' has admit~ed that the Hj are not merely ve~y
difficult, but in fact impossible to learn in the normal way.
His plausibility ranking simply reproduces, in thinly disguised
~
form, the ve_ry partition_ (Figure 2) it was meant to eliminate.
The first horn of this dilemma, by the way, suggests a new
way of looking at the lIi~terleafedll plausibility ranking of
Figure 5. That ranking implicitly claims that there is some
corpus C of linguistic data, such that presentation of C would
lead the acquisition device to_.reject the first 10 50 learnable
grammars, and accept Hi on a tentative basis_ The rationalist
pr~dicts, on the other hand, that presentation of C would lead
to the acceptance of G1050+1 t ,not to the acceptance of HI-
While it is not possible to arrange a direct test to Settle
this'disagree~ent, there- wi~l surely be evidence that bears on
it indirectly, namely evidence about language learners' res-
ponses to corpora smaller than C. We can then ask: which of
. the two hypothesa~ projects the pattern of observed responses
. --
in the iirnpler, more natui~l way? Given the highly artificial
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construction of the resourceful empiricist's list, it seems likely
that he will lose out when considerations of naturalness and
simplicity are taken into account.
It seems, then, that the resourceful e~piricist cannot make
good on his offer to paraphrase away the difference·between un-
l~arnable and very-difficult-to-learn grammars., If I read
Harman correctly, then resoqrceful empiricism does not include
l1 any specific empirical.proposal that anyone can formulate ll
(Chomsky 1969b, 158). To be sure, "it can accornodate the view
th~t knowledge of English is innate ll , by placing the grammar of
English first in its plausibility ranking. But i~ is s~e~ifically
i·nt~nded· to rule out the claim that "knowledge of universal gram,-
mar is innate ll (Chomsky 1969b, 158). Any evidence, then, which
tends to show that certain types of grammar are not-accessible
to the human.language~learningmechanism~ is evidence against
resourceful empiricis~. ~he resou~cef~l empiricist thus occupies
a positio~ distin~t from tha~ of the rationali~t. But.his posi-
tion is ~lso different from traditional empirlcism, because of
his willingness to countenance innat~ heuristics, and learning
mechanisms that are task- as well as species-specific. Since
r~sourceful empiricism is a much weaker position than genuine.
empiricism, even a full vindication of resourceful empiricism
would not be enough to save empiricism. And I know of no reason
to suppose that resourceful empiricism can be vindicated over
against the rationalist theory of language acquisition.
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III. COHEN: CAN ENRICHED EMPIR~CISM'EXPLAIN LANGUAGE LEARNING?
Harman tried to argue that rationalism and empiricism are
not distinct posi tio.ns,. tha t any rationa~ist theory about
language learning can be mechanically translated into an empiri-
cally equivalent empiricist hypothesis. ·L. J. Cohen, whose
paper (1970b) we shall take, up next, acknowledges that ration-
alism and empiricism are empirically distinguishable hypotheses
about the internal structure of a language-learning device. He
maintains (plausibly enough, I think) that'if an empiricist
theory can account for the facts about language acquisition, then
we should reject the rationalist theory, on the grounds that it
attributes an ,unnecessarily comple~ internal structure to the
child's language acquisition device (Cohen 1970b,. 305, 306).
But as ,Katz has pointed out, "s implici ty is a consideration in
choosing between c~mpeting hypotheses Only when th~ hypotheses
can afford an equally pla~sible basis on which to explain the
available evidence" (Katz 1966, 268-269). I shall argue that
Cohen, despite the innovative aspects of ~is theory of induction,
,JlQ~~s,.not present a successful explanation of language learning.
Cohen is critical of recent attempts (especially that of
Chomsky and Miller, 1963) to show the inadequacy of inductivist
theories of language learning. These anti-empiricist arguments,
he complains, have concentrated on an enumerative conception of
induction, which "stems from ... the associationist tradition
'. that goes back not, to Bacon but to, Hume"'. In enumerative
induction, "it is the sheer number of evidential instance~ .•.
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that makes one ... indu,ction better than another". Bacon, and
more recently Mill,' emph-asiz,ed th,e importance of variational
induction, which takes account of' lithe value of variety, as
.distinct from mere multiplici ty, in exper imental ins tanCes il
(Cohen 1970b, 300). Coh.en sugg'ests that a theory of 'language
l~arning based on variational induction "may riot share the defects
of theories based on enumerative induc:tion ~ He -argues, thathis
theory of variational induction invalidates the usual arguments
against empiricism, and in' favor ,of the innateness, of syntactic
universals.
-Thre'e questions, face' u's '{n a ttempting to, underst'a.-nd Cohen 1 S
paper : What is Cohen's theory of 'var.iational induction? 'How
does he propose to apply it to the exp~anation of language
~ le?rning?, And in what way is variational induction 'supposed to
'remedy the defects of enumerative theories of langua~e learning?
On the first question, the c6ncept of a (finite) sequence
of canonical te.sts is central to Cohen I s theory . Given certain
information about the field of research within which an hypo-
thesis lies, it is possible to calculate th~ design of thi~
sequ.ence of tests. Each test in the sequence is more 'thorough
than its pred~cessor. If an hypothesis passes every t~st in
this (finite) sequence, ,it is said to enjoy full inductive
support~ A fully supported'hypothesis may, of course, be false.
In order to calculate the sequence of canonical, tests for
a given hypothe$is H, we need two pieces of information (Cqhen
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1970b, 301; 1970a, 51-6'0). The first is a specification of tht~
. -
'vocabulary used to formulate hypotheses in the same field of
research as H. This vpcabulary will most likely include many
.. predicateS that.do not appear in H itself i of course. Any
hypothesis that can be formulated in this vocabulary is said
to be materially similar to H. l ?
Second, we need a list of variables that have proven to bu.
inductively relevant to hypotheses materially similar to H. This
; ,
Ii·st. of variables is taken to be disjoint. (initially, at least.)
with 'the vocabulary used 'to define material similarity to H. A
variable is inductively rele~ant to a set of hypotheses just in
case manipulation of that variable has· led to the refutation ot:
at least one hypot~esis in the,set. A variable V has greater
,inductive relevance than variable W to a set S of hypotheses,
just in case manipulation of V has refu~ed more hyp~theses in
. S than has manipulation of W. Our (finite) list of variables
is to be ranked in order. of decreasing inductive relevance. The
list begins with that variable having the greatest inductive
relevance to H-like hypotheses, and ende with the variable whi~h
has the po~rest track record of falsified hypotheses. Also, the
values of each variable in the list are to be "observable cir-
cumstances" (Cohen 1970b, 301).
Given this list of inductively relevant yariables, ~e are
~t l~st in"a ~osition to calculate the canonical test sequence
for H. ·For the first te~t'in the sequence, we manipulate only
the first variable in our list, while holding all other variables
. -J
_______.......J
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'constant. In the second test, we manipulate (independently, of
course) the first two variables in our list, holding the 'others
constant. And. so ,on, until we reach the, ,f'inal test in 'the
sequence, in which we simultaneously manipulate all 'th~ variables
of known relevance, from ,the greatest unto tne least.
Now if H happens to pass all these' tests, it has full
inductive support. But to see one of the alleged advantages
of variational induction, let us consider a case in which an
(11) All hares are gray .
. hypothesis gets refuted in the last test of its· se'quence. The
hypothesis Cohen discu-sses is (11) I ·and he assumes that "variation
from arctic to temperate zones was considered the least relevant
variable for hypotheses ~bout fur-color" (Cohen 197Gb, 302).
Naturally, a white arctic hare turns up when we finally manipulate
(12) All temperate-zone hares are gray.
this variable, and we must reject (11). But variational induc-
ti.on tells us how ,to convert (11) into a s'lightly more complex
'hypothesis, (12)/ that has full inductive support, without any
further observations. This modification in effect removes the
arctic/tempe~a,te 'tJariable from the list of variables to be man-
ipulated, thus shortening the sequence of canonical tests, and
speeding the ,confirmation of a putatively correct hypothesis.
Such modifications pee~ not, of course, involve the last
variable on our list for a given 'hypothesis. We can deal in
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similar fashion with counterexamples. that arise earlier in the
test sequence. Such modifications will not result in hypotheses
-with full support, of course, but even here, variational induc~
tion facilitates the -process of confirmation. This is because
"the more we modify and cornplica te our hypothesis, i~ one of tt\.e
ways described, the smaller is the number of evidential instances,
or individual experiments, that we need to obtain full support
for a modified version,of the hypothesis" (Cohen 197Gb, 302).
One of the advantages of variation~l induction, then, is sup-
posed to be that .it leads more rapidly to the (full) confirma-
tion of true hypotheses, because of the hypothesis-modification
p~oced~re just described.
Though Cohen does not claim any further advantages in the'
paper under discussion (Cohen 1970b), I gather tha~ variationat
induction is also meant to promote quicker refutation of false
hypotheses. This surely is part of the reason Cohen instructs
us to begin a test sequence by manipulating the variable having
the greatest inductive,relevance. These, -then, are the two ways
in which variational induction is supposed to be more efficient
than enumerative ind~ction: ,it speeds the refutation of false
hypothes~s, and the confirmation of true ones.
We come now to our second question: how might variational
induction be used ,to explain language learning? First, how
would "an inductive language-learning device ... acquire the
-concepts in terms of which it, could construct its syntactic
hypotheses~' (Cohen 19 70b, 304)? Among these concepts "necessax=-y
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for generalizations ab0':lt surf·ace structure" are co.nce·pts like
noun, verb, and sentenc~e. All these concepts
can be reduced to two primitive ones (" sent'ence" and
"nominal ll ) by assuming a mode of derivation for the others
like that used in categorial gralnrnars. Then the acquisition
of these two primitive concepts has to be supposed to stem,
as to "sentence, II from experience of utterances ,formed by
varying recombinations of a stock of recogniza~ly recurring
components, and, as to "nominal," from experience of the
utterance of some such components in isolation from others
(in the presence, no doubt 1 of wh'a t Quine called II conspicu-
ously segregated objects ll ) •. (Cohen ·1970b, 304)
This, then, is the process by which the child is supposed
to acquire the V9cabulary in terms .of which, he defines the class
of gr.arnInatica,l hypotheses; an 'eOquivalence cla.ss wi th r~spect to
the relation of material similarity. ,He uses this vodabulary
initially.to formul.ate. IIgeneralizations about surface structure",
e.o. the ~ypothesis that "any string oof .the form noun·-verb-
noun, is grammatical in English" (Cohen 197Gb, 302).
But 'a variational language-learning device is .not "confi11ed
to ... listing labeled bracketings of non-devianto~urf~ce struc-
tures ll (Cohen 197Gb, 303). As it begins to find counterexamples
to its initial hypotheses, which are about surface- structure,
lI.a ;;tore of relevant variables ocan gradually be amassed: e. g. ,
the singular-plural variable for nouns preceding verbs, the
singular-plural variable for verbs, the transitive-intransitive
variabl~ for verbs, and so On" (Cohen 1970b, 302). The device
(13) Any noun-verb-noun sequence in which both the verb
and the preceding n'oun are singul.ar, 'is gralTh.L1a tical
in English.
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(14) Any noun-verb-rioun sequence in which both the verb
and the 'precedi~g noun are p~ural, is -grammatical
in English.
mentions specific values of these 'variables in modifying its
.initia1.hypotheses. Its modified hypoth~ses ~ight include (13)
and (14), for instance ..Then
its nisus toward generalization will lead it to
. formulate [second-order; correlat~onal] hypotheses about
relationships between these variables which .will subsume
and explain, as it were, the more elementary hypotheses
that have already been established: e.g., IIThe,singular/
p~ural variable for yerbs varies directly with th~
singular/plural variable for preceding nouns," or liThe
inse~tability 6f ·a eY... phrase after the verb varies.
inver·sely with the active/pass"ive variable. II (Cohen
- 1970b, 303).
Numb~r agreement and passivizati~n are two well-known trans-
formational processes .. I take it, from the passage' just qu6ted~
th~~ Cohen're~ards transformations as s~cond-ord~r (correla-
tion~l) hypotheses that expre~s relatio~~hips between (and thus
. '
quant·i fy .over) "surface-s tructure .var.iables, such as number in
verbs and nouns.
This, then, is how Cohen applies variational inquction to
" ..
the theory~of language acquisition. We come now to our ,third
• I· •
question: how is the variational theory of language learning
supposed to remedy the defects of theories based on enumerative
induct,ion?
To review our discussiori of Harman (pp~ 228~229), the
principal difficulty with inductivist language~learningdevices
was thei'r' inabi·li ty to· generate hyp.otheses about deep structures
._-_ .._----_.._ ....~--'_... ,~",,~._'~.._~-------'-~-~- ~;~-'-~/
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and transformational processes. Now 'on Cohen's theo~y, a child's
initial hypotheses are· "generalizations ~bout sur.face. 'structu,re".
But the benefits claimed for variational induction have to do with
hypothesis testing and modification, not with'the generation of
. initial hypotheses. And it is in fact the ~esting and modifica-
tion process which leads to the development of trans'formational
hypotheses, according to Cohen. Refutation of·hypotheses leads
us· to' recognize the inductiv~ rel,evance "0.£ vario\ls syntactic
variables~ and thus makes it possible to formulate (transforrna-
tional) generalizations about rela,tionships among these variables.
Cohen is not the first, empiricist to ,suggest that trans-
. .
formations are absent from a child's first gr~~~ical hypothese~.
-. .
Martin' Braine (~963, 1965) thought that a.child first learned 'to
use sentences whose deep s~ru9tures .w~re. identical with their
.surtace structures. Later, they learned to use sente~ces ·trans-
·formationall~ derived from these element~ry sentences. But as
"Bever, Fodor, and Weksel" (1965a,b) pointed out in their critique
of Braine's -theory, there are no sentences w:qose surface, and
deep.structures coincide; the derivation of every sentence in-.
valves transformational processes.
This 6bservation in itself does not defeat Cohen's (or
Braine's) theory. There is no reason why a child'.s first hypo-
. thesis must.be correct; Cohen only needs to ~xplain how the child
comes to adopt the correct grammar as his ,final hypothesis .. And
of course Cohen does suggest a process by which transformation
rules might enter the child's grammar.
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·.Unfortun~tely, Cohen (like Braine before him) misconceives
the nature of transf'ormation rules. A grammatical transforrnat'ion
does not derive the s~rface structure of a sentence from another
.surface structure, not even from the surface structure of some
other sentence. Rather, transformations operate on deep struc-
tures, and no deep structure is identical with any surface
structure. To be sure, the present concept of a transformation
rule appears to have developed out of work by Zellig Harris
(1957), in which he spoke of lI a formal [transformational] relation .
.among sentences ll , i.e. surface structures (Harris 1957, 283;
emphasis added). But since at least 195.7, transformations have
been conceived as operations on abstract deep structures, or
underlying phrase markers (cf. Chomsky 1957, 44-48; Chomsky
_196~, 128-129).
Now Cohen's theory tells us how ch~ldren migh~ learn Harris-
style_transformations, but that is not the accomplishment which
a theory of language learning needs to explain. The switch to
a variational theory of induction cannot help the empiricist to
get at deep structures and transformatiQnal operations on them,
- for a very_simple reason. In variational induction, we modify
a refuted hypothesis by constraining an inductively relevant
variable. Such variables_ take "observable circumstances" as
their values. The child acquires them by "perception of a
difference between his own utterance and some adult speaker's
utterance" (Cohen 1970b, 303).
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But neither deep.structures nor transformations are, per-
ceptible., Consequently, if there is no reference to deep-
structure" in the hypothesis to be modified, then the modified
hypothesis will not contain'any such refcre~ce either. The
~trength of variational ind~ction supposedly lies in the modif-
ication process; but that process only adds references .to new
surface-structure variables. If Coh~n'~ theory ·is to 'explain
how a child learns a transformational grammar, then reference
to deep structure must appear in. the ·child IS firs't hypothesis,
before the alleged advantages.of ·variational induction can be
realized .
. Cohen I s paper contains a rema'rk that might be con~trued ~s
the beginning of,an answer to this criticism. He suggests that
nth~ more abstract concepts' of transformat.ional grammar ll I!lay be
i"nnate, rather- than acquired, and that these concepts are "capabie
of non-linguistic as well ·as of linguistic realization ll (Cohen
197Gb, 304). Now, he might argue, some of the concepts needed
to descr'ibe deep structure, and to formulate transfornlations,
are acquired: NP 1 plural, etc. The' rest of the nece.s$ary
concepts are innate, but not specifically lingulstic. (This
latter restriction expresses the empiricist ban on task-
specific learning mechanisms.) ~\1i th a,ll the requisi te concepts
at hand, why can't the child 1 s first hypothesis be a conjecture
about deep structure, and about the operations that map it into
surfac~ structure?
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This proposal claims that the child learns all his specifically
linguistic concepts from his experience with surface structure.
Unfortunately, some deep-structure constituents (e.g.. , Imperative)
.never appear in surface structure, so the child could not learn
the corresponding concepts from exper~ence.' But the proposal
l1as a far m,ore serious defE?ct. Let us suppose that .concepts like
deletiori, pe~mutation,· ~tc. are innate, and "c~pable of non-
linguistic ... realization". Still, all we have thus far is a
collection of conceptual materials. How is the child supposed
to distinguish between promising and unpromising ways 9£ putting
these materials together into hypotheses? Not, of course, by
observation, since transformational proc~sses are not observable.-
Moreover, the child's first hypothesis is bound to be refuted~
When this happens, how does the child know what cha~ges to make
in the refuted hypothesis? 'Again, observation is not, likely to
help, for transformational grammars are hypotheses about un-
observable operations on unobservable entities (deep structures) .
Th~ point is that substantive universals, linguistic or
othe~wise, do not tell. us what form a fir~t hypothesis (o~ a
modified hypothesis) mus't take in order to be plausible. For
t~iSl we need formal and organizational universals (cf. Katz
1972, 30-31), plus an evaluation procedure that defines the
relation more plausible ~ha~ on the class of admissible hypo-
theses. Cohen has of course suggested a method of hypothesis
mddification, and he claims that that method. is appli~a~le·.to
non~linguistic learning tasks. We have reason to'doubt, however,
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that Cohen '·s. modification proc~dure can make approp~ia.~e changes
in hypotheses about unobservable entitie~ and ·processes.
As for the heuristic task of formulating a plausible initial
·hypothe$is, Cohen's modification procedure can be of no help in
this. process .. It would be inimical to Cohen's empiricist prin-
. ."
-c~'ples ,to invoke an innatel.y (ra ther th'an environmen·tally) deter-
mined heuristic process (cf. pp. ~34-2.36 above), let a~on~ a
,-
plausibility metric defined only on grammatical hypotheses. But
since the heuristic device'must generate an hyp~thesis about un-
'observables, it is unlikely that the operation of the child's
heuristic depends on experience as heavily as empiric~sts_have
supposed. And Cohen's p~per gives us no reason to suppos~ that
any general, muitipurpose heuristic can gerierate'grammatica~
hypotheses. of the appropriate sort .. With or without variational'
induction, Cohen's theory of language aGquisition is inadequate,
and cannot be used to vindicate empiricism ..
In summary, the rationalist account .of language learning
does. not require· the postulation of infinite storage capacity,
as Morgenbesser argues. Contrary to Har~anls corit~ntion, ration-
alisrn is empirically distinct from empiricism. And empiricism
seems unable to account for-language learning, even when enriched
by Cohenls variational theory of induction.
f
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F~otnotes.·
*1. wish to than~ Sylvain Bromberger and Ned Block for their
help 'in revising an earlier version of this paper.
1 The entity Morgenbesser has in mind is the nervous system.
Morgenbesser goes on to suggest a way to justify making state S
a knowledge state. That is, he puzzles over how Fodor might
justify a claim that some part of the nervous system knows some~
thing. Cf. Morgenbesser 1969, 463-464.
2 The concept of tacit .action raises many issues in the
theory of action, e.g.: When one of my little men performs an
action,' is that. action ipso facto an action (tacit, or otherwise)
of mine? I shall have nothing to say about such issues •
. 3· For discussion of a similar argument, cf. Chapter 2 of
this thesis, pp. 11~-l23; also Smart 1'63, 38, and katz 1972, 29.
4 In an earlier draft, my discussion of this point was
excessively complex. I wish to thank my wife for a radical
simplification of this discussion.
5 S~m~lar' diagrams can be drawn for systems that perform
tasks involving sequential, rather then si~ultaneous, occur
of elementary operation. The added complexity would only com-
plicate the discussion, however. Despite its simplicity, Figure
1 seems to me to do full justice to Nagel's point.
6 By picturing the nervous system as a sort of Uobbesian
256
leviathan"we have also,made it necessary to specify the little
man for whom a given·operation is elementary. We can no longer
simply say that an operation is elementary for the organism, or_
for its nervous system as a whole. Elementarity is thus relative
to systems as well as to tasks~ An operation that is elementary
for a superintendent may set his subordinates to performing tasks
of considerable complexity. It may thus be somewhat misleadi~g
to say (as Fodor does) that an ele~entary operation is without
"theoretically relevant internal structure" (Fodor 1968, 629),
because we may give the superintendent credit for an entire
operation, .including the labors of his u~derlings.•
7 In. "correlating" sentence (1) with sentence (2), the idea
is, I take it, that we mentally transform sentence (1) into
sentence (2). We can easily in~erpret (2), b~cause -all seman-
t~cal constituents are explicitly represented in (2)~ We. give
.sentence (1) the semantic,.interpretation we get for sentence (2),
on -the assumption that "correlCition ll prese~ves meaning. Katz's
question is: how do we know which correlations (transformations)
pres~rve meaning, and which do not?
8 Katz (1966, 260-261) is somewhat unfair, I think, to the
-empir'icist I s correlational theory about the interpretation of
subjectless imperatives. He mistakenly der~ves from that theory
the requirement that in order to interpret a particular subject-
less imperative, S, we must first have encounte~ed the actual
sentence 8' with which S is cor~elated•. (The-sentence S' begins
with a,you subject, but thereafter it is identical, constituent
for constituent/with S.)
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. 9 Notice, by the way, that a child would have to know a
principle of conversat~onal implicature in order to draw.the
appropriate conclusion from this fact: the principle that people
.do not usually issue commands which obviously cannot be executed.
The child reasons: "Surely, he must know we can't all hide'
behind the easy chair, so he can't be address~ng all of us.'~ The.
-earlier argument against correlating (1) with (3) may require
app~al ~o another such principle:.a speaker does not usually
address someorie whom he knows to be absent. "He can't be talking
to any John Jones, because no John Jones is present."
1
10 Cf. note 9 above. Also, to provide a'manageablY small
set of hypotheses, it may be necessary to resort to an innate
evaluation measure that is applicable. only to the evaluation of
grammatical hypotheses; cf. Chomsky 1965, 203, note 22. Also,
in.case other than that of the imperative rule, considerations of
simplicity of the general (~.grammar-specific) sort may not
dictate the correct choice -among hypotheses compatible with a
given body of data. But in general, an incorrect choice based on
simplicity considerations may be rectified by gatheri~9 further
data.
11 I have presupposed what Fodor (1971) calls the "stro~g
psychological reality" position, but a refutation of that position
would clearly do nothing -to enhance the tenability of empiricism.
However we recover" the.deep structure of a sente~ce from its
phonetic.representation, the process is. clearly not an observable
one.
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12 This ,argument is.not intended to show that resourceful
empiricism is false. It goes rather to the charact~r'of, the bias
a resourceful empiricist must post~late, if he wan~s a theory that
is empir{cally adequate. This ~rgument may, then, tend to show,
not that resourceful empiricism is not true, 'but that it is .not
empiricism.
13 Even outside linguistics, co'nfiJ;mabili ty' appa~ently
depends on more than entrenchment of predicates. Davidson (l966)
. 'has pointed out, for example, that the statement All emeroses are
. .
gred is, despite its use of ill-entrenched predicates, a lawlike.
statement. (Note, by the way, that we can'confim this statement
by observing rubies before .t, and emeralds aft~r ,t~.though such
'. .
rupies are not, 'and such emeralds may not be, emerubies.) Also,
an hypothesis containing ill~entrenched predicate~ (e.g., All
emerphires ~ grue, and all sappheralds '~'bleen) may ,be logi-
cally eq~ivalent to an hypothesis of similar complexity, 'in which
no~ such predicates occur (All emeralds are green,' 'and all sap-
phires ~ blue).
14 Earlier (pp. 223ff. ) I pointed out that empi.r icists
look to experience, rather then to any innate schernatism, to per-
form the heuristic function of generating hypotheses, which the
.learner then'tests against further exp~rience. But Chomsky (1965,
203, note 22) has pointed out that an evaluation measure may, play
. -
a key role in selecting hypotheses for testing. The bias postu-
lated by the "res6urcef~l empir~cist,fI may of'fend gentiin.e empiri-
cists, the.n, by its inna teness as well as', by its task- and species-
specificity-.
;:
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15 My argument in this paragraph assumes that Harman's'list
of all grammars, learnable. and unlearnabl'e, must be. of order
typeW. For an argument that does not rely on'this assumption,
cf. pp. 240-241. below.
16 . The set of all possible sentences is defined in univer-
sal' phonetic theory; cf. Chomsky 1965, 31.
17 It is not clear to me just how one. would go about decid-
ing which predicates belong. to this vocabulary and which do not.
This problem appears to be a crucial one for Cohen's theory,
since the constitu~ion of t~is vocabulary af~ects ~he, design of
cahonical test .seque~ces and thus the asseSsment· of indtictive
scipport foi hyp~theses; I shall have nothing to say about this
probl~m, however.
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Appendix
Gettier, Idioiects, and
Ling~istic Rationalism*
'.
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According to Graves, Katz, et al., lIestablishing thE\t
speakers know some principles of linguistic theory does not show
.that they know that ... the principles in question are P~inciples
of every possible grammar ll (Graves, Katz, et ale in preSH). By
"principles of every possible grammar" I take it these aLlthors
m~an "principles about all possible graI1U11ars"., That is, I take
them to be denying that we hav,e innate knowledge of any llniversal
principles which quantify over possible gramrna~s. I wish in this
appendix to argue, on the contrary, that we do know many such
principles. The argument for this thesis will bring to light a
problem with the rationalist account of linguistic knowledge, a
problem related to Gettier's refutation of the tradition~l anal-
ysis of knowledge.
It will be convenient to begin the argument by consj,dering
a passage from another recent publication by.Katz:
asking "What'is analyticity in English?" or "What
is synonymy in Chinese?" is no less foolish than ask.ing
IIWha t is a toothache for Englishmen? n or "~\T~at is tl\e
relation of being sicker than among Chinese?" .•. th'f~ con-
cepts of analyticity, synonymy, and so on [are not to be]
conceived of as relative notions, to be explicated with
respect to the particular structure of one or anothE~r
natural language ... Rather, they are to be conceived of
as ~bsolute notions, as semanti~ properties and rel~tions
exhibited by words, phrases, clauses, and sentences in
eac~ and every natural language. (Katz 1972, 11-12)
.There is a danger that this, passage may be rnisinterprete~. Katz's
po~nt, I take it, is that one can define the relation S ~cs anal-
ytic in ~, or ~ and T are synonymous in ~, for variable L as
well as variable Sand T. That,.it, we need not take L in these
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sch'emata to re'fer to any particular language; r~ther, it is to be
construed .as a variable "ranging over all possible human ,languages ..
-This point"is quite correc~. The theory of-tr~nsformationa1 gram-
rnarmeets the. challenge, laid dc>w!l by Quine in "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism", to II explain'S is analytic for L I gener~lly for'
variable 'Lin (Quine 1961, 34).
But Katz's remarks might be taken to .i~ply so~ething str~nger
. than this. They might be read as claiming that synonymy, for in-.
stance, is strictly speaking a two-place relation, which takes
. (1) Oculist a'nd eye doctor are synonymous in' .Engli~h...
(2) Oculist and eye doctor are synonymous_.
expres,sions as its arguments. On this view, sent-~nce (1) .is a
ne~d~essly verbose way of stating the fact expressed by (2) ~
There is ~othing'incompleteor elliptical.about (2), on'this
.yiewi in particular, no reference to a languag~ (or to-a grammar)
is necessary. in order to render (2) fully explicit.
This view might seem to ga~n further support from the
(3) Messer and couteau. are synonymous ..
. -
observation that (3) cannot be rendered "explicit" by adding a
reference to any single language. Messer anq couteau are not
synonymous in German, because couteau is not a German ~ord. Nor
are they synonymous in Fr~nch, since Messer is not a French term.
They are, apparen~ly, synonymous simpliciter.
.~,-
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I wish to ·argue that synonymy is not· merely a two-place
relation, that grammatical is not ~trictly speaking a one-place
predicate, etc. Rath~rl I mairitain that a sentence is grammat-
ical with-respect to a specifiable language or grammar, that
expression pairs are synonymous relative to a pair of languages
or grammars, etc. (Throughout this 'discussion, by the way, I
shall identify and distinguish sentences not bi their deep or
surface structure, but only by th~ir phonetic characteristics.)
I thus maintain that sentences like (2) and (3) above are
(4) German Messer and French couteau are synonymous.
(5) The cat is on the mat is grammatical •.
(6) The cat is on the mat is grammatical in English.
elliptical ,versions of (1) and (4) respectiv~ly.. Similarly, I
regard (6) as a mor~.explicit version of (5). None of this seems
incompatible with the intent of Katz's remarks, quoted above.
The need for reference to a language is fairly obvious when
(7) The cat is on the .mat is grammatical in Spanish.
we. alre dealing with "one-place .. predicates, such as grarnmatical.
Thus The cat is on the mat is not grammatical tout court, irres-
----------- " --
pective of language; sentence (7), for example, is -false. The
,point is s~rnewhat more elusive, I think, when we consider relation
te.rms, such. as synonymous. To see that synonymy, like granunati-
·cality, is relative to language, let us consider a sentence which
has been said (I forget by whom) to be grammatical in both English
~
__~r.......:-.----. ~ ~ ~~_____
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and German. The sentence, in its English' spelling, i~ Euripides
leaped; a German would write Euripides liebt. Let us adopt a
language-independent phonetic spelling: Iy~wripidiyz ~iypt].
Now a question ar,ises as to II the II meani'ng of this sentence:
is it or is it not synonymous with the English sentence, Euripides
loves? Clearly,. there is no answer to this ,question; or if you _
like, there are two answers to it:
(8) German [yuwripidiyz liypt] is synonymous with (Englis~
Euripides loves.
(9) English~uwripidiyz liypt] is not syn9ny~ous with
(English) Euripides loves.
The example is not altogether satisfying, since love and
lieben are not object-deleting verbs. Nonetheless, the general
point is clear~ The theory of universal grammar specifies a
set of possible sentences (Chomsky 1965, 31), pho~etically repre-
sented. A given possible sentence will generally be grammatical
in some possible languages (~.e., it will be generated by some
possible grammars), and ungrammatical in others. Not all the
gramrnar~ that generate a given-possible sentence will neces-
sarily assign it the same structural descriptions or semantic
'imterpretations. The grammatical and semantic properties of a
sentence are net, then l properties it has in and of itself; a
sentence has these properties by virtue of its relationship to
this or that grammar or languag~.
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This same poin~ may be br~ught out in a somewhat different
'way by considering ~he situation of a chiid ~ho is learning.'
English. T.h.e child, by virtue. of his knowledge of ·universal
grammar, considers only those grammatical hypotheses which are
grammars of possible human languages. His experience thus far
has led him to adopt, as his tentative. g~amma~ of English, a
certain possible grammar which we may call G.
~'
Now Katz (1966, 251-261) has argued that the meaning of a
sentence often depends on .~nobserv~ble.'grammati~al,featuresof
that sentence. ,On~ must have recourse to the appropriate grammar"
in order to be able to II £i·l1 in~' the unobservable· grammat~cal
features of a sentence, on the bas is of its observable. fe'a tures .
CID) -You must not· put pins in you~ mouth ..
.-
..
(11) 'You need not put pins in your. mouth.
. (12) You may not put pins in your m·out.h.
T·hus the child's grammar G assigns to s.entehce (10) . certain un-
obs~rvable grammatical features, and eventually, a'semantic
interpretation based in part on those features. In particular,
G marks (10) as synonymous with (11), and a~ heteronymous with
As adult speakers. of English, we know that the child's
grammar G has led him to misinterpret sentence (10).. Evi.dently
G is not the appropriate grammar for the child "to use in inter-
preting the utt~rances of hi~ elders. The child will ~ventually
discover 'that G" is not- the grammar, .under:lying the speech of 11is
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community, no doubt, and he will then abandon. G. in favor of a
better approximation, say G'. He may leqrn, for instan~e, that
some sentence S which is generated by h'is granunar G .is nQ't gram-
matical in English. There is a ,(possible) language in which S
is ,granunatical, of caur,se; that i's th~ l~nguage L, generated by
the rejected granunar G. B~t the. child is not interested in ,grarn-
ma~icality (or synonymy')' in just any.possible l~nguage. He wants
to be able to recognize grammaticality and synonymy, inter alia,
,in English.
In clai~ing that sentences have unobservable grammatical
features with semant~q ~elevance, then, Katz means to imply that
some features of the structure of sentences can be d~termined
only with reference to a particu~ar (possible.) grammar .or language~
. .
Apparently any given possible sentence may be.generated by a
variety of possible grammars. Consequently, when someone describes
a·sentence as grammatical, or a pair of sentences as synonymous,
it is often in order to ask, "Grammatical (synonymous) with
respect, to which langua;ge (or grammar)?11
In what follows, then, I shall assume that the native
. speaker's knowledge of '-I the granuna tic'al ,pr'operties, ,of individual
. expressions of [his] language 11 (Graves; Kat·z, et al. in press)
(13) The cat is on the mat is grammatical in English.
consists in his knowing that such propositions as (13) are true.
Graves, Katz, et al. (in press) se·em pr~'pared to go along with
this. Now according to ,the rationalist ,account, a native speaker
- -- -----~-~.........-----~--,---_._,-,-, .._-_ .._~;
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comes ~o know propositions like ,(13). by deducing them from his
'gene~al knowledge of ,the grarrunar' of his language. The speaker IS
. knowledge of principles of particular grammar is postulated
precisely because this postulation cont~ibutes to an explanation
of the speaker's knowledge of such propositions as (13).
Evidently one's knowledge of particular grammar can be form-
ulated in some proposition or other. Graves, Katz, et ale explain
that their argument for knowledge of particular grammar implicitly
assumes the following principle: "a proposition is tacitly
known if it is ... one of the propositions from which the person
"has tacitly deduced a (in this case explicitly) known proposi-
tion" "(Grave8, Katz, et ale in press). Their appeal to this
principle clearly implies that we have propositional knowledge
of particular grammar. I wish now to inquire what sort of pro-
position might exp~ess our knowledge of English gr~mmar.
The ansWer, I think, is adumbrated in a f6otnote to the
paper by Grav"'es, Katz, et ale ThOse writers indicate that II X
:is granunatical in L =df, an optimal grammar of L generates x"
(Graves, Kat~, et ale in press). This suggests that our
(14) Granunar· Ge is the (optimal) grammar' of English.
knowledge of particular grammar may be formulated in some such
propqsition <\s (14}." Our, knowledg,e of universal grammar gives
us "a method for d~termining what each [possib~e granunar] im-
plies. with ruspect to each' [possible] sentence" (Choms]<y 1965,
30). In particular, we are innately endowed with the ability to
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determine whether a given' grammar generates a specified possible
~entence. We are thus, able to discover the truth. of (15) ~ But
(15-) Grammar G
e
generates The cat. is on the mat.
(~6) The optimal grammar of'English generates The cat is
on the mat. --
-----
·from (14) and (15), we can deduce (16), and according to the
defin'i tion quoted above I (16) means j list· .the same thin,g as. (13) •
We were concerned to .explain the speaker's knowledge of (13).
We have done so by postulating knowledge of (l~), which (I rnain-
ta~n) ~xpresses the speaker's "knowledge of "the part~cular grarn-
matical rules of [his] language" (Graves, Katz, ,et ale in. press) .
Also., we" had to assume.. an inna te abili ty to discern" the con-
sequences of a grammatical hypothesis.
One might ask why th~ granunar Ge 1.tself cannot be. taken to
. formulate what .an English speaker knows~ The answer is .that the
grammar Ge does not have" the status of a proposition; a grammar,
in and of 'i t'self, is nei t-her true nor false. The grammar Ge is
~rather ·more like a definite description, ~hich is true of English,
and false of every other possible language. This is why I main-
. tain that QUr 'knowledge of' English grammar is expressed in a
proposition that mentions Ge (namely (14)), rather than by Ge
"itself.
It is not altogether satisfactory to view a grammar as a
definite description of a possible language, for on that vi~w,
we ought to ,get a true st~ternent if we filled the blank in the
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fO,llo~ing sch,ema wi th the gr~ar of English:
'( 17), is the English language.,
Filling this blank wi th the ,grCl:rnmar of English would not give
us a truth, however. Unless a grammar is a 'gigantic noun phrase,
th~ result will not even be syntactically well-formed, and
surely' it would be. odd to regard a g~anunar as an NP., ,Pe,rhaps a
grammar should be viewed ins'tead as an. open sentence having
..". roughly the following force:
(18) In the language, sounds and meanings are
paired according to rules Rl' R2' .••. , Rp..·
Like a definite·descriptio~, such an open sentenees would be tru~
at' one (possibl'e) language, and false of' all others. Wi th its
blank fi~ied in, (18) would .have much 'the same i~port as (1'4);
uniil.its blan~ .is filled:in, (18) does n~t express a propositiori
_that one could'know, sinc~ (·18) is merely an ,open sentence,
neithe~ true nor false in ~tself,'but only true 6f this language,
and false of tha~~
Appare~tly, then, it is no,t the grammar of English, that
expresses our .knowledge of English, but rather some sta~ement
such,as (14), which mentions th~ grammar of ~nglish (or else a
filled-in version o~ (18), which would: contain the grammar of
English, rather than a term referring to it). Thus. in acqu~ring
our knowledge of English, the proposition we deduce from univer-
sal grammar plus primary lingui.stic ,data must. be 's6rnet~ing 'like
(14). We are now in a position to ask what sort of propositions
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roU,Slt be, suppos.ed to consti tute the theory of universa'l granunar,
in order for (14) to be deduci.ble from tha t theo·r~,. in conjunc-
.tion with primary linguistic data. (Graves, Katz" et ale in press).
I wish to argue that unles~ certain principles of universal
(19') Every (psychologically) possible human language
has a gr'ammar with property P'.
grammar have roughly the force of schema', (19) (which' a~pears in
,the body of Chapter 2, p.99, as (13»), these principles will not
be strong enough to play their role in the. deduct{on of proposl~
tions like (14). If this is correct, then we must admit that
some of our innate linguistic knowledge ~o~sists, in kno~ing that
cer"tain properties are.: prop~rties of every possibl"e. granunar. ,If
we"refuse to admit this, then the explanatory pow~r disappears
from the postulation of innate linguistic knowle~ge. That ex-
. .
planatory'powe:r:: depends, after all, on the ded\lcibility. of state-'
.rnents like (14). from primary' linguistic 'data plus univer~al
grammatica~ principles .
.On the rationalist th.eory of langu'age acquis.i tion', II a child
who is capable of language learni~g must have [among other things]
. ,
some initial'd'elimitation of a class of poSsible hypotheses about
la,nguage structure" (Chomsky 1965, 30). Othe"rwise put', he must
'have "a definition of "generative grammar llll , or a "specification
'of the class GIl G2 , •.. of possible generative gra~ars" (Ghomsky
1965, 31) ~ This characterization of a possible human ·grammar
(and indirectly, of a possible human_language) is·avaii~ble 'to a
chi'ld by virtue of his knowledge of linguistic uni"versals.
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Katz distinguishes forma,I, substantive, and organ'izat,ional,
universals.
Formal universals constrain the form of the'rules in
a g~ammar; substantive universals provide a theoretical ,
vocabulary from which the constructs used to formulate the
rules of particular grammars are ,drawn; .organizational
universals' ... spec{fy the interrelations among the rules
and among the systems of rules within ·a grammar. (Katz
1972, 30-31) .
How might these linguistic un'iversal·s b.e exp'ressed? I
sug~~st that in general th~ir form is that of (19)'. 'More
specifica~ly, formal universals might be expressed by such
.( 2.0) .Eve~y possi.ble grammar 'contains transformation
.rules as well as phrase-struqture rules~
(21) .The terms. in. 'any rule in any possible grammar ar.e
a subset of the following vocabulary: S,~,··v.P, •.• ,
.lcontinuant], ... , (Human) '.
(22) Every possible grammar contains a system of phono-
logi~al rules that operate o~ th~ output· of the
transformation rules in"t~~ syntactic co~ponent.
statements as (2,0); substantive and organiza.tional universals
are exemplified in sentences (21) and (22) respectively.
The theory of universal grammar contains, in addition to
principles haying the form of (19) (linguistic universals), an
evaluation procedure or ,plausibility metric. "With.this metric
the child can rank the set of initial hypotheses prior to any
linguistic experience, and. thus can obtain a best hypothesis or
set of best hypotheses given 'no evidence about 'the language
community he is in" (Katz 1966, 277). ,The linguistic univ·ersals
--~,..~----------- 'oS:
_____, .. _c , ~
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de:fine. a, set' of possible granunars, and the evaluation p'rocedure
(partially) ~rders thi~ set of grammars with re~pect to ~ priori
pl~usibility. This is the' contr ibution of univ~rsa'l grammar to
the process of language acquisition, the deduction of·a part~cular
(23) In order' of plausibili ty, the pass.ibie granunars
are -. G G Gl' 2' ... , .e'- •••
grammar. Universal grammar can thus - be seen as 'contributing to
the deduction of a particular grammar some such. premise as (23)_
At this point, ~rimary linguistic data enters the deduction.
The data which a child has encountered, up' to a given moment will
be logically compatible 'wi th some of .the grammars in the list of
(23), and logically inconsistent with ,other grammars in the list.
(24) The cat is on the mat· is.grammatical in English.
(25) The cats is on the mats is not. grammatical in English.
These data will consist of such proposi~ion~ as (6) (repeated
here for convenience as (24) and (25) _ Grammar Gl is logic,ally
inconsistent. with (24)1 if it fails to generate The cat is on the
mati it is inconsistent '9ith (25) if it generates, The cats is on
the mats. In 'eithe~ caee, Gl can be.eliminated from the list of
hypotheses. Thus "'the role of expe'rience' is . primarily to
eliminate false hypotheses about the rules of a language" (Katz
1966, 278n.).2 The child's grammatical hypothesis at any given.
'moment is "the maximally [plausible] hypothesis all of whose
pred-ictions art~ compatible with th~ facts .. 0_ available to him
!!g to that time" (Katz 1966, 278; emphasis Katz's).
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In short, the primary linguistic data will allow the child
to deduce such results as (26 ) and (27) • Eventuail.y, the child's
(26) Gl is not compatible with the data.
(27) G2 is not compatible with the data.
(28). Ge is the most plausible grammar campa tible, with
the data.
data refutes every grammatic~l hypothesi's" that precedes Ge in'
the plausibility rank.ing of (23). At that point, the child
reaches conclusion (28) via a deduction from his innate lin-
guistic knowledge plus his primary linguistic 'data. This justi-
fies the child in believing, arid acting ~n,. 'proP9sition .(29)
(29) Ge is_the (optimal) grammar of English.
(Which appeared earlier- as (14».
'Having sketched the overall structure of the deduction of
. (28), I wish now to return 'to premise. (23), wh"ich .. summarizes the
innate knowledge that enters into the language learning'process.
If (2~) is to follow from. (23), in conjunction with refutation
re~orts such as (26) and (27), then .(~3) must entail three
,things. Fi'rst; (23) must entail that the list of grammars it
contains is arranged in order of decreasing piausibility;' sec~ndi
"that the lis,t contains no psychological,ly impossible grammars;
and third,'that the list contaips all the psychologically pos-
sible grammars.'
-If the "third' requirern~nt is not met, then the~e is some
·possible ,grammar, ~ay Gil which does not ,appear in the list.
: .
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A given body of data may fail to refute Gil while refuting
~very listed grammar tha.t pr~cedes Gj , one of, the granuna'rs on
the list. -If we knew that Gj was more plausible than Gi' we
could conclude that Gj was the most plausible unrefuted
grarrunar. 3 But since Gi does not appear in the list, it migh-t
be-{for all we kno~) that Gi is more plausible than Gj' and thus
that G· is not the -most plausible unr,~futed possible. granunar .
. J
How can we guarantee that the list in premise ,(23) includes
all the possible grammars? So far as I can see, the only way
- (3'0) All possible grammars have properties P Ir P2 , ••• , P n .
(31) All grammars .. that have prqperties PI' P2' - ... , Pn are
'psychol.ogically possible grammars.
to guararitee this, in a theory that al~eady contains a principle
like ('30)' (th~ -conjunction of all the" linguistic universals), is
,to' include 'in our theory sC?me such principle 'as (31). ,But (31)
quantifies, over possible grammars. So, for that matter, do the
language "u~iversal-s; (30) says on the face of 'it that certain
properties are properties of ~.~l poss~ble grammars.
Of course', Graves, Katz, ~t ale do not deny that there are
properties which are 'innately known to belong to every possible
grammar. They rather deny the existence of any principles that
are innately known to occur in every possiple grammar. Thei.r
example is the A-over-A principle, a "condition for extracting
phrases in certain contexts II (Graves,. Katz, et al' .. in pres's) .
But i~ .the A-over-A principle is really 'a principle we know
.j
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(32) In any possible grammar, a transformation that
applies to· constituents of category A may never
be applied to an A that is embedded in some other
A.
:·innately, then it must be stated as a constraint on transforma-
tions in all pass.ible granunars, as in (32). Innate knowledge
of the A-over-A principle, the~would consist in knowing tnat
a certain principle governs all possible grammars. 4
I take Graves, Katz, et freres to be .rnaint~ining that the
pri~ciples of universal grammar, which we' know innately, do not
quantify. over possible grammars. The foregoing discussion has,
·r think, sufficiently refuted that view .. But in exploring the
nature of the ded~ction of a particular grammar from universal
grammar plus linguistic data, we have, I think, stumbled onto a
. problem fo~ the rationalist explanation of our knowledge about
individual. sentences.- The p·roblem is related to Ge·ttier I s
counterexamples to the traditional analysis of Knowledge.
(33) The cat is on the mat is grammatical in English. _
(34) Ge is t~e grammar of English.
English speakers know such propositions as (33). They come
- to know these propositions, according to the rationalist, by
inferring them from (34), another propositi?n they believe for
good reasons. Now it might be argued that this explanation of
our knowledge of (33) is at best incomplete, i~ the light of
Gettier~s counterexample. That counter~x~mple showed that
inference from justified premiSes does .not always produce
i ;
___ __---'-- ~~_-_f
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(35) The man who wi-II get the job has' ten co~ns in his
pocket.
~
t
(36) Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in ~-i·
his pocket.
knowl'edge, even when the conclusi"on happens to be true. Smith
was justifieq in belieyi~g ~36), but when he,rea~oned from (36)
to (35), the result was not knowledge, despite th~ tr~th of (35)
(Gettier 1963, 122). To explain someone's knowledge of (33),
'then, the rationalist must 'show that the inference from (34) to
(33) meets some additional condition, not ,satisfied by ~he
inference from (36) to (35), which guarantees that the resultant
belief in (33) will count as knowledge.
There does seem to'be one relevant difference between these
two inferences. The premi.se- in Gettier' s example,. proposi tion
(36), is false, and hence it is not· something Smith knows .
. Premise (34), however~ is 'true, and presumably the native speaker
(31) If A knows E,. and A infers q from p, then A ,knows ~.
knows (34). The rationa~ist can argue, then', that Smith's
·inference does not satisfy the antecedent of principle (37),.
-but that the native speakerls inferenc~ ~oes satisfy the ante-
cedellt of (37).
,Unfortunately, (37) is false.. We can easily modify Gettier's
(38) The j;>resident of the company',says that Jones will,
get the job, and.Jones had. ten coins in'his pocket
ten. minutes ago.
~---_/
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e~ample to refute (37)., ·Srnithls mistaken belief in (36) was
based on something he knew, namely (38). Suppo~:;e that instead
of. inferring (35) from (36), Smith had,i~ferred. (35) directly
from (38). In this case, Smith would have lnferred (35) from
...
some'thing he knew', namely (38), but Smi th would still not know
(35)~ This refutes (37).
The rationalist still has resources, however. The nat~ve
speakerJs inference from (34) to (33) is deduct~vely valid, ,unlike
:the inference from (38) to (35). This ~eans that the rationalist
(39) If·A knows E' and A ya~idly .deduces q from P, then
A knows s..
can appeal to principle (39),' in supp6rt of this expl~~ation of the
native speaker's knowle~ge of (33). Smith's inference does not
satisfy the antecedent of (~9), but the ~ative speaker's inference
, -
does. That is why the native speaker's infererice, unlike Smith's,
results in knowledge. Principle (39) does not seem vulnerable to
any Gettier-style coun~erexarnples, such as the one that refuted
. Here the rationalis·t' s problem appears to en'd, but this
appearance is deceiving. We have been a'ssuming tha't the native
speaker knows premise (34), but this assumption cannot be justi-
fied by appeal to principle (39), even if we grant innate know-
ledge ~of universal grammar. For premise (34) does not follow
. (40) Ge is the most plausible. gra~rnar c~mpatible'with
the available data.' '
--~--------~---~/
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de~uct~vely f~om the conjunction of primary linguistic data with
the 'theory of universal 'grammar. What does fpllow,deductively
is (40) (p~eviously designa·ted as (28». But (40). says only that
the ,grammar Ge is the most.~ikely candidate relative to the partic-
ular body of data which the language learner happens to have
encountered. The 'possibility remains that this body of data is
in' some way deficient, and that Ge i~ not the gr-arnmar ~f Engli~h
after all. If this is the case,' then (34) is false, and the
native speaker's inference from (34) to (33) does _not satisfy
the antecedent of (39). If (34) ,is false, then the native
spea~er's inference is precisely like Smith's inference from
(36) to (35), and the rationalist is faced wit'h Gettier's original
counterexample.
Thi-s'- is no mere logica"l, possibili ty. Sylvai.n Bromberger has "
suggested -to me that perha'ps no one acquires p~ecisely' the grammar
.of standard. Eng~ish. The phenomenon of-idiolect variation is
well at,tested, and it may be' that every speaker- o'f English has
an idiolect that d~,ffers in some respect from "standard English.
If G~ is the grammar of my idiolect, and my idiolect differs
slightly from standard English, then (41) is, strictly speaking,
, (41) G is the grammar of English.
m
false. But. (41) is the premise from which I' q.ed-qce my judgments
about the grammatical properties of English sentences.
One might ~sk what. sense tnere' can be ,in talking abou-t'
standard English, if no one speaks it. In answer to this
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obj'ection , we may a.dopt someth~ng like (42) as a co~ve!ltion
'(42) If sentence S is grammatical in a (substantial)
majority of English idiQlects, then S is 'grammatical
in standard English.
defining grammaticality in standard. Engli~h, and similar con-
ventions for synonymy and other properti~s,an.d relations ,among
sehtences. There is no logical impossib~l~ty in both (43) and
.. '
(43) Every sentence .in Es is grammatica~ in a majority
of idiolects EI. I E21 . ••• , En~
(44). Each of the 'idiolects Ell E21 ••• I En lacks at
'least one sentence of Es .
(44) being satisfied sim~ltaneously. For instance, let rt = 3,'
and let a, b, c, and' d be the ,~entenC?es.'?~ 'E s (standard Eng~ish) ,
where a ~'j, b ~ h, c ~ g, and d ~~. Then the. family of idiolects
. (45) Es
E 1 = -~ , b ,e , ~}
E2 = ~,b,g,d"}
= --G, b , c , d} ~ .
E 3 =O~ih,c,-eD-
E 4 = {} , b ,·e , d}-
in (45) satisfies both (43) and (44). Thus it'is ,possible for
standard Eriglish '(in the sense of (4~) 'to exist, even if no one
happens tq.speak, it. And it seems ~ompatible with all. we know
about idiolect variation to suppose. that this sort of .s.i tuation
really does obtain.
It is an empirical question whether idiolect variation is as
eJ:{tensive as (44) suggests. .But however that question is event-
ually answered,· it seems clear tha~ many of us, th~ugh native
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sp~akers of'English, sp~ak idiolects th~t diffe~ in .minor ways
from' ,standard English. (.N9ta1l .of us can' be "",right" I since'
we differ over the grammaticality,of certain constructions.) We
,know propositions like (33), and we deduce'them from whatever~
grammar we have acquired (cf. note 1). But s,ince our granunars
.ar~ not altogether correct, why should such deductions result i~
kno~ledge? The rationalist account seems to provide no explan~
ation of our knowledge about English sentences.
One might attempt to '~ircumvent this diffi6ulty be defining
.som~ sense. of approximate truth in which gra.J:1lIt1ars of. our idiolects
~ are '"almost''' true.' S,mith"s'pretnise (36) must not be anyWhere near'
the truth, under this qef'ini tion of approxirna~e truth."' A tempting
~uggestion. is to say that a grammar ·of English (say' G) is ,approx-
~im~tely c~rrect if the class of sente~ce~ concerning.~hidh G
yields true rionsequences is larger than ~the class of sentences
about which G yields fa~se consequence~. This suggestion ·Seems
doomed to fail, however, because both Sets are likely to be
infinite.
The g~ammar,of an idiolect may differ'from the standard
gra~ar in a yariety. of ways. It may have a deviant rule or
lexical entry, or it may have a particular rule in 'the right
form, but incorrectly ordered with respect to other rules. Since
the gra~ar treats many sentences correctly, evidently this rule
or lexical entry applies co~rectly (or does. not apply at all) to
these sentences. But since the length of ~ sentence is.in general
--~--------~._---~.
j
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grammatically irrelevant, the length of a gi~en sentence S is
not like1y to have any bearing on whether the grammar G treats
S correctly or incorrectly. There is in general no' uppe,r bound
pn the 1ength of sentences in which a lexical item may appea~,
nor on the length of .sentences to whi9h a given rule or set of
rules may apply. Thus botq the set of sentences which G handles
properl~, and the set bf" sentences it does not h~ndle properly,
are likely to be infinite sets.
So far from provid~ng a ready-made -defense of the rationalist
account of linguistic knowledge, Gettier'~ work poses a serious
problem for that accoun~~ Perhaps the only way to solve this'
problem ·would be to provide-a general analysis of knowledge that
escapes Gettier's refutation.
--.,'~. _..._,-~'----~_.
~,
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Footnotes
* The' idea for this paper grew out of a conversation I had
with Sylvain Bromberger. I also wish to thank' him and Ned Block
-for helping me to revise an earlier version of this paper.
1 Strictly s~eaking, of course, Gl is only an open sentende,
and hence it cann"ot- Iiterally be incompatible with (24 >, • In
saying that a grammar is inconsistent with a datum ~bout English,
.we mean to say that that datum refutes the claim that that
grammar is the optimal grammar of English.
2 Katz implies that the child's, lingu.ist~c da'ta do.es not
af·feet the operation of the _evaluati~n procedure'.' This is not
an. essential feature of all r~tionalist hypotheses about language
'learning, .however. For example, a given datum might (on another
- rationalist hypothesis) bring about the ,r~jection of Gl r even
though the dat~ is not logically in'cornp"atible with Gl.. That
datum migh~ bring about a rev~sion in the plausibility ranking of
possible 9rammars,. so that Gl trades places with Gi' a grammar
'that was highly implausible up until the time when the new datum
became available.
. Any hypothesis in which the evaluation procedure applies
·only to the ranking of linguistic hypotheses is a rationalist
hypothesis. There might even be rationalist hypotheses in which
~ the relative plausibility of two grammatical hypotheses cannot be
. ,
assessed at all, save on the basi~ of some linguistic data, 'though
Katz of course presents quite a different' sort of hypothesis.
--~----~~-------.. "
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3 This assumes that.Gi is the only unlisted possible grammar.
4 In an earlier passage, the authors mentioned two other
- examples.of "principles of. particular granuuars· which are also
-principles of linguistic tli.e6ry 'i. These are ."the base rule, fer
the recursive expansion of NP to contain sentence-structures" and
.'. the transformation rule tha t forms a relative clause" (Graves,
Katz, ·et ale in press). But if every possible grarruna~ does co'n-
tain a base rule that generates complex NP's, and a" relative-
clause transformation rule, the details of these rules may vary'
fro~ one language to another. "If 'such variation does occur, then
t~~ theory of universal granunar obviously. c,annot contaiQ' "the"
'rules whi'ch occur in each particular granUna.r. 'Universal grammar
c~.n at best describe the rules, in broad outline •.
Bu_t even if ~ll possible -grammars contained precisely. the
.same~relative~ciause transformation, the theory of uriive~sal
'gr~mmar still CQuid not contain that rule. ~nive~sal. grammar is
not a grammar of a possible human language, not a theory about
the structure of sentences in such a l&nguage. Rather, u~iversal
grammar is a theory about grammars o~'possible human Languages.
A statement of· the theory of universal grammar.might thus mention
th~· (putatively universal) relative-clause rule, or describe it,
-but a statement ,of 1inguistic theory would not use or contain
that rule. The relative-clause rule itself has nothing to s~y
about the -structure of grammars, but deals only wi th the structure
. of' sentences. To shed light on_ the structure of possib.le grammars,
we must say something about that rule, namely, that it occurs in
every possible grammar.
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